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LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA:
THE CASE OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH DISABILITY (CRPD) IN GHANA

ABSTRACT
Most African states are legally pluralistic. As a result, the universalism and cultural
relativism approaches to the implementation of international human rights norms in
African domestic settings are largely unsuccessful because they do not factor in legal
pluralism. A better approach appears to be the cultural pluralism approach. This
approach has fared well in Ghana’s implementation of the international convention
on the rights of the child. A thorough examination of this case study reveals that the
cultural pluralism approach requires an additional step to make it more effective in
domesticating international human rights norms. This dissertation identifies this
third step: the creation of an interface between state and non-state law for
international law and customary law to meet; examines its robustness, and tests it
against the implementation of disability rights in Ghana as a measure to improve
those set of rights in Ghana.
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INTRODUCTION
The main theme of this dissertation is implementation of international human rights
treaties in African states with legal pluralistic contexts. Generally, states domesticate
international law in a number of ways.1 Absent automaticity, the absorption of
international law by some states terminates at the state level and does not percolate
to the non-state level.2 This is particularly the case in African states with legal
pluralistic contexts as they attempt implementing international human rights norms.
My claim in this dissertation is that the legal pluralistic context of most African states
presents unconventional challenges to the domestication of international human
rights norms which are often ignored by human rights treaty bodies, state legislators
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in local communities. My
theory is that the various existing approaches to implementing international human
rights law in Africa will not succeed in domesticating international human rights
norms unless they factor in the unique situation of legal pluralism in African states.

1

LOUIS HENKIN et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 397 (2nd ed. Foundation Press, 2009.): Generally, Monist states
receive international law directly into their legal system after ratifying the treaty whilst Dualist states
undertake further domestic processes in order for the ratified treaty to be incorporated into their
municipal laws.
2 Oxford Reference, Reception of international law: “This term refers to the effect of rules of
international
law
within
municipal
legal
system.”
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195389777.001.0001/acref((la9780195389777-e-1896 (last visited on 23 March 2018) When a state ratifies a treaty at the
international level and undertakes the required processes for incorporating the international law into
the municipal laws, the international law becomes received into the municipal legal system.
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Africa is a continent with about 3000 distinct ethnic groups, 2000 languages and as
many customary laws and norms creating a degree of intrastate heterogeneity
different from the intrastate homogeneity in Western states.3 After Independence
most African states opted to continue the plural legal systems operated in those states
during the colonial era, resulting in legal pluralism in the form of state law versus
non-state law on the one hand and state law versus different types of non-state laws
on the other hand4 – and the two are disconnected.5 This dissertation concerns itself
with the second type. The latent automaticity in the process on reception of
international law in African states with legal pluralism, is a function of this disconnect
between the two legal systems operating simultaneously within the same state.

The problem with human rights implementation in Africa is that in most African
states, local people implementing non-state legal systems for various reasons –
including the need to preserve their cultural identities – do not concern themselves
with the international law because it has not been absorbed into their (non-state)
legal systems and therefore is not part of the laws by which they order their behavior.
These local people usually continue enforcing customary laws, some of which are
valid under their (non-state) ‘legal systems’ but invalid under the state’s laws and

3

Baylor University, Modern Languages & Culture, Division of Asian and African Languages,
http://www.baylor.edu/mlc/index.php?id=11594 (last visited on 23 March 2018): “The people and
cultures of Africa are as diverse as its geography. Anthropologists have identified almost 3,000
different ethnic groups, which speak approximately 1,000 different languages.”
4 Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty years later The Journal of Legal Pluralism,
Vol. 21, Iss 28, (1989); ANNE HELLUM, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFRICA: MIXED
NORMS AND IDENTITIES IN INFERTILITY MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE 30 (Tano Aschehoug, 1999.)
5 In this dissertation, “state legal system” refers to the “municipal legal system” and “non-state legal
system” refers to the normative orders operating within the state whose laws are not made by state
actors such as state legislators.
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violate the state’s obligations under international human rights law. For instance, a
state may become party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and make state laws mandating the
education of all girls in compliance with its obligations under that treaty. However,
non-state actors within that state, without breaking with pre-existing customary
laws, may continue to discourage the education of girls. In such legal pluralistic
contexts in Africa, my claim is that legal pluralism needs to be accounted for in the
approach to state implementation of international human rights law in order for that
approach to work.

Research has found that in African states with legal pluralism, the most effective
approach to implementing international human rights treaties is cultural pluralism
as opposed to universalism and cultural relativism.6 This was the conclusion of
research conducted on women’s rights in Zimbabwe by Anne Hellum.7 The cultural
pluralism approach has subsequently been applied by state actors in Ghana to the
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and shown to
improve the protection of children’s rights in Ghana. However Ghana added an
additional step to the cultural pluralism approach. This means that first, Ghana
followed the cultural pluralism approach by doing two things: the state tapped into
non-state level indigenous child protection knowledge and methods to enable it
achieve the overarching international human rights principle of child protection; and

Hellum, supra note 4: Anne Hellum conducted research on women’s human rights in Zimbabwe. Her
research will form the subject of our CEDAW case study in Zimbabwe later on in this dissertation.
7 Hellum, supra note 4
6
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developed a legal and policy framework for achieving that principle. After these steps,
the additionally step Ghana took was to create an interface between state and nonstate actors for continuous knowledge sharing and law (both customary and state
law) updating to ensure a sustained compliance with the international human rights
principle. This was the critical step that Ghana added to the cultural pluralism
approach which enabled her succeed in implementing its child protection policy.

I aim to assess the portability of the cultural pluralism approach to the
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
in Ghana. I would determine if this approach would help improve the protection of
disability rights in Ghana as it was found capable of doing in women’s rights in
Zimbabwe. If it would not improve disability rights in Ghana, I will determine whether
the additional step that was applied to cultural pluralism in the case of children’s
rights in Ghana would help improve disability rights in Ghana. If so I will research
whether this version of cultural pluralism has enough traction in other sectors of
international human rights such as women’s rights and if so, if what I know would
help improve the implementation of international human rights in African states with
legal pluralism can be theorized.

This dissertation will comprise seven chapters. The first thing a reader needs to know
is a detailed background of the approaches that have been used to attempt to
domesticate international human rights in African states with legal pluralistic
contexts, which approach has been found most effective, and what accounts for the
22

effectiveness of that approach. This requires a literature review of the nature of state
party obligations under international human rights treaties and the main approaches
that have been proffered to states to help them comply with these obligations – the
universalism approach, the cultural relativism approach and the cultural pluralism
approach. The nature of state party obligations under international human rights
treaties and the approaches to treaty implementation will therefore constitute
chapter one of this dissertation.

Having identified and discussed the nature of state party obligations and the
prevailing approaches to complying with them in African states with legal pluralism,
the next thing that the reader needs to know is the character of legal pluralism and
why it is capable of determining which approach may or may not succeed in
improving international human rights implementation in Africa. To this end, chapter
two will examine the following issues: What is legal pluralism? How does it operate
in Africa? What factors promote and retrogress legal pluralism in Africa? And how
important is legal pluralism to understanding whether the domestication of
international human rights norms will succeed in Africa? We will first find out what
legal pluralism is generally, then we will narrow in on Africa and find out how has
Africa’s legal history engendered legal pluralism and what makes Africa’s legal
pluralism distinct from the legal pluralism seen elsewhere such as the United States
of America (US). Next, we will find out the factors that promote and retrogress legal
pluralism in Africa and how together they cause the situation as described to persist.
Then we will determine the positives and negatives of legal pluralism in Africa. Finally
23

we will specifically examine domestic legal pluralism in an African state (Ghana) and
then determine the lessons that can be drawn from the implementation of domestic
legal pluralism for the implementation of international human rights in African states
with legal pluralism. This detailed discussion of African legal pluralism is necessary
because legal pluralism determines which approach to international human rights
treaty implementation would work best within Africa.

After reviewing the various approaches to international human rights treaty
implementation available for African states to use in implementing international
human rights treaties within their legal pluralistic contexts in chapter two the next
thing the reader would need to know is why African states still poorly implement
international human rights laws. To show this, chapter three of the dissertation
would first present the reader with an account of how international human rights law
is incorporated into domestic law in Africa. Next, the reader will need to know why
African states, after incorporating international law into their domestic law, still
poorly implement them. Finally, the chapter will seek to identify those responsible
for causing this situation in Africa and those who can help to solve the problem by
examining the following questions: Who is responsible for what causal contribution
to the situation? Who is responsible for making which contributions to alleviating or
better eradicating the problem? This analysis will constitute chapter three of the
dissertation.
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In Chapter four, I will use two case studies to illustrate my thesis. The first case study
will be on the implementation of CEDAW in Zimbabwe. We will see how the
implementation of this human rights treaty was hindered by the situation of legal
pluralism in Zimbabwe. Next we will examine how the application of the various
approaches to state implementation of international human rights—universalism,
cultural relativism and cultural pluralism—would help improve Zimbabwe’s
domestication of the CEDAW. The case study will show that the universalism and
cultural relativism approaches do not help improve the implementation of
international human rights in Zimbabwe’s legal pluralistic context but rather what
has been found capable of working is the cultural pluralism approach to
implementing international human rights law.8 The question that arises is whether
the cultural pluralism approach then has enough traction in other sectors of
international human rights or if it works for only women’s rights. To answer this
question, I will present a second case study. This second case study would be on the
implementation of the CRC in Ghana, which, like Zimbabwe, is an African state with a
legal pluralistic context. The purpose of this case study is to determine whether the
cultural pluralism approach would help improve children’s rights protection in
Ghana. To do this, we will examine how the CRC has been actually implemented in
Ghana, how it succeeded or failed and what accounts for its present success. Based on
these two case studies, I will formulate a feasible theoretical proposal for the
successful implementation of international human rights in African states with legal

Hellum, supra note 4: The case study built on research work by Anne Hellum, a women’s rights’
expert.
8

25

pluralistic contexts. My diverse reflections would contribute toward my selecting,
formulating, appreciating and implementing the theory of the dissertation. This will
constitute chapter four of the dissertation.

Chapter five will be the application of my theory to the implementation of the CRPD
in Ghana. In this Chapter, I will first present Ghana’s obligations under the CRPD and
the legislative and other measures undertaken by the state to meet these obligations.
Next I will describe the actual - lived conditions of Persons with Disabilities (PWDs)
in Ghana; the relevant contextual facts and trends: the situation and attitudes or
"ideologies" of the general population, relevant politicians and civil servants towards
disability. I will further examine the available funds and facilities for disability rights
protections in Ghana, and the work of chiefs, individuals and NGOs in disability rights
protection in Ghana. Next, I will explain why the rights of PWDs are not well protected
in Ghana: what are the existing laws (customary laws, judicial pronouncements,
statutes, and constitutional provisions), practices, culture, attitudes, influence of
multiple domestic systems of law on disability protections and foreign influences,
among others, and how they together cause the situation of PWDs as described to
persist. I will then assess the current situation of PWDs in terms of national and
international (including human rights) law as well as from the standpoints of social
justice and morality. Some crucial questions to be asked here are that of
responsibility: who is responsible for what causal contributions to the problems of
PWDs in Ghana? Who is responsible for making (which) contributions to alleviating
or better eradicating these problems? And who is responsible for making the various
26

systems of law co-existing in Ghana’s legal system work together to improve the
rights of PWDs in Ghana?

After presenting the disability rights situation in Ghana, I will apply my theory for the
successful implementation of international human rights in African states with legal
pluralism, which I developed in Chapter four, to the implementation of the CRPD in
Ghana. I will determine whether my theory would succeed in improving the
implementation of the CRPD in Ghana’s legal pluralistic context. If it would, I will find
out whether this theory then has enough traction in other sectors of international
human rights protection such as women’s rights. If it does, what accounts for it? To
answer these questions I will apply my theory to the implementation of CEDAW in
Zimbabwe to find out whether it would help improve the implementation of the
CEDAW in Zimbabwe as it has been found capable of doing for the CRPD and CRC in
Ghana. I would like to find out how the CRC success story in Ghana vindicates the
CEDAW story in Zimbabwe. This will constitute Chapter five of the dissertation.

Chapter six will be the concluding chapter of this dissertation. In this Chapter, I will
summarize the thesis, the method used in undertaking the research, the outcome of
the research and the contribution this dissertation makes to legal knowledge.

I will employ traditional legal research and case studies on the implementation of
international human rights treaties in African states with legal pluralism to establish
my thesis. The traditional legal research will examine the following research
27

question: First, what are the prevailing approaches to implementation of
international human rights in Africa? Second, what is legal pluralism, and why is it
important to factor it into any approach to implementing international human rights
law in Africa? Third, how has this factoring-in been done and what were the
outcomes? And fourth, can the outcomes of the third research question be applied to
the CRPD in Ghana? Furthermore can it help improve the implementation of the CRPD
in Ghana? If not what else should be added? The thesis would involve two case
studies. The first case study examines the implementation of the CEDAW in
Zimbabwe, while the second case study examines the implementation of the CRC in
Ghana. Then I would apply my theory, developed from the two case studies to the
implementation of the CRPD in Ghana.

The possible outcome of my research is a retrofitted version of the cultural pluralism
approach to help improve the implementation of international human rights norms
in African states with legal pluralism.
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1 CHAPTER ONE:
APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES
1.1 INTRODUCTION

Various approaches have been proposed to help improve the implementation of
international human rights norms in Africa. However, these approaches have
generally not achieved the expected outcomes. In this chapter we will examine the
nature of states’ obligations under the human rights treaties they ratify, the three
prevailing approaches for state implementation of their treaty obligations and
identify what makes these approaches unsuccessful in improving international
human rights’ implementation in African states with legal pluralism.

1.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
AND STATES OBLIGATIONS
29

There are nine international human rights treaties; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1965); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966); Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT,
1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989); International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(ICMW, 1990); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (CPED, 2006); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006.)9

Of these, the CEDAW and the CRC are the

international Conventions with the highest number of ratifications.10 For the
purposes of this research, these two human rights treaties will be analyzed along with
the CRPD.

The CEDAW, CRC and CRPD require states parties to change negative domestic
customs and laws that constitute barriers to the enjoyment of the rights particular to
those human rights treaties. States Parties comply with these treaties when they take

Specific information on each of the nine international human rights treaties is available at website of
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
http://www..org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited on 23 March
2018.)
10 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner website (OHCHR), Status of
ratification interactive dashboard http://indicators.ohchr.org (last updated on 13 March 2018 and last
visited on 23 March 2018.) The CRC has 196 ratifications, CEDAW has 189 ratifications and the CRPD
has 176 ratifications. The remaining international human rights treaties are ICERD, which has 179
ratifications. ICCPR, which has 170 ratifications, ICESCR, which has 167 ratifications, CAT, which has
163 ratifications, ICMW, which has 51 ratifications and the CPED, which has 58 ratifications.
9
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actions targeted at removing those barriers and their actions succeed in removing
them. According to UN Women, CEDAW “targets culture and tradition as influential
forces shaping gender roles and family relations.”11 Article 2 of CEDAW obligates
States Parties to take legislative and all other appropriate measures “to modify or
abolish existing … customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women”12 (emphasis is mine.) Article 5(a) specifically requires States Parties “to take
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.13
The CRC obligates States Parties to “take all effective and appropriate measures with
a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.”14
(emphasis is mine.) UNICEF extends these traditional practices to include child
marriages.15 States Parties to the CPRD are required “to take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing … customs and

11

UN Women, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (last visited on 23 March 2018)
12 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 2(f),
Text
of
the
CEDAW
is
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited on 23
March 2018).
13 CEDAW, supra note 12, Article 5(a)
14 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 24(3), Text of the CRC is available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited on 23
March 2018.)
15 Early Marriage: A Harmful Traditional Practice (A statistical exploration), (UNICEF, 2005) Available
at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Early_Marriage_12.lo.pdf (last visited on 23 March
2018.)
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practices that constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities”16
(emphasis is mine.) Article 8 specifically requires States Parties to adopt
“appropriate measures … to combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful
practices relating to persons with disabilities…”17 (emphasis is mine.)

The above analysis of the CEDAW, CRC and CRPD, show that State Party actions
required to demonstrate compliance with international human rights treaties include
taking measures that result in the changing of domestic non-state level customary
laws in violation of the rights protected under international human rights law. How
does a State Party change its domestic customary laws and bring them in compliance
with international human rights treaties? Let us now consider the prevailing
approaches for implementing international human rights treaties.

1.3 INTRODUCTION TO UNIVERSALISM,
CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND CULTURAL
PLURALISM
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) established the idea of the
universality of Human Rights.18 This idea was reaffirmed forty-five years later at the

16

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Article 4(1)(b.) Text of the CRPD is
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
(last
visited on 23 March 2018).
17 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 8(1)(b)
18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Adopted by UN General Assembly 217A (III) of 10
December 1948 in Paris during the 183rd plenary meeting. Available at OHCHR website
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx (Last visited on 21 January 2018)
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second United Nations World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, Austria,
through the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.19 Despite the affirmation,
many states, particularly the Asian ones argue that the principles captured in the
UDHR are representative of Western culture and therefore not universal.20 The effect
has been a long-standing debate on “whether human rights are universal or culturally
relative.”21 Professor Louis Henkin, a Western scholar, claims that human rights are
universal22 whilst Professor Makau wa Mutua, a Kenyan-American scholar, insists
that human rights are culturally relative.23 Other scholars (and organizations) have
approached the debate with a more nuanced look. For instance, Jack Donnelly prefers
to identify a continuum ranging from extreme universalism to weak cultural
relativism. Donnelly places human rights as basically universal but to be implemented
with a degree of weak cultural relativism because for him, there are several degrees
of cultural relativism; at one end of the continuum is radical cultural relativism and
at the other end is radical universalism.24 He suggests that the UDHR and the present
International Human Rights Conventions would admit of weak cultural relativism
because this means that they accept that certain rights are universal but then, at some

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights
in
Vienna
on
25
June
1993.
Available
at
OHCHR
website
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx (Last visited on 21 January
2018)
20 Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human
Rights in Different socio-cultural contexts, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 740, 741 (1994.)
21 Bonney Ibhawoh, Restraining Universalism: Africanist Perspectives on Cultural Relativism in the
Human Rights Discourse in HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, (Paul Tiyambe
Zeleza and Philip J. McConnaughay eds. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 22
22 Henkin et al., supra note 1, Chapter 2: “Human rights are universal: they belong to every human being
in every human society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or
economic system, or stage of societal development.”
23 Makau wa Matua, The Ideology of Human Rights, Virginia Journal of International Law 36 (1996.)
24 Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 6 No.
4, 400-419 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Nov., 1984.)
19
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point, culture can be allowed to make modifications to these “fundamental /
universal” rights; or the form in which the rights are implemented. Although the
universalism – cultural relativism debate has been long established, in recent decades
scholars have introduced a third theme to the debate called cultural pluralism.25

The reason for the debate is the approach that must be given to the implementation
of international human rights law by State Parties. If human rights are universal, then
all States Parties must be held to the same standard of implementation of those rights
irrespective of their “social, cultural or political differences.”26 However if what
constitutes human rights varies with culture then hold each State Party to a standard
of implementation that reflects its culture because values vary with culture. Kory
Sorrell explains this cultural variation thus:
“Different cultures rely on, and reproduce, narratives and practices that privilege
some values over others, explain those regnant hierarchies, offer rules for resolving
different sorts of conflicts among members of the community in significantly
different ways. What counts as acceptable behavior, what marks the differences
between, for example pain and pleasure, cruelty and disciple, rewarding initiation
in a culture and subjection by a culture, acts worthy of praise and those demanding
censure are all difficult to remove from the way of life that sustains and reproduces
it.”27

Antonia Pantoja et al., Towards the Development of Theory: Cultural Pluralism Redefined, The Journal
of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 4 Issue 1, Article 11, 130-131 (1976).
26 Cerna, supra note 20, at 741
27 Kory Sorrell, Cultural Pluralism and International Rights, 10 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l 369, 371 (2002)
25
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In the following sections we will explain each approach, the major critique against it
and how its proponents expect State Parties to apply it in implementing their
international human rights obligations.

1.3.1 What Is Universalism

Human rights, by definition, implicate the universalism theory. Cranston’s oft-cited
definition of human rights exemplifies this perfectly: “A human right by definition is
a universal moral right, something which all men, everywhere, at all times ought to
have, something of which no one may be deprived without a grave affront to justice,
something which is owing to every human being simply because he is human.” 28
Levesque explains that Universalists identify a core set of “truths” which they project
as universal, inalienable and applicable to everyone, in every society.29 Some argue
that the core set of truths is the rights set out in the UDHR and that they have attained
the level of customary international law or jus cogens. 30

MAURICE WILLIAM CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (Bodley Head, 1973.)
Roger J.R. Levesque, Are (Should) Human Rights (Be) Universal, 22 Update on L-Related Educ. 28
(1998)
30 The Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights (22-27 March 1968), Montreal Statement,
reprinted in J. Int’l Commission Jurists 94 (June 1968), statement issued by nongovernmental meeting
of experts on human rights issues. Globalization 101, A project of Suny Levin Institute, Human Rights,
79: “Customary international law refers to rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of states
acting out of the belief that law required them to act that way, ie persistent and customary practice of
states can lead to the consideration of their behavior as creating a legal precedent for future action.”
Available at http://www.globalization101.org/introduction-the-idea-of-human-rights/ (last visited
on 23 March 2018.)
28
29
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But this core set of truths or violations has been variously criticized as representative
of a particular culture (Western culture), and that other cultures may not consider
them as truths or even violations. For instance, Alison Renteln opines that the
presumption in favor of the universality of human rights is flawed when examined
across cultures.31

Universalists claim that the core universal truths should “serve as a common standard
of achievement for all peoples of all nations”32 and should be implemented through a
positivist approach.33 They project the individual as autonomous34 and as Louis
Henkin et al suggest, the individual should be able to claim the enforcement of his or
her rights from his or her society: “Every human being has, or is entitled to have,
“rights” – legitimate, valid, justified claims - upon his or her society; claims to various
“goods” and benefits.”35

1.3.2 What is Cultural Relativism

For cultural relativists, a multicultural approach should be used for understanding
what constitutes a human right, what constitutes a right violation and how State

ALISON RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM, (QUID PRO, 2013)
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt statement at the adoption of the UDHR, General Assembly Adopts
Declaration of Human Rights (Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, US Representative to the U.N.
GAOR, 9 December 1948), DEP’T ST. BULL., 19 DEC. 1948, at 751.
33 Levesque, supra note 29
34 Ibid
35 Henkin et al., supra note 1, Chapter 2: Henkin defines human rights as claims individuals have against
their societies.
31
32

36

Parties should implement human rights within their states. One of the main
proponents of the cultural relativism theory is Makau wa Mutua. In his celebrated
article The Ideology of Human Rights,36 Mutua criticizes the current approach to
human rights as a political ideology in favor of Western liberal democracy. The so –
called core set of “truths” is actually Eurocentric and varies in non-Western societies.
Levesque adds that individuals live in the context of a society, and can only be
understood within that context. Therefore the (cultural) context should not be
isolated from the individual but rather respected in order to give full respect to one’s
individuality.37

Donnelly however argues that culture is deployed as an excuse to prevent human
rights protections and project parochial interests. He considers that people hide
behind “culture” to prevent the implementation of human rights because the Precolonial African culture or the native American culture or the strict Islamic religious
systems have all in reality been westernized in some way over time. Therefore using
them as reason for not employing human rights standards, which are westernized
and an invasion of those cultures, is just an excuse. In a sum, allowing cultural
derogations from international human rights standards the cultural basis must be
“strong and authentic” and there must be “alternative mechanisms guaranteeing
basic human dignity.”

36
37

Mutua, supra note 23: Mutua suggests a multicultural approach to reform the Human Rights regime.
Levesque, supra note 29.
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These criticisms notwithstanding, cultural relativists maintain that universal values
vary among societies and a positivist approach to implementation of State Party
obligations under a treaty would not work. Ending one group’s customs may mean
ending the groups existing culture. Implementation of the skewed international
human rights norms as we have them presently would erase cultural diversity.
Consequently, international bodies should rather respect traditions and cultural
practices.

1.3.3 What is Cultural Pluralism

Cultural pluralism refers to the situation where multiple cultural groups are located
in the same society, they set certain universal values for themselves and allow for the
different application of the societal resources by the different groups for the
attainment of the universal value. Pantoja et al sum up the definition of cultural
pluralism more succinctly:
“Cultural Pluralism is the condition in a society in which individuals, on the basis
of ascribed or attached characteristics, are able to form and develop
communities along the differences of race, age, sex, religion, language and
cultural life styles. These communities are open systems and members can select
to belong to one or more communities at the same time. This condition can only
exist in a society where there are two or more culturally diverse function
communities, and where these communities adhere to a universal value
38

that promotes the use of the resources of the society to fulfill the needs of
all of its members. This condition is considered realized in a society where
culturally different communities exist, are recognized and permitted to
participate and to control those functions and resources which they consider
vital to their community’s functioning. Cultural pluralism can not exist in a
society where culturally different communities exist in isolation from each
other or/and in competition under unequal conditions for the life
sustaining/enhancing resources that the society produces.”38 (emphasis is
mine)
In their article Pantoja, Perry and Blourock present Cultural pluralism as the best way
society should operate rather that the present way in which certain cultures are the
preferred and other cultures required to aim to be like those through integration,
assimilation or acculturation. Using the United states as an example, the scholars
show that beyond culture, there are other characteristics such as race (black race),
gender (female), age (seniors), sexual orientation (homosexuals) that are considered
not preferred because they deviate from the preferred ideal for the society which is
the young adult white male. Rather than preferring one state of life or one culture to
the other, the society should make room for all cultures to thrive. There should
however be certain “regulative values” for everyone to adhere to, irrespective of
culture, for the general society to thrive. According to Yvonne Donders, cultural
pluralism allows individuals and communities to maintain their specific cultural

38

Pantoja et al., supra note 25.
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identity, provided that those identities are consistent with the laws, policies and
values of the wider society.39

In terms of the implementation of international human rights, cultural pluralists
suggest that states adhere to universal values but adopt culturally appropriate
methods in achieving those universal values.

1.4 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM,
CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND CULTURAL
PLURALISM
Universalists believe that certain human rights values have universal validity and
universal methods and standards should be applied to protect those values.40
Cultural relativists are convinced that rights vary with culture and violations vary
with culture. Therefore methods and standards of human rights protection should
vary with culture”41 Cultural pluralists acknowledge that certain rights have
universal value but permit different cultures to achieve those universal values
differently using the same resources available to all in the society. Universalists push
for “a more absolute hierarchy of values” whilst “culture relativists deny the existence
of overarching values” and cultural pluralists support “a reasonable ranking of …

Yvonne Donders, Cultural Pluralism in International Human Rights Law: The role of Reservations,
Interfaces Research Paper 02 (2013), ACIL 2013 – 02.
40 RAINER ARNOLD (ed.), THE UNIVERSALISM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013)
41 Fernando R. Teson, ‘International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism’ 25 Va. J. Int’l L. 869 (1985)
39

40

values” based on an analysis of “the conflicting values found in the social and cultural
context in which the individuals concerned live and act.”42

Applying this in the area of disability rights for instance, whereas the universalists
would suggest the creation of disability rights through legislative intervention; the
cultural relativists would suggest that such legislative intervention to change cultural
understanding of disability is a form of cultural imperialism; and the cultural
pluralists would prefer to allow customary law on disability to evolve in interplay
with legislative change in a situation-sensitive manner.

The significant lacuna in the universalism approach is that it anticipates the
implementation of the international human rights law in a state with intrastate
homogeneity. Universalists expect the state to be functioning through homogenous
state laws which is very unlike the situation in most African states. The cultural
relativism approach anticipates the operation of customs and practices within the
state but does not elevate them to the level of laws with the same validity as state
laws. So although cultural relativists are acutely aware of the myriad of customary
laws within African societies, they do not account for the situation where customary
laws have the force of law within the state because they flow from a valid stream of
law (non-state laws) other than the state’s legal system, and therefore legitimately
co-exist with the state laws (legal pluralistic contexts). Only the cultural pluralism
approach accounts for situations of legal pluralism within a state. However, the caveat

42

Hellum, supra note 4.
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in cultural pluralism is that the different legal systems are at equal level and that one
is not preferred over the other.

Cultural pluralism anticipates multiple non-state laws having the same force of law
within the state and operating simultaneously with state laws. Research has found
that in African states with legal pluralism, the most effective approach to
domesticating international human rights treaties is cultural pluralism as opposed to
universalism and cultural relativism.43 The cultural pluralism approach has been
shown to improve children’s rights in Ghana and hold the capacity to improve
women’s rights in Zimbabwe.44 In this dissertation, I aim to assess its portability to
the implementation of the CRPD in Ghana. If it would not improve disability rights in
Ghana, I will find out whether cultural pluralism has enough traction in other sectors
of international human rights such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
and if so, why those sectors are different from disability; what can and should be done
differently in the cultural pluralism approach to the implementation of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) from that of the CEDAW
and the CRC in legal pluralistic contexts to improve disability rights?

1.5 CONCLUSION

43
44

Ibid
Ibid
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This chapter has presented the various obligations that States Parties to international
human rights treaties assume, and the suggested approaches to achieving compliance
with those obligations. However, the chapter has identified that in the case of African
states with legal pluralism the universalism and cultural relativism approaches have
limited capacity to improve implementation of human rights law, and that it is the
cultural pluralism approach that holds more promise. In the next chapter, this
dissertation undertakes an in-depth examination of the situation of legal pluralism in
African states.
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2 CHAPTER TWO:
LEGAL PLURALISM AND ITS
OPERATION IN AFRICA
2.1 INTRODUCTION

Legal Pluralism is not a recent phenomenon. It has been in existence for centuries. In
Africa, legal pluralism is considered to be the product of the interaction of different
indigenous customary laws in Africa: within and across nations; the Islamic invasions
and the interaction of Islamic law with African laws; and colonialism and the
interaction of customary law with the laws of the colonial masters among others.45 In
this chapter we will discuss what legal pluralism is, its history, how it operates in fact
in Africa and lessons that can be learnt from this operation to improve the
domestication of international human rights norms in African states with legal
pluralistic contexts.

Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, Law and Society Review, Vol. 22 No. 5 869-896, 870(1988) “The
Europeans were not the first outside influence bringing a new legal system to many Third World
Peoples. Indigenous law had been shaped by conquests and migrations for centuries.”
45

44

2.2 WHAT IS LEGAL PLURLAISM

2.2.1 History of Legal Pluralism

The beginnings of legal pluralism can be traced to the medieval era.46 As the medieval
period came to an end, there was a shift towards state-building, and with that, the
consolidation and implementation of laws through the state.47 The form of legal

46 Brian

Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, Sydney Law Review
Vol. 30, 375, 377 (2007): “The mid-to-late medieval period was characterized by a remarkable jumble
of different sorts of law and institutions, occupying the same space, sometimes conflicting, sometimes
complementary, and typically lacking any overarching hierarchy or organization. These forms of law
included local customs (often in several versions, usually unwritten); general Germanic customary law
(in code form); feudal law (mostly unwritten); the law merchant or lex mercatoria – commercial law
and customs followed by merchants; canon law of the Roman Catholic Church; and the revived Roman
law developed in the universities. Various types of courts or judicial forums coexisted: manorial courts;
municipal courts; merchant court; guild courts; church courts and royal courts. Serving as judges in
these courts were, respectively, barons or lords of the manor, burghers (leading city residents),
merchants, guild members, bishops (and in certain cases the pope), and kings or their appointees.
Jurisdictional rules for each court, and the laws to be applied, related to the person involved – their
status, descent, citizenship, occupation or religion – as well as to the subject matter at issue. … Not only
did separate legal systems and bodies of legal norms coexist, a single system or judge could apply
distinct bodies of law. … The mid through late Middle Ages thus exhibited legal pluralism along at least
three major axes: coexisting, overlapping bodies of law with different geographical reaches; coexisting
institutionalized systems; and conflicting legal norms within a system. In terms of the first axis – bodies
of law – the ius commune, the lex mercatoria, and the ecclesiastical law spanned separate kingdoms
across a large swath of Europe; this transnational law (loosely described as such, for nations were not
yet fully formed) coexisted with codified Germanic customary law on a national level, and with feudal
law, municipal law and unwritten local customary law on the local level. In terms of the second axis –
coexisting institutionalised systems – in the words of medieval scholar Raoul van Caenegem, ‘there
were also vertical dividing lines between legal systems: those which separated townsmen from
countrymen, churchmen and students from laymen, members of guilds and crafts from those not so
affiliated. The great (and smaller) ordines of society lived according to distinct sets of rules,
administered by distinct networks of law courts, for it was understood that everyone should be tried
by his peers.’ In addition, royal courts could hear cases in the first instance or on appeal from other
courts. In terms of the third axis – conflicting legal norms, within a single system and social arena there
could be different bodies of legal norms, especially of customary law.
47 Tamanaha supra note 46, at 379: “Two famous treaties serve as early markers of the state building
process. The Treaty of Augsburg in 1555 established the principle that sovereigns could decide the
religion of citizens within their territory. Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 divided Europe into separate,
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pluralism during this period was the incorporation of a state apparatus-engineered
customary law into the municipal legal system. The state version of customary law
however, frequently varied from actual custom.48 From the late 18th century through
the late 19th century, Europeans began exerting greater legal authority over the
indigenous populations they had previously been trading with. Colonization often
started with ‘indirect rule,’ which developed into

‘direct rule.’49 European

colonization of non-western societies generally ended in the 1970s, having
introduced a new wave of legal pluralism in which colonial officials incorporated local
customary laws into their transplanted legal systems.50 This form of legal pluralism
persists in many post-colonial states.51 The late 20th century ushered in global legal
pluralism which makes international law part of the state legal system.52

secular territories under the authority of sovereigns. The treaty recognized that heads of state control
internal affairs and have the right to defend territorial boundaries.”
48 Tamanaha, supra note 46, at 379 - 378
49 Tamanaha, supra note 46, at 382: The Europeans “relied upon pre-existing sources of political
authority – using indigenous leaders – or involved the creation of so-called ‘native courts’ that enforced
customary or religious laws. The result was, as in medieval Europe, a hodgepodge of coexisting legal
institutions and norms operating side by sider, with various points of overlap, conflict and mutual
influence.”
50 Merry, supra note 45.
51 Ibid. For instance this happens in Ghana and many other former British colonies in Africa.
52 BRIAN Z TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (Oxford University Press, 2001)
Chapter 5: “Global legal pluralism is organized around 5 themes: First theme is ‘international legal
pluralism’: the international legal system is internally pluralistic with … separate tribunals and …
distinct bodies of legal norms tied to specific areas of regulation that are not coordinated with one
another and can overlap or conflict. … Not only is the international system fragmented, additional
complications arise because domestic or national courts incorporate international law in different
ways and to different extents. A second theme … highlights the invocation of human rights norms, often
by non-governmental organisations …, to challenge state laws or actions or customary laws or cultural
practices. Suits are being brought in supranational human rights courts, like the European Court of
Human Rights … by citizens seeking redress against their own state. In these situations the norms and
institutions of one legal system are being pitted against another. Third theme of the global legal
pluralist literature is the growth of ‘self-creating’, ‘private’, or ‘unofficial’ legal orders. A leading
theorist, Gunther Teubner, suggests that functionally different systems have developed with a global
or transnational reach – commercial transactions, the internet, and sports organisations, for example
– generating their own legal orders. What observers have dubbed the new lex mercatoria is the
example … . A fourth theme relates to the creation of ‘trans-governmental networks’ that have
regulatory powers and implications. … Active networks have also been created among judges, NGOs,
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2.2.2 Definition of Legal Pluralism

What legal pluralism is, has been the subject of great debate.53 Two sides of the debate
are helpful for present purposes of implementation of international human rights: the
positions of John Griffiths and Jacques Vanderlinden54 who are two of the foremost
authorities on legal pluralism.

Griffiths defines legal pluralism as “the presence in a social field of more than one
legal order”55 whilst Vanderlinden says ‘legal pluralism’ is ‘pluralism’ limited to the
legal regulatory orders with which the ‘sujet de droits’ can be confronted.’56 Griffiths
emphasizes the milieu within which the legal orders operate whereas Vanderlinden

and development organisations, among others. The multiplications of these networks beyond the
direct control of any national or international agency, … constitutes another form of legal pluralism. A
fifth theme relates to the global movement of people. Within nations, people are moving in droves from
the countryside to burgeoning cities in search of jobs and a better life. People are also moving in large
numbers from one nation to another for the same reasons, often settling in immigrant communities in
the new land. They bring their own cultural and religious norms, which may conflict with the official
legal rules of the new land.
53 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the “Social Scientific” concept of Legal Pluralism, Journal of Law and
Society, Vol. 20 No. 2 (1993); Anne Griffiths, Pursuing Legal Pluralism: The Power of Paradigms in a
Global World, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 43: 64, 173 – 202 (2013). Both
Tamanaha and Griffiths argue that what is legal pluralism has not been settled but continues to be the
subject of debate.
54 Jacques Vanderlinden wrote an earlier article titled “Le pluralism juridique: essai de synthese” pages
19 – 56 in John Gilissen (ed.), Le Pluralisme Juridique. Brussels: Universite de Bruxelles. The position
he expresses in this article is markedly opposed to the position he expresses in his later work Jacques
Vanderlinden, “Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty years later,” The Journal of Legal Pluralism, Vol. 21
Issue 28 (1989). In this dissertation we will be using the position of Jacques Vanderlinden as expressed
in “Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty years later.”
55 John Griffiths, What is legal pluralism? Journal of Legal Pluralism 24, 1 (1986): John Griffiths is
regarded as one of earliest scholars on legal pluralism. He used this 1986 article to describe the concept
of legal pluralism.
56 Vanderlinden, supra note 4.
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emphasizes the subject of the multiple legal orders. According to Vanderlinden
different social networks operate simultaneously through different regulatory orders
– legal and non-legal. The individual is a member of these different social networks at
the same time and therefore subject to the different regulatory orders of these social
networks at the same time. “If, among the regulatory orders involved there is more
than one ‘legal’ order, such a dialectical process is … ‘legal pluralism.’” Therefore
Vanderlinden considers legal pluralism from the stand point of the ‘sujet de droits’ –
Man or the individual “who can be subjected to many legal orders as a member of
many networks” and not from the standpoint of a given legal system as Griffiths does.
So the difference is Vanderlinden looks at who the subject of these multiple legal
orders is: ‘le sujet de droits,’ whereas Griffiths looks at where these multiple legal
orders are operating: ‘a social field’ and both scholars define legal pluralism based on
where they are looking. (emphasis is mine.)

I however identify two critical points of convergence of both scholars; first, is that
Vanderlinden, like Griffiths, agree that the fundamental element of legal pluralism is
the simultaneous operation of multiple legal orders and second is that both scholars
disavow legal centralism within states albeit for varying reasons. The issue of the
simultaneous operation of legal orders has been discussed above therefore I continue
the discussion with legal centralism on the table.

Vanderlinden’s position is that it is not the state that has legal pluralism but rather it
is the individual – le ‘sujet de droits’ – that finds himself in a situation of legal
48

pluralism because it is the individual who is faced with the different regulations (legal
and non-legal) emerging from the various social networks to which he belongs and
deciding at each point which laws he will allow to order his life. Vanderlinden
criticizes those who approach legal pluralism from the standpoint of the state
claiming that the state has legal pluralism. For him the problem with the state is that
it seeks to be in total control of all laws, and when it realizes that it does not have the
capacity to provide laws for all situations arising from the different social networks,
it pretends to accommodate these other legal orders by incorporating them into its
(the state’s) legal order and calling them “subordinate” or “inferior” legal orders,57
when in actual fact none of the legal orders is subordinate to the other. To appreciate
that no one legal order is subordinate to the other, Vanderlinden considers legal
pluralism from the standpoint of the individual when he has to choose at any moment
to order his behaviour according to any of the multiple regulatory orders he is faced
with. Griffiths also makes a similar critique of the state. He claims that the state
prefers to project the idea that there is legal centralism – meaning that within the
society, there is a hierarchy of laws that fit into one piece58 (state law), have one
source of legitimacy – the sovereign command (Bentham59, Austin60) or the ultimate
norm – grundnorm (Kelsen61) or the rule of recognition (H.L.A. Hart62); and one set
of state institutions that implement the laws: the “law is and should be the law of the

Vanderlinden, supra note 4, 153.
Griffiths, supra note 55, at 3.
59 Jeremy Betham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (18th Ed., London, W.
Pickering 1823)
60 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1781)
61 HANS KELSEN GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Trans. A. Wedberg, 1949)
62 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (Oxford University Press, 1961.)
57
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49

state, uniform for all persons exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single
set of state institutions.”63 But then Griffiths argues that this hegemonic claim of the
state falls flat in the face of reality because within the state “not all law is state law
nor administered by a single set of state legal institutions.”64 Often, other laws operate
alongside state laws within states, and non-state actors and non-state institutions
administer these non-state laws. “Legal reality is rather an unsystematic collage of
inconsistent and overlapping parts, lending itself to no easy legal interpretation.”65
Therefore in actual life, legal pluralism rather than legal centralism is what actually
happens.66 Beyond the reality of legal pluralism, legal pluralism is what occurs
regularly in states rather than legal centralism, and legal pluralism is what gives the
full picture of what occurs in societies rather than legal centralism. Griffiths sums it
up perfectly:
“Legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an
illusion. Nevertheless, the ideology of legal centralism has had such a powerful
hold on the imagination of lawyers and social scientists that its picture of the
legal world has been able successfully to masquerade as fact and has formed the
foundation stone of social and legal theory.”67

Griffiths’ and Vanderlinden’s position is buttressed by Tamanaha thus:

Griffiths, supra note 55, at 3.
Griffiths, supra note 55, at 5.
65 Griffiths, supra note 55, at 4
66 Of course there are many scholars who argue that the idea of legal pluralism is misplaced. An
example is Jacques Vanderlinden, Return to Legal pluralism: Twenty Years Later (supra note 4). At
page 152 he argues thus: “Hence to speak of a legally pluralistic system as being a system in which
many competing legal orders exist is redundant.”
67 Griffiths, supra note 55, at 4
63
64
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“Legal pluralism, it turns out, is a common historical condition. The long
dominant view that law is a unified and uniform system administered by the
state has erased our consciousness of the extended history of legal pluralism.” 68
So both Griffiths and Vanderlinden agree that there is no one single uniform law
within the state ordering every aspect of the life of individuals within it.

Both scholars reference colonialism as the starting point of modern legal pluralism.
Griffiths traces the modern origins of legal pluralism to 1772 when “a regulation for
the new judicial system established in the territories administered by the East India
Company provided” for different laws to apply to the cases of different groups of
people within the population: “the laws of the Koran … to the Mohamedans and those
of the Shaster … to the Gentoos… .”69 According to Vanderlinden, the colonial powers
“carefully tolerated ‘native’ or ‘religious laws’ controlling their acceptability through
the use of repugnancy clauses.”70 During the colonial era therefore, admissible
customary laws took their authority from the state but applied differently to different
groups of people within the state for different purposes. Many states of the world
today continue to recognize different rules for different people within their
population in pursuit of different purposes. So both Griffiths and Vanderlinden agree
that in a state there is no one uniform legal system. However the point of divergence
of both scholars is that whereas Vanderlinden disagrees with legal centralism

Tamanaha supra note 46, at 376.
Griffiths, supra note 55, at 1: Griffiths cites HOOKER, M.B. LEGAL PLURALISM – AN INTRODUCTION TO
COLONIAL AND NEO COLONIAL LAWS, (Oxford University Press, 1975) 61.
70 Vanderlinden, supra note 4, at 6.
68
69
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because those multiple legal orders give rise to multiple ‘mechanisms’ by which the
subject or individual can order his behavior and are not all under the state’s laws,
Griffiths accepts legal pluralism to mean that the state’s laws recognize “other legal
orders” other than the state laws and these other legal orders operate under the
authority of the state. An example of where multiple legal orders operate under the
authority of the state is where the Constitution of the state makes provision for
customary laws and state law to operate and order the lives of groups within the
population to facilitate governance.

This debate raises various questions: How do we operate the social contract we have
entered into if a person decides today to kill because he chooses to follow the laws of
a particular religious order he belongs that justifies such killing rather than follow the
law of another group he also belongs to that does not justify the killing? How does the
state regulate such behavior? Does the state have to know all the possible legal orders
of each individual within the state – for the sake of enforcing the social contract we
have entered into with it? Would it be better that the state receives some laws from
our social networks into the state’s laws and retrofits them, where possible, to be
consistent with the basic law/norm (Constitution or grundnorm) which all members
of the state acknowledge, and by allowing this accommodation, create a situation of
legal pluralism?
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2.3 LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFRICA

2.3.1 How Africa’s colonial history engenders Legal
Pluralism
During the Pre-colonial era, Africans governed themselves through indigenous
customary laws.71 Colonization in Africa saw the transplantation of European legal
system over customary law.72 The “imported” laws did not completely eliminate the
indigenous laws; instead, indigenous (customary) law operated “alongside” the
imported laws.73 The colonialists raised their imported laws to the level of official
state law, and used the repugnancy clause or test as a process to admit indigenous
(customary) laws into the official state legal system (European law) to achieve a
uniform hierarchy of laws for their colonies.74 Thus in British colonies such as the
Gold Coast (present day Ghana) and Lagos (in Nigeria), the customary laws of the
natives living in the Gold Coast and Lagos75 were subjected to admissibility tests in
order to be made part of the official state laws of the colonies, which were essentially

71 Christian

N. Okeke, The Use of International Law in the domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria, 32 Ariz.
J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 371, 381 (2015): “When the British entered Ghana, like in other colonial African
states, they met a system of customary laws practiced by different ethnic groups.” At 384 Okeke
further states: “In Nigeria, the common law sits uneasily against the customary law to which the people
had been accustomed even before the beginning of colonialism.”
72 Tamanaha, supra note 46.
73 Okeke, supra note 71, at 382: “As it was not practical for the British to completely eliminate
customary law, they had to recognize it and allow its application alongside the common law.”
74 Okeke, supra note 71.
75 Okeke, supra note 71, at 381 and 384: Here, Okeke makes the point that in both Ghana and Nigeria
the people were governed by their own customary laws before the British introduced the Common
law.
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the English common laws operating in England. Admissible customary laws were
those that were considered not to be “repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good
conscience.”76 Inadmissible customary laws were those that were considered
otherwise. The natives however continued to observe both their admissible and
inadmissible customary laws during the colonial era.

After independence, most post-colonial African states continued the system of
governance introduced by the colonial rulers: the transplanted system of governance
introduced by the colonial rulers became the official state legal systems and
indigenous customary laws generally operated as non-state laws.77 Thus for instance,
English common law and customary law continued to intersect in post-colonial
African states such as Ghana and Nigeria. Okeke says that “There is no other area in
which the clash of legal cultures is more manifest than the interaction of common

Okeke, supra note 71, at 381 - 382: In Ghana, “[T]he tasks faced by the British were to impose their
own Western system of laws on the people and “civilize” the Africans, as well as protect British
possessions … . The British Common Law became operational through the enactment of The Gold Coast
Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, 439 & Vict. 1, § 14 (Eng.) which provided that “the common law,
doctrines of equity, and statutes of general application which were in force in England at the date
when the Colony obtained a local legislature, that is to say, on the 24 th day of July, 1874, shall be
in force within the jurisdiction of the Court.” As it was not practical for the British to completely
eliminate customary law, they had to recognize it and allow its application alongside the common law…
The Supreme Court was [therefore] required to enforce customary law in situations where the parties
were Africans, provided the law was “not… repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience
…” Gold Coast Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. 1, § 19 (Eng.): Nothing in this Ordinance
shall deprive the Courts of the right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person
of the benefit of any native law or custom existing in the Gold Coast, such law or custom not being
repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by
necessary implication with any ordinance for the time being in force. Such laws and customs shall be
deemed applicable in causes and matters where the parties thereto are natives, and particularly, but
without derogating from their application in other cases, in causes and matters relating to the tenure
and transfer of real and personal property, and to inheritance and testamentary dispositions, and also
in causes and matters between natives and non-natives where it may appear to the Court that
substantial injustice would be done to ether party by a strict adherence to the rules of English law.[
](Emphasis is mine.)
77 Tamanaha, supra note 46.
76
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law and customary law in the post-colonial African states.”78 (emphasis is mine)
Consequently, “[i]n Nigeria, the common law sits uneasily against the customary law
to which the people had been accustomed even before the beginning of colonialism”79
and in Ghana, Ghana at 50 years after independence is “Colonized and Happy” because
the country is still governed by colonial laws and rules of common law which remain
in its statute books and are valid law in Ghana.80 This means that in most post-colonial
African states, two main types of laws operate: the official state law which is the
transplanted legal system of the former colonial power, and the non-official laws
which are the indigenous customary laws of the people.

Today, many people within modern African states still pattern their lives in
accordance with other systems of law apart from the official state legal systems for
various reasons. One of the main reasons is that the colonial legal systems were
unable to reach those people in their rural societies during the colonial period in the
first place: “While some people were completely transformed, [under colonial rule]
others hardly knew the European rulers were here before they began to leave.”81 Such
communities continued to live according to their own indigenous legal systems
during the colonial era, and since the post-colonial state’s legal systems largely

Okeke, supra note 71, at 384
Ibid
80 Raymond Atuguba, Ghana @ 50 Colonised and Happy, in GHANA LAW SINCE INDEPENDENCE, HISTORY,
DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS CONSTITUTION, (Henrietta J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu et al., ed., Black Mask for
Faculty of Law University of Ghana, Legon, 2007); Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, Article
11 shows that the English common laws are still part of the Laws of the Politically independent Ghana;
and Okeke, supra note 71, at 383 Okeke also supports this position thus: “On the whole, Ghana has not
substantially truncated its colonial attachment to the British common law system...”
81 JF Ade Ajayi, The Continuity of African Institutions under Colonialism in T.O. Ranger, ed., EMERGING
THEMES OF AFRICAN HISTORY 189, 195 (East Africa Pub House, 1968).
78
79
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continued in the stead of the colonial legal system, also failed to affect those
normative orderings. Thus it is common to find many communities within African
states untouched by the state’s laws and living according to their own indigenous or
native laws. Other reasons accounting for the prevalence of multiple legal systems
within African states is that rural dwellers have no knowledge of state law. 82 Some
local communities that know the state law, persist in ignoring it, “carry[ing] on as if
the new law had not been passed”83 because they are “unwilling to surrender their
cultural heritage and embrace a legal system that they can hardly identify with” 84
Those that could be amenable to reconsidering their heritage to embrace the state
legal system also find themselves lacking the “requisite capacity to engage with the
formal state system and its institutions.”85 For these reasons in many African states
multiple systems of law operate simultaneously; in many territories people are still
governed by their own ethnic laws;86 there are situations where in the absence of a
central legal system within a social sphere people behave orderly;87 and situations

Edward Kutsoati and Randall Morck, Family Ties, Inheritance Rights, and Successful Poverty
Alleviation: Evidence from Ghana, NBER Working Paper No. 18080, 23-24 (2012). Available at
www.nber.org/papers/w18080 (Last visited on 23 March 2018.)
83 Antony Allot, THE LIMITS OF THE LAW (Butterworths, 1980) 197
84 Victor Gedzi, “Principles and Practices of Dispute Resolution in Ghana: Ewe and Akan Procedures on
Females Inheritance and Property Rights” PhD thesis, International Institute of Social Studies of
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Hague, Netherlands, (2009) 109-111, available online:
repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32640/90-423-0372-7 DOK%5B1%5D.pdf
85 Ama Fowa Hammond, “Towards an Inclusive Vision of Law Reform and Legal Pluralism in Ghana,
PhD thesis, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, (2016), available online:
http://docplayer.net/48486835-Towards-an-inclusive-vision-of-law-reform-and-legal-pluralism-inghana-ama-fowa-hammond-a-thesis-submitted-in-partial-fulfilment-of-the-requirements.html (last
visited on 23 March 2018.)
86 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Kenya, Country Report of the Research Project by International
Labour Organization and the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (2009).
87 Griffiths, supra note 55, at 3.
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where other laws operate legally within the state but do not fit neatly into the
compartments of the state’s hierarchy of laws.88

2.3.2 The Distinctiveness of Legal Pluralism in
Africa
Legal pluralism does not exist solely in Africa. It also occurs in other parts of the
world. However the form of legal pluralism found in Africa is different from that
which occurs elsewhere. In the following paragraphs we will compare the form of
legal pluralism that occurs in African societies to what occurs in Western societies to
tell the difference between the two and highlight the distinctiveness of African legal
pluralism.

First, there is the argument that customary law is not law at all, and that in Africa, the
state legal system is the only legal system. Menski masterfully sums up Okupa’s
response to such incorrect representation of African customary law thus:
“Okupa (1998:1) indicates that early visitors to Africa found all kinds of legal
Systems in operation and recognised familiar features, but their view were
probably dismissed as romantic infatuation. Later, for legal scholars infused
with Western positivism, African law was not law because it was just a vast
jumble of local customary laws. Due to the prevalent orality of African cultures,
lack of dependence on written documentation, and reliance on unacceptable
88

Griffiths, supra note 55.
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‘primitive’ value systems, it was considered impossible to find proper law. While
such difficulties may exist for foreign observers, Africans knew that they had
laws, and their ancestors had laws, too, and they experienced their respective
‘living law.’ Such manifold breakdowns in communication when it comes to
understanding culture-specific concepts of law are again marked by meaningful
silences and gaps of communication.”89

Second, Sally Engle Merry distinguishes African legal pluralism from American or
Western legal pluralism in the following way: she classifies the simultaneous
operation of indigenous and European law in colonial and post-colonial societies such
as African states, as classic legal pluralism, and classifies the operation of state law
and other forms of orderings within the same social field in non-colonized societies
such as the U.S. and Britain since the 1970s as the new legal pluralism90:
Legal Pluralism has expanded from a concept that refers to the relations between
colonized and colonizer to relations between dominant groups and subordinate
groups such as religious, ethnic, or cultural minorities, immigrant groups, and
unofficial forms of ordering located in social networks or institutions.”91

Most post-colonial African states fall into the category of Merry’s classic legal
pluralism. This is because during the colonial era European law was superimposed

89 WERNER

MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ASIA AND AFRICA, (2nd ed.,
Cambridge.) Menski quotes Okupa Effa with approval: Okupa Effa, I NTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW IUS NON SCRIPTUM, (Lit verlag, 1998) 1
90 Merry, supra note 45 at 872.
91 Merry, supra note 45 at 872.
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over indigenous law in those African societies and the colonial law assumed the
position of official state law in those colonial societies over the pre-existing
indigenous laws. Today, the European and indigenous laws coexist and operate
simultaneously in those same African societies. Another form of legal pluralism is
experienced in Western societies such as the U.S. and this type of legal pluralism falls
into the category of Merry’s new legal pluralism. This is because those Western
societies exhibit the following necessary ingredients of the new legal pluralism: First,
there is an official legal system on the one hand, and then other forms of orderings on
the other hand, and both systems operating within the same social field. Second, the
other forms of orderings “connect with the official legal systems” but are “separate
from it” and “dependent on it” at the same time. Thus for example, the official state
laws could guarantee the use of an individual’s personal law under certain
circumstances within the state. In such a case, the provision made in the official state
laws for the non-state law demonstrates a connection between the state law and the
other forms of orderings yet, the state laws constitute a legal ordering different from
the other forms of orderings. At the same time, for the other orderings to be applied
to an individual’s situation at the official state level, the state laws must prescribe it;
making the other forms of orderings dependent on the state laws. Thus new legal
pluralism is manifested by plural normative orders operating simultaneously in a
society with one of them being the official one, and being connected with the other
ones, but at the same time separate from them and they in turn depend on it. In the
US for instance, several normative orders operate simultaneously yet state (either
Federal or state level) law is the official one. This state law connects with those
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normative orders such as religious norms but those norms depend on it. For instance,
if a religious norm permits polygamy in the United States, the state laws must
additionally permit it, otherwise an individual cannot engage in polygamy.

Third, customary laws in Africa form a separate legal system from the state legal
system unlike the plural normative orders found in western societies like the US.
Therefore in Ghana for instance, the Constitution of Ghana recognizes and upholds
customary law as a distinct and separate legal order from laws enactment by
Parliament. Legal Pluralism (which involves the co-existence of state law and
customary law) is upheld and recognized by the Constitution of Ghana. This is
because Article 11 of the Constitution of Ghana recognizes the existence of more than
one legal order—Article 11(2) provides that common law is a separate and distinct
source of law and Article 11(3) provides that the rules of law which by custom are
applicable to particular communities (meaning, customary law) is recognized by the
Constitution.92

Fourth, in African societies there is multiple plurality unlike the uni-dimensional
plurality found in Western societies like the US. Using the example of Native
Americans in the US, Native Americans are a single group of people whose laws

92 Constitution, supra

note 80, Article 11(1) The Law of Ghana shall comprise-(a) This Constitution; (b)
enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this Constitution; (c) any
orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority under a power conferred by this
Constitution; (d) the existing law; and (e) the common law. Article 11(2): The common law of Ghana
shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the
doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court
of Judicature. Article 11(3): For the purposes of this article, “customary law” means the rules of law
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.
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conflict with the national laws in the US. However in Africa, there are thousands of
ethnic groups with different identities lumped together to coexist93, different
languages facilitating the way of life of the many ethnic groups94 and different
chieftaincies from which the ethnic groups take their authorities;95 whose laws
conflict with the national laws. The cultural organization of African peoples is held
together by different customary laws which ordered their lives in the pre-colonial era,
remained during the colonial era despite the introduction of European colonial laws,
and continues to thrive even under current state laws of African states. For instance
in Nigeria alone there are more than 200 ethnic groups and each group applies its
specific customary laws within its community96 and these laws conflict with the
national law. Multiculturalism has resulted in the unique situation where in Africa,
not only are individual rights guaranteed but Peoples’ rights are also guaranteed
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AFCHR). 97 The AFCHR
therefore supports and protects the African version of legal pluralism. For instance,
The AFCHR reaffirms the rights of Peoples’ and obligates states to protect traditional
values enshrined in customary laws observed by the community.98 Thus if the
customary laws prohibit the participation of PWDs in cultural activities, a violation of

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The Forgotten
Peoples? The African Commission’s work on indigenous peoples in Africa (2006) 23: Africa is
characterized by multiculturalism. Almost all African states host a rich variety of different ethnic
groups, some of which are dominant and some of which are in subordinate positions.”
94 Baylor University, supra note 3 http://www.baylor.edu/mlc/index.php?id=11594 (last visited on 23
March 2018): The people and cultures of Africa are as diverse as its geography. Anthropologists have
identified almost 3,000 different ethnic groups, which speak approximately 1,000 different languages.
95 E. Adriaan B. van, Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, States and Chiefs: Are Chiefs Mere Puppets? Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Issue No. 37-38 (1996.)
96 Okeke, supra note 71 at 385.
97 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AFCHR), Preamble and Articles 2, 3, 5, 17, 19, 20, 21,
22 and 60.
98 AFCHR, supra note 96, Article 17(3).
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which could anger the gods and cause the annihilation of the community, the
individual PWD’s right to participate in that cultural activity under the state laws,
would have to give way to the communal right to survival under their customary laws,
and in fact, both the individual and the State have a duty to protect the community’s
right. Anne Hellum suggests that this creates a situation of conflict of values.99

Fourth, the amount of subject matter left by state law for determination by customary
law in African societies is more than what Western societies reserve for
determination by non-state law. For instance in Ghana the amount of subject matter
left for determination by customary law is more than what US laws leave for Native
American Indian law to determine. For example customary law predominantly
governs family law issues, land law issues and chieftaincy issues in Ghana’s legal
pluralistic context. About 80% of lands in Ghana are held under customary law. 100
Allodial title (the highest land title in Ghana) usually belongs to stools or skins or
families and not individuals or the state. All other titles derive from the Allodial title.
Therefore the validity of land title in Ghana is determined by the customary law of the
particular people involved, and not by state law. Consequently, most people asserting
land ownership in Ghana will find their root of title under one customary law or the

Hellum, supra note 4, 31-32
W. Odame Larbi, Ghana’s Land Admin Project: Accomplishments, Impact and the way ahead, Annual
World
Bank
Conference
on
Land
and
Poverty,
2011,
Available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Resources/4754951302790806106/GOV5Pres2Larbi.pdf (last visited on 23 March 2018): Odame Larbi, Chief Executive
Officer of the Lands Commission of Ghana, gave a powerpoint presentation at a World Bank
programme in which he indicated that 78% of land in Ghana is owned by traditional authority (stool,
skin, clan and family), 20% by state and 2% through split ownership.
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other.101 About 90% of marriages in Ghana are celebrated under customary law even
if they are subsequently converted into civil law marriages.102 The norm is to be
married first at customary law according to one’s custom before being married under
the Marriages Act. Marriage licenses issued by marriage officers authorizing parties
to marry usually require parties to state who their spouses are under customary law.
This practice has elevated the practice to the status of law: everyone is expected to
marry under customary law before converting the customary law marriage into a
marriage under the Marriages Act. Some people end up not performing the marriage
under the Act after the customary law. The customary law marriage as is, is valid, or
it can be registered as it is – a registered customary law marriage – or converted to a
marriage under the Marriages Act.103 Additionally, the Ghanaian Constitution
reserves Chieftaincy matters to customary law.104

Finally, due to the unique relationship between state law and indigenous laws in
African societies with legal pluralism, there are certain instances where the
indigenous laws actually take precedence over state law. For instance, the Ghanaian

101 Land

Title Registration Act, P.N.D.C.L. 152
Raymond A. Atuguba, “Seven Phases in the Evolution of Customary Law in Africa: Signposts from
Ghana,” Lancaster University of Ghana, 2nd Colloquium on Law for Development: “Almost 100% of
marriages in Ghana are (first) celebrated or wholly or partially performed according to the rules of
customary law.
103 Marriages Act of Ghana, 1884-1985, CAP 125; Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law,
PNDC Law 112: Both Laws recognize a Customary Marriage as valid marriage in Ghana.
104 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 270(1) provides that: “The institution of chieftaincy, together
with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed;”
Article 270(2) provides that “Parliament shall have no power to enact any law which – (a) confers on
any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose
whatsoever; …”; and Article 270(3) (a) provides that: “Nothing in or done under the authority of any
law shall be held to be inconsistent with, or in contravention of, clause (1) or (2) of this article if the
law makes provision for – (a) the determination, in accordance with the appropriate customary law
and usage, by a traditional council… .” (emphasis is mine)
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Courts Act tries to privilege customary law in the resolution of civil disputes.105 The
Courts Act of Ghana privileges customary law in the resolution of civil disputes in the
Courts Act of Ghana, 1993 (Act 459) sections 50-60. Under the choice of law
provisions of Ghana’s Courts Act, section 54 permits the court to use the personal law
of parties to resolve civil disputes and has set out some rules to regulate this. The
intended law of the parties as to the transaction is what will prevail where the
intention is not clear. Law applicable to the devolution of estates shall be the personal
law of the person and Law applicable to title where the persons involved have the
same personal law, shall be that (their) personal law.

2.4 FACTORS PROMOTING LEGAL PLURALISM IN
AFRICA
2.4.1 Colonization created two streams of law within
the state
Legal pluralism was the natural consequence of colonization in Africa. In the precolonial era African societies had their own systems of governance. Most of these
societies were lead by chiefs or traditional religious leaders. During the colonial era
the colonial rulers were torn between directly ruling the population and indirectly
ruling the population through indigenous leaders such as chiefs.106 Where they chose
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Courts Act of Ghana, 1993, Act 459, sections 50-60.
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95.
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to indirectly rule the people, the leaders of the people: the chiefs, largely acted as
intermediaries between the people and the rulers in administering the colonial
state.107 This allowed the chiefs to maintain their indigenous legal systems, allowing
the people to keep their indigenous rules whilst continually finding ways for the
people to obey the colonial rules. With time, and in some colonies, certain avenues
were created by the colonial government through which they would give credence to
some of the indigenous rules by first subjecting the indigenous or customary laws to
a repugnancy test.108 The Western European colonial masters superimposed
Montesquieu’s branches of government including Western-style formal legislative
system on the indigenous system of governance and most post-colonial African states
maintained the status quo with slight variation.109

Colonization therefore created legal pluralism through the transplantation of formal
state legal system and destabilization of lawmaking at the ethnic group level (without
eliminating it.) Today ethnic group leaders continue to make rules recognized under
the state laws just as the Legislature continues to enact state legislation.

2.4.2 The desire to maintain the African identity

Ibid
Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev), section 87(1) inter alia, provided as follows:“Nothing in this
ordinance shall deprive the Courts of the right to observe and enforce the observance … of any native
law or custom existing the Gold Coast, such law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscience…”
109 Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95.
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The preservation of Legal pluralism in Africa has been largely attributed to the claim
to African identity. Generally Africans maintain a firm belief in the spiritual or
metaphysical as part of their identity. They consider that such beliefs often have
proper representation only in their customary laws and not in state laws. The result
is their inability to relinquish their multiple and complex customary laws in favour of
a unifying and homogenous state laws.

2.4.3 Presence of alternative systems

In Africa, there is the presence of an alternative system of everything – Politics,
economics, social ordering, education, and science among others, that are in abeyance
and are easily recalled in times of crises. Thus, for instance, whenever internal
conflicts arise, such as through a coup d’etat or civil war, the state justice system falls
into abeyance and it is usually the non-state justice system that delivers justice. In
section 2.6.3 below I give an example of how Tanzania and Rwanda resurrected their
non-state justice systems after conflicts to deliver justice when the state system was
incapacitated owing to the conflict. Thus the presence of alternative indigenous
systems in Africa that are easily recalled to fill a lacuna in governance in times of
crises ensures that legal pluralism persists.
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2.4.4 Lack of Formal Education

Lack of formal education in many parts of Africa engenders legal pluralism. People in
most parts of Africa, particularly in rural communities, have limited access to formal
education. Consequently, they gravitate towards the customary legal system which
they are more familiar with and which does not appear complicated to them. For
instance, when a crime is reported at a Police station (state legal system), the
complainant may be required to make a formal report. Where the complainant has no
formal education, simple acts such as a formal report may appear intimidating to him.
Consequently such a person would prefer to access the customary legal system where
he can fully understand his interaction with the chief or traditional leader. The lack
of formal education therefore does not encourage access to the state legal system but
rather encourages people to access their non-state legal systems thereby promoting
legal pluralism within the African state.

2.4.5 Economic factors

Closely related to how the lack of formal education fosters legal pluralism in Africa is
how economic factors also contribute to legal pluralism in Africa. Economic factors
largely account for the prevalence of legal pluralism in Africa. The operation of the
non-state legal system is not as costly and complicated as the formal state legal
system. In a sense, to those who believe it, the non-state system delivers a much more
67

efficient dispute resolution mechanism than the state system. For instance in a land
dispute with a neighbor a threat of invocation of a powerful deity to punish a neighbor
who has encroached on your land without permission is likely to yield a positive and
instantaneous result more quickly than the threat of a law suit knowing how slowly
the wheels of justice turn. To invoke this deity all that one may need may be a few
items within his household such as eggs, and the deity could work to kill the offending
party. Due to the intersubjective knowledge about the power of the deities, the
offending party immediately halts the mischief.

On the other hand, to go to court one may need to hire a lawyer and pay for his
services, pay to file her case in court and bear transportation cost to attend court
whilst leaving her work unattended. What is worse, the outcome of the case is not
guaranteed to be in his favor. Again, a new law, Revenue Administration Act of Ghana,
2016, requiring a person to have a Tax Identification Number (TIN) before he or she
could file a case in court, further increased the difficulty in access to formal justice.
This law would have denied more than half of Ghana’s population access to the justice
through the court system because very few people at the non-state level have TIN
numbers. Fortunately the High Court has overruled this law in the case of Eric Asae v
Ghana Growth Fund Company (Suit No. IL/0034/2017). The informal system is
therefore more accessible to the ordinary person, provides more efficient results for
her, and is faster.
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2.5 FACTORS OBSTRUCTING LEGAL PLURALISM IN
AFRICA
2.5.1 Decentralization

Most African states have embraced the decentralized system of governance, making
state agencies available at community levels to enforce state laws, and this
accessibility to state law discourages the enforcement of non-state law at the lowest
level of the governmental structure. There are traditional rulers in every community
in most African states enforcing their rules in measured ways. During the colonial era
when the traditional rulers functioned as intermediaries between the colonial rulers
and the population the traditional rulers found innovative ways to continually
enforce their traditional laws.110 In the post-colonial era, most post-colonial African
governments stopped ruling the population through intermediaries and extended
government agencies directly to community and district levels. The availability of
government agents such as the Police is gradually shifting reliance for security and
other concerns from the traditional rulers to the government agents at their
community and district levels. This phenomenon has the potential of rendering nonstate laws over issues redundant and eventually scrapping out other systems of laws
in operation within the state.
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On the other hand, sometimes the local people, particularly those in the rural areas,
find the operation of government agents such as the Police difficult to relate to. For
instance, when a person commits an offence and is arrested by the Police, the remedy
of the justice system and imprisonment is not something that the people can identify
with. It is not their own. They would rather have the Chief reprimand the culprit and
obtain restitution. So instead of the decentralized system achieving uniformity in the
legal system, it promotes legal pluralism by encouraging local people to seek other
systems of law they can identify with.

2.5.2 Education

The more educated people are, the less likely they are to consult fetish priests for
solutions to their problems, and the more likely they are to seek redress in the state’s
courts rather than the chief’s court and the more likely they are to challenge some of
the laws of the non-state actors such as banishment from their communities. Formal
education of the population is therefore likely to discourage reliance on non-state
laws and non-state actors in favor or state-laws and state actors, resulting in the
rejection of legal pluralism. Currently large populations in Africa are uneducated in
the formal system but there is a movement towards improvement in education
through policies such as Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE.) In
Ghana, the government has introduced a Free SHS (Senior High School) Policy which
ensure that students attend senior high school for free. The effect of this Policy is that
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if one chooses to attend public school in Ghana, the she does not have to pay fees at
all levels until College. Such policies will significantly reduce the numbers of people
without formal education.

Of course, it can be argued in the alternative, that education promotes legal pluralism.
As people acquire education, they realize that their indigenous legal systems are
actually better-suited to their lifestyles than the transplanted legal systems that their
states have inherited. They therefore seek various ways to hold on to the non-state
level systems of law, including writing them into their state laws and ending up with
a legal pluralistic system.

2.5.3 Consolidation of State power

The state is gradually reaching all unreached parts of the country, imposing its
Montesquieu governance systems, obliterating the traditional governance systems,
and thereby legal pluralism. For instance, these days it is commonplace to find the
Police service in very remote parts of the country enforcing the state level laws.
People report cases to them rather than the chief because the work of the Police is
backed by the powers of the state. This practice shifts the confidence of the local
people from their traditional governance systems to the state’s (Montesquieu)
governance system. The effect is the gradual erosion of legal pluralism.
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2.5.4 Cost of maintaining plural legal systems within
the state
The cost of maintaining more than one legal system within the state discourages some
states from pursuing legal pluralism and they rather settle for a unified legal system
being the state legal system. When a state gives recognition to more than one legal
system within it, it ultimately bears responsibility for incidents flowing from the
implementation of that legal system. Some of the responsibility is financial. For
instance, in some parts of Africa, chiefs are paid by the state.111 Such extra financial
burdens discourage some governments from maintaining a plural legal system within
their states.

2.5.5 Conflicting value systems within the same social
field
Legal pluralism results in conflicting value systems within the same social field which
does not allow for societal harmony so to maintain social harmony, people prefer to
order their behavior according to a unified order. When people within the same social
field order their behavior after different legal orders it can produce conflicting value
systems and disharmony within the society. Lloyd Fallers of Princeton University says
it can generate:
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Carolyn Logan, Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief co-exist?
Afrobarometer working Paper No. 93, February 2008: “Traditional leaders have been banned, deposed
and paid state salaries …”(emphasis is mine.)
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“… situations in which incompatible values and beliefs widely held by members
of the same social system, where individuals are regularly motivated to behavior
which in the eyes of others is deviant and where other individuals have
conflicting motivations corresponding with discontinuities among the values of
the social systems.”112
For instance, one person can decide to steal the goods of another because according
to his value systems such goods should be freely accessible to all. Where the one
whose goods were stolen does not share such values it can result in conflict within
that society with each person feeling justified by his conduct because he acted
according to the dictates of the legal system he follows.

2.6 POSITIVES OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICAN POLITIES
2.6.1 Legal pluralism helps protect cultural identity

In a modern state, state actors seek to present one identity for the whole nation at all
times – whether in international affairs or in domestic budgets. Yet, as seen in most
African countries, a nation may consist of many different sub-groups with different
cultural identities, which are increasingly eroded as various aspects of nationhood

112 Lloyd Fallers, The Predicament of Modern African Chief: An instance from Uganda, American

Anthropologist, Vol. 57, 290; 295 (1955)
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(including laws) compete for a single identity rather than multiple identities
representing the nation. This erosion of the identities of subgroups within the state
can negatively affect a people’s “self-conception and self-perception…”113 and
identity. Legal pluralism on the other hand allows for the operation and preservation
of such cultural identities whilst protecting the national identity because it permits
non-state laws stemming from the various cultural identities, and state laws
stemming from the national identity to operate simultaneously within the state. This
situation protects cultural identity because it gives non-state laws room to operate
and develop to accommodate the evolving needs of its constituents.

2.6.2 Legal Pluralism teaches history to future
generations
Flowing from the above advantage of legal pluralism is that the operation of multiple
systems of laws will give future generations the benefit of a first hand understanding
of their cultural and national histories. The enforcement of customary laws in the
domestic lives of children – such as child naming ceremonies, rites of passage into
adulthood, customary law marriage ceremonies and funeral rites connect the new
generations with their predecessors. Although some parts of customary law may have
been modified in keeping with official state laws and modern trends, observing and
sometimes participating in the performance of those ceremonies in fulfillment of the

Definition
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https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=what+is+cultural+identity&* (last visited on 23 March
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law, give younger ones practical knowledge of their culture and society which is not
available in their history text books.

2.6.3 Legal pluralism makes indigenous systems of
governance relevant in modern African states
Most post-independence African states operate according to Montesquieu
government’s separation of powers. However, the states’ structures have been
increasingly confronted with the insufficiency of this system to provide real solutions
to the peculiar issues of African polities. Many African governments have therefore
begun to tap into resources available through the indigenous systems of governments
to resolve some of its challenges. For instance, the “sungusungu” institution in
Tanzania was revived by (male) lineage-elders to solve crimes that modern-day
courts could not solve in Tanzania after the war with Uganda, and after some
resistance, was accepted by the state apparatus.114

“Sungusungu are vigilante groups that have been brought into existence in order to
fight crimes such as murder, rape, cattle-theft and witchcraft. … In the beginning
the actions of the sungusungu groups were condemned … and they were felt to be
in competition with the judicial organisation. Therefore, people in the sungusungu
groups were arrested. But as judicial forces continued to be incapable of fighting

Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95, 66: “The following concerns the sungusungu that has come
into being under the Sukuma and Nyamwezi in Tanzania since the 1980’s.”
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the increasing stream of crime and the faith of the Tanzanian population in the
Sungusungu groups grew, the opinion of the state also swung round. There then
came a reactivation of a pre-colonial institution, the sungusungu, that was able to
establish security and order. This was followed by legal recognition of the
sungusungu as a successful alternative to the state judicial organization.”115

At the October 2017 TEDGlobal conference Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu, an indigenous
knowledge expert and researcher on Africa’s knowledge system, specifically original
authentic traditional knowledge, gave this enlightening account of how Rwanda used
its traditional judicial system in the aftermaths of the 1994 genocide to solve over a
million criminal cases within a record time.
“Gacaca is Rwanda’s traditional judicial system that was used after the genocide. In
1994, when the genocide ended, Rwanda’s national court system was in shambles;
no judges, no lawyers to try hundreds of thousands of genocide cases. So the
government of Rwanda came up with this idea to resuscitate a traditional judicial
system known as Gacaca. Gacaca is a community-based judicial system, where
community members come together to elect men and women of proven integrity to
try cases of crimes committed within these communities. So by the time Gacaca
concluded its trial of genocide cases in 2012, 12,000 community-based courts had
tried approximately 1.2million cases. Most importantly, is that Gacaca emphasized

115 Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95, at 66 – 67.
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Rwanda’s traditional philosophy of reconciliation and reintegration as against the
whole punitive and banishment idea that undergirds present-day Western style.”116

The Sungusungu and Gacaca accounts clearly show the value in maintaining
indigenous legal systems alongside the official state legal system because the modern
state legal system can tap into the indigenous knowledge of the indigenous legal
system to help solve new challenges the state faces.

2.6.4 Legal pluralism offers alternatives to individuals

Legal pluralism offers alternatives to citizens in determining how they want to order
their lives. The availability of multiple systems of law within the same social sphere
of the state means that a citizen could choose and pick a suitable one and is not
restricted to a particular legal order. For instance, where the law permits marriage
under customary law and ordinance, a man may choose to marry only under
customary law and therefore enjoy the benefit of unlimited number of wives instead
of marrying under the ordinance and restricting himself to only one wife. Multiple
systems of law therefore present alternative lifestyles to citizens which they can take
advantage of to make live more enjoyable.

Chika
Ezeanya-Esiobu,
TED
Talk
2007
https://www.ted.com/talks/chika_ezeanya_esiobu_how_africa_can_use_its_traditional_knowledge_to
_make_progress (last visited on February 20 2018.)
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2.6.5 Legal pluralism has the potential to make
implementation of international human rights
more effective
Flowing from the point made above, if traditional institutions can reach into
traditional phenomenon to retrieve indigenous institutions or activities that can offer
real solutions to today’s problems in African polities, then legal pluralism has the
potential to bring solutions to facilitate implementation of international human rights
laws, which are different from the solutions already known, but which the population
can identify with and which can be more effective. This capacity makes the chiefs
potentially important actors in the processes of improving international human
rights implementation. For instance, child marriage usually operates at the non-state
level because customary laws permit marriage right after puberty whereas state laws,
consistent with intentional human rights law, forbid the practice. The practice has
been stopped inspite of the state laws. Recently, traditional leaders instituted fines to
stem child marriage.117 This means that they abolished the customary law permitting
child marriage and instituted punishment for the violation of the new customary law.
When a traditional leader makes such laws it resonates more clearly with the people
and is likely to achieve the attitudinal change required by the international law rather
than the state law.

Myjoyonline http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/March-7th/traditional-rulers-institutefines-to-stem-child-marriage.php (last visited on 23 March 2018.)
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2.7 NEGATIVES OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICAN POLITIES
2.7.1 Uncertainty whether to obey state laws or nonstate laws
In situations where there is both state law and non-state laws on an issue citizens
may be uncertain whether to obey the state laws or non-state laws. For instance, in
the area of education of CWDs, whereas state laws may require CWDs to be educated,
customary laws may require the killing of such a child to ensure the survival of the
community. A parent of such a child may be torn between obeying the state law and
enduring shame and stigmatization for the rest of his life whilst the child may never
get a fair chance in life or obeying the customary law and losing the love of a child
forever. If the situation of legal pluralism had not been present, the parent would not
have been presented with these choices. Tamanaha aptly summarizes the point thus:

“They [pluralism of laws] may make competing claims of authority; … This
potential conflict can generate uncertainty or jeopardy for individuals and groups
in society who cannot be sure in advance which legal regime will be applied to
their situation.”118
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Tamanaha, supra note 46, at 375.
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“From the standpoint of a legal authority trying to consolidate its rule, legal
pluralism is a flaw to be rectified. From the standpoint of individuals or groups
subject to legal pluralism, it can be a source of uncertainty, but it also creates the
possibility of resort to alternative legal regimes.”119

2.7.2 It makes the implementation of state law more
difficult
When non-state laws co-exist with state laws within the state, implementation of
state laws become problematic because individuals could opt to conduct their lives in
accordance with non-state laws which they find more suitable to their beliefs. In
Tamanaha’s view,
“This state of conflict also creates opportunities for individuals and groups
within society, who can opportunistically select from among coexisting legal
authorities to advance their aims. … pos[ing] a challenge to the legal authorities
themselves, for it means that they have rivals. … Law characteristically claims to
rule whatever it addresses, but the fact of legal pluralism challenges this
claim.”120

For instance, during the outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014, state laws were passed
in Liberia in August 2014 banning the burial of persons who died from the virus and
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Tamanaha, supra note 46, at 385
Tamanaha supra note 46, at 375
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requiring that all such corpses be burnt.121 The reason was that “an Ebola victim is
most contagious in the moments and days after death, when unprotected contact with
infected bodily fluids carries an extremely high risk of transmission.”122

Until the passage of this state law, when people die, customary laws on funeral and
burial require bathing, dressing and even kissing the corpse.123 Relatives buried the
corpses and would subsequently visit the departed person’s grave. This ensured that
close linkage with one’s ancestors. The new state law requiring cremations to be held
in the capital and the burial of Ebola victims in body bags outside Monrovia (the
Capital) without the presence of relatives, meant that people would not be able to
identify their deceased loved ones or even locate their burial places to honour them.
Consequently, “decoration days, where people flock to cemeteries to clean and
decorate the graves of relatives, will come with many not knowing where the location
of the remains of their loves ones [is].” The state law was therefore forcing a
disconnect with dead loved ones which is an ideal promoted under customary law. It
was therefore met with resistance. Consequently, rather than obeying the new state
law in Liberia which would have curbed the spread of the virus quickly, people with
the Ebola virus stopped attending health centers for treatment124 and others secretly

The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/ebola-cremation-rulingsecret-burials-liberia (last visited on 23 March 2018)
122 Time, http://time.com/3478238/ebola-liberia-burials-cremation-burned/ (last visited on 23
March 2018)
123 Ibid
124 The Guardian, supra note 121: “a recent analysis of bed space at Ebola treatment unit concluded
that out of 742 spaces, only 351 were occupied.”
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buried their loved ones who died of the virus in order to maintain their connection
with deceased relatives.125

2.7.3 Applicability of a subgroup’s law to a particular
transaction or conflict
Flowing from the preceding negative effect of legal pluralism, is the fact that legal
pluralism creates the need for determining when a subgroup’s law applies to a
particular transaction or conflict and when it does not. As previously illustrated, in
some African countries like Ghana, certain areas of the law such as Chieftaincy and
land law has been designated by state law to be determined according to the
subgroup law. Therefore, for instance, determining who should be rightful successor
to a “throne” is done according to the laws of the particular subgroup to be governed.
However there are still many grey areas of the law, especially family law, that not do
fall under state law but under customary law but state law may not have designated
them as such. It is necessary to fully designate which matters are to be determined
according state law or sub-group law to ensure order within the state.

2.7.4 Changing applicable law
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In states with legal pluralism there is the need for robust ways for people to change
which laws apply to them or not. People’s situations vary constantly. For instance
marriage can change the applicable laws. For instance, a surviving wife would not be
considered a member of her deceased husband’s family under the customary law of
Asantes in Ghana but would be considered a member of the deceased’s family under
state law.126 Similarly, a child born to an Asante mother and an Ewe mother can
choose whether to belong to the father’s family and therefore observe patrilineal laws
on inheritance or to belong to the mother’s family and observe matrilineal laws on
inheritance or change applicable customary law to maximize inheritance when it
suits him or her. Changing applicable law creates unpredictability to people’s
situations and is unhelpful for social interaction.

2.7.5 Frustration of leaders and obstruction of
national progress
From the above discussion, the situation of legal pluralism obstructs efforts at nationbuilding by national leaders. Legal pluralism creates additional hurdles for national
cohesion. Leaders cannot assume a centralized system of governance to facilitate
dissemination and implementation of laws but must consider an environmentappropriate solution at all times to maximize outcomes. For instance, in Ghana,
Article 39(2) of the Constitution, 1992 provides that “The State shall ensure that

T.E. Kyei, Marriage and Divorce Among the Asante: A study undertaken in the course of the Ashanti
Social Survey, Cambridge African Monographs 14 (1945), 76: “Death of a spouse.”
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appropriate customary and cultural values are adapted and developed as an integral
part of the growing needs of the society as a whole; and in particular that traditional
practices which are injurious to the health and well-being of the person are
abolished.” Since traditional practices are community specific, abolishing one
community’s practice whilst accepting the other community’s practice could present
obstacles that could be frustrating to state leaders.

2.8 DOMESTIC LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFRICA
(The case of Ghana)
The Constitution of Ghana recognizes the operation of multiple systems of law within
Ghana: state law, customary law, and the common law.127 However, the two systems
of law that most Ghanaians rely on daily are the state law and customary law.
Between these two systems of law, most rural Ghanaian rural dwellers rely more on
customary law than state law whereas as urban dwellers rely more on state law than
customary laws.128 Of the two systems of law, customary law is the more prevalent
legal system in Africa. Professor Muna Ndulo states that “In a typical African country,
the great majority of the people conduct their personal activities in accordance with
and subject to customary law.”129 A typical African can easily recall the customary law
that governs an aspect of his life such as marriage but would likely not know the

Constitution, supra note 80, Article 11.
Hammond, supra note 85
129 Muna Ndulo, African customary law, customs, and women’s rights (2011) Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies, Vol. 18:Iss. 1, Art. 5.
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appropriate state law governing the same issue. On the issue of the validity of
customary law as a source of Nigerian law, Obaseki, J.S.C. (as he then was) put it thus:
“Customary Law is organic or living law of the indigenous people [of Nigeria]
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static. It is
regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions of the community subject to it.
It is said that custom is a mirror of the culture of the people. I would say that
customary law goes further and imports justice to the lives of those entirely subject
to it.”130

Atuguba identifies seven types of customary laws in operation in Africa, using Ghana
as a case in point. 131 These are Pristine customary law132, Judicial customary law133,

Oyewumi v. Ogunesan, Judgment delivered on Friday the 4 th of May 1990 in the Supreme Court of
Nigeria, judgment of the Court delivered by Andrews Otutu Obaseki, J.S.C., See also Lewis v. Bankole
[1908] 1 NLR 81, 100-01 (Nigeria.)
131 Atuguba, supra note 102.
132 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Pristine customary law thus: Pristine customary law describes
the elaborate law that Africans made for themselves and lived by before contact with Islam (and then
Euro-Christianity) and before colonialism.” The Islamic invasion, the Christian invasion and
subsequent colonial rule diluted the pristine customary law. Although the invaders and colonial rulers
kept records of what they considered to be the customary laws of the people, their recordings are
questionable due to ‘recording errors, translation errors, self-serving accounts, biased accounts’ and
the ‘general African belief and practice of keeping the outsider away from the details of what it does.’
133 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Judicial customary law thus: Judicial customary law. This type of
customary law evolved from the application of the European colonial rulers’ repugnancy clause to
customary law “to ensure that only rules of Customary Law which are consistent with European
notions of "natural justice, equity and good conscience" are recognized and enforceable.” (Raymond,
2017) Today the Constitutions of various African countries with legal pluralism permit only customary
laws that are consistent with the Constitution
130
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Codified customary law134, Statutorily instituted customary law135, Complementary
customary law136, Insular customary law137, Declared customary law.138 Other
customary law scholars such as Hammond identify a fewer number of customary law
types in Ghana: The Living customary law139, Judicial customary law140 and Islamic
customary law141.

Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Codified customary law thus: Codified customary law describes
the situation where the rules of customary law are written into statute or distilled by authorities on
customary law or customary law publicists. For instance, Ghana’s intestate succession law and the
Wills Act are statutes that have customary law written into them; Ghana’s National House of Chiefs has
been constitutionally mandated to undertake a process of codifying customary law and assimilation
customary law into the common law and distilling customary law; and publicists such as Dr. J B
Danquah and Professor Kludze have written treatises on customary law that are now used as
authorities on defining customary law.
135 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains statutorily instituted customary law thus: Statutorily instituted
customary law refers to situations where new state laws are made which have the effect of setting
down new rules of customary law. Sometimes the new customary laws may be found in the writings
of publicists. This change to customary law can be used to improve implementation of international
human rights domestically. The only issue is that sometimes the people reject the new rule and other
times the people accept the new rules.
136 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Complementary customary law thus: Complementary customary
law describes the situation where customary law is used to fill gaps in basic rules of statute and of
common law to facilitate daily. Therefore the customary law rules complement the basic law. For
example, Family law tribunals use customary law. Customary law used in interpersonal arbitration.
137 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Insular customary law thus: Insular customary law is used to
describe the situation where the state (or basic) law complements customary law rules; particularly
in the areas of land law, family law and Chieftaincy, customary law is supplemented by the basic law.
Other form of law operate in tandem and parallel to rules of customary law in particular domains in
social life, leaving the rules of Customary law intact, allowing them to evolve on their own.
138 Atuguba, supra note 102, explains Declared customary law thus: Declared customary law refers to
situations where new rules of customary law are declared as such and old rules of customary law are
declared as invalid customary law.
139 Hammond, supra note 85 explains Living customary law thus: Living customary law is the
customary law as practiced by people on a daily basis. When issues arise from such practices the Courts
decide the validity of such customary laws.
140 Hammond, supra note 85 explains Judicial customary law thus: Judicial customary law is living
customary law that has been subjected to judicial modification. Courts may amend some of the customs
and practices of various groups to make them consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The
outcome of such judicial processes is a form of customary law that is usually described as judicial
customary law (because it is detached from the actual customary law as practiced by the population.)
141 Hammond, supra note 85 explains Islamic customary law thus: Islamic customary law is the Islamic
law practiced in the courts in Ghana. Often people in the Muslim communities in Ghana practice their
tribal laws in addition to Islamic laws so when issues such as marriage are presented to the courts the
courts apply the Islamic law to Muslims as their customary law in order not to get mixed up on which
law should apply to a particular issue.
134
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Customary law is very relevant in Ghana and Africa today. The reasons for the
continued relevance of customary law in modern day Africa are many. First,
customary law is not static – it continually evolves to accommodate changes in the
lives of its subjects.142 For this reason many scholars in their field are against the
codification of customary law as this could undermine the evolving character of
customary law. In many African countries, judges still refer to treaties of African
scholars who lived almost a century ago to ascertain the customary law governing
particular issues such as land law. This practice undermines any changes to the
customary law that may have occurred subsequently. Second, Africans need their
customary laws in order to survive. Okupa asks why ‘African customary law has not
fallen into abeyance despite the onslaught of authoritative modernity in the form of
state laws?’ The answer she gives is that people in Africa need their local laws as
before to survive143. Thirdly, customary law provides the kind of dispute
resolution/judicial system that Africans understand best. The Senior Vice President
and General Counsel at the World Bank aptly sums up this position:
“Customary law systems in common law African countries help meet a fundamental
need for justice, and thus provide an important complement to formal justice
institutions. Their enduring popularity is an indication of their importance to the
lives of the majority of people in Africa. They are also a testament to the fact that
the States in many countries have failed to provide access to justice to most of the

Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff, “Law as…” Theory and Practice in Legal History, available
at http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/Vol1No3Articles/TomlinsandComaroff.pdf (last visited on 23
March 2018.)
143 Menski, supra note 89 at 391.
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population144. Customary law tribunals have many valuable features which are
well known to all of you. They are infinitely more accessible to the average person
in Ghana than the formal courts. Traditional tribunals are inexpensive, efficient,
and often geographically very close to users. Their proceedings are easily
understood by users because they generally use a vernacular language and avoid
legalese. They thus provide communities with a sense of ownership and social
cohesion.145”
He further stated that where appropriate, customary law encourages mediation and
reaches decisions that “are restorative and tend to rebuild community relations, as
opposed to the formal judiciary which can be adversarial. The laws applied by
these customary tribunals tend to be flexible and to take into account current local
values and mores. These laws evolve naturally with the communities.146”

The range of the people implementing other laws and creating situations of domestic
legal pluralism within African states include the following:
a) Chiefs implementing customary laws
b) Muslim imams implementing Islamic laws across a variety of issues; for
instance marriage, inheritance and succession
c) Catholic priests implementing canon laws
d) Mallams and soothsayers implementing spiritual laws

Roberto Dañino, World Bank: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/2145761139604306966/20817148/CustomaryLawGhana120505.pdf at 1.
145 Dañino, supra note 144 at 2
146 Ibid
144
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e) Traditional or fetish priests implementing spiritual laws

2.8.1 Chiefs implementing Customary Law

As mentioned in the preceding section, most African communities were chiefdoms
before they were colonized. The chieftaincy institution remained during colonization
and still continues in this post-colonial era. In Africa today, some Chiefs trace their
legitimacy, authority and power from pre-colonial era147 whilst others trace theirs to
the colonial governments because the colonial masters created them during the
colonial era. Chiefs’ powers have been modified over time and are not the same across
Africa. Their relation with their post-colonial states is not the same across Africa and
their relation with their subjects is no longer the same. For instance, the Berbers of
north west Africa, for instance Morocco, had chiefs but their colonizers and the people
did not attribute the same kind of authority to those chiefs as for instance, Asantes of
southern Ghana attribute to their chiefs who “could, and still can, make claims to
political legitimacy, authority, and even sovereignty on grounds that predate the
colonial and post-colonial states in terms of time, and can make these claims on the
basis not only of politics but also of religion.”148 We now examine how the chieftaincy

147 E.

ADRIAAN B. VAN ROUVEROY VAN NIEUWAAl and WERNER ZIPS eds., SOVEREIGNTY, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER
IN WEST AFRICAN SOCIETIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY, (Lit Verlag, 1998): Chiefs in Ghana
occupy a unique position. They have their “own roots of legitimacy” – sacred authority, which predates the pre-colonial era and through which they have retained various degrees of sovereignty
through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras.
148 Donald I. Ray and E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, The New Relevance of Traditional
Authorities in Africa: The Conference; Major Themes; Reflections on Chieftaincy in Africa; Future
Directions, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, The Ghana Conference, Vol. 37-38 (1996), 13.
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institution operates alongside the state legal system as an example of how legal
pluralism operates in fact in Africa today.

The chief is the head of his community. In the pre-colonial era, chiefs had their own
political structure.149 A Chief exercised executive, legislative and judicial authority
over his subjects. Chiefs made laws with their elders (council members) and enforced
their laws through their elders, sub-chiefs and subjects. 150 During the colonial era,
the colonial masters created administrative chieftaincy through their state
administrators; turning existing chiefs into intermediaries between the state and his
people and creating new chieftaincies to rival non-complying ones and using the new
chiefs to administer those territories.151 Post-colonial era saw both the continuation
of the administrative chieftaincy and the introduction of the political chieftaincy.152
The bases of power and authority of African chiefs had begun to shift in favour of the
state during the colonial era and in the post-colonial era, chiefs now depended on the
central administrative apparatus for their legitimacy thereby politicizing
chieftaincy.153 The central government assigned chiefs some roles whilst restricting

Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95.
Skalnik, Authority Versus Power: Democracy in Africa Must Include original African Institutions,
Journal of Legal Pluralism, (1996): Peter argues that African indigenous institutions were genuinely
democratic but did not necessarily conform to the European conceptions of representative democracy.
151 Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 95. For example, Togo, South Africa and Rhodesia.
152 The Chiefs’ Act of Kenya, Chapter 128 of the Laws of Kenya, section 6: ‘It shall be the duty of every
chief or assistant chief to maintain order in the area in respect of which he is appointed, and for such
purpose he shall have and exercise the jurisdiction and powers by this Act conferred upon him over
persons residing or being within such area.’ Chiefs and assistant chiefs in Kenya were assigned
administrative roles by the state.
153 The Chiefs Act of Zambia, Chapter 287 of the Laws of Zambia, sections 1 and 3: A person must be
recognized as a chief by the President of the country in order to hold the office of a chief. Section 4 of
the Act permits the President to suspend or withdraw the recognition.
149

150Peter
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the powers of the chiefs and in some post-colonial states, some Chiefs have been
destooled or demoted for falling out of favour with ruling governments.154

One of the important roles maintained by chiefs from the pre-colonial era, through
the colonial era to the present post-colonial era is implementation of customary law.
Chiefs have found innovative ways to enforce these customary laws even in the face
of state laws. The enforcement of these customary laws raises the following questions
for their subjects: are those subjects “persons-as-citizens” of their states or “personsas-subjects” of their chiefs or are they both? For instance if the person wants to travel
outside of the country he has to go under the umbrella of person-as-citizen of the state
– because he needs a passport; but if for instance he has a land dispute to settle with
his kinsmen then he becomes a person-as-subject of the chief. This tension between
‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ continues in many African states155 and has arisen because
chiefs have found ways to maintain some of their authority and to continue enforcing
customary laws.

2.8.2 Muslim Imams implementing Islamic Law

In Malawi, Twenty-two Chiefs were demoted in 2015: http://mwnation.com/22-malawi-chiefsdemoted/ In Togo during Gnassingbe Eyadema’s term as President he found a way to make chiefs a
part of his ruling political party; Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, supra note 94, 42 – 43 “For instance, in 1987
General Eyadema, the President of Togo … added the chiefs, who had been united in 1972 in an Union
Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo, as an aile marchante (marching wing) to his Rassemblement
du Peuple Togolais.”
155 Donald I. Ray, Divided Sovereignty: Traditional Authority and the State in Ghana, Journal of legal
pluralism 1996, 12: Ray uses the Konkomba and Nanumba conflicts in Ghana to exemplify this.
154
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The Islamic religion is one of the major religions in Africa. An Imam is the leader of a
Muslim community or the worship leader of a Mosque. He implements Islamic
religious rules across a variety of issues such as marriage, inheritance and succession
for members of the Muslim community. Those rules are sometimes different from the
state laws on the same issues as marriage, inheritance or succession. This raises a
variety of questions. For instance in the area of marriage: is the marriage contracted
under Islamic law valid in a non-Islamic state? Since the Holy Quran permits a Muslim
man to be married to up to four wives at a time156 yet most statutory marriages in
Africa admit of one-man-one-wife what recognition is to be given to the one-manmultiple-wives marriage contracted under valid Islamic law?

In the area of inheritance, when the Imam facilitates the distribution of the estate of
a Muslim who dies intestate according to Islamic laws of inheritance can this
distribution be valid in the face of a state law permitting the distribution of the
deceased’s estate in a different manner? Whereas state laws do not generally
distribute property on the basis of gender, the Quran permits a male to receive twice
the share of the property that the female receives.157 Thus where children including
a non-Muslim daughter survive a deceased Muslim, the daughter would be entitled to
less property under Islamic laws of inheritance but more property under the state’s
laws of inheritance.

Quran 4:3:”Marry of the women, who seem good to you, two or three or four; and if ye fear that ye
cannot do justice (to so many) then one (only) or (the captives) that your right hands possess.”
157 Quran 4:11: “Allah commands you regarding your children. For the male a share equivalent to that
of two females.”
156
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2.8.3 Catholic priests implementing Canon Law

The Catholic Church is a prominent Christian denomination in Africa. 158 The Church
has its own laws which are canon laws and Catholics are supposed to abide by those
laws as part of the practice of the faith. The Catholic priest administers the canon laws
on a daily basis in addressing various issues confronting members. One of such issues
is marriage. There are strict canon law rules on validity of marriage. For instance, a
marriage is not valid until it is consummated. Non-consummation of a marriage is a
valid grounds for annulment of a catholic marriage whereas it is not a ground for
annulling a statutory marriage. Consequently, a priest may implement the canon laws
to declare a marriage as non-existing or invalid whereas that same union exists and
is valid under the state’s family laws.

2.8.4 Mallams and soothsayers implementing
Spiritual Law
Mallams and Soothsayers are spiritual leaders who are believed to have the power to
foresee future events.159 They warn their patrons about those events and advise them
on what they need to do to avoid the negative consequences of those events. The

As at 2007 there were about 176 million Catholics in Africa
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/12/catholic-church-africa/1963171/
159 Definition of Soothsayer: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/soothsayer
158
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spirituality attached to these warnings make the patrons of the Mallams and
soothsayer follow through with their advice. For instance a soothsayer in the
northern part of Ghana may declare a child whose birth coincides with a major family
tragedy as one born to undermine the economic advancement of his or her family and
therefore advice that the family brings the child to him to be killed if the family wishes
to prosper financially.160 When such a child is brought the soothsayer implements his
spiritual law by killing the child. The right to life of that child which is guaranteed
under the Constitution161 and under the Children’s Act of Ghana162 is violated by the
soothsayer in the implementation of his ‘said’ spiritual laws.

Mallams are frequently consulted in Africa for spiritual protection and guidance for
every situation. The Mallams, like the soothsayers, prescribe activities for their
patrons to undertake in order to achieve their desired goals. In 2014, President
Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, in an attempt to solve the problem of the Boko Haram
terrorists consulted Mallams from Senegal. He invited them to his Presidential villa
Anas Aremeyaw Anas, is the Ghanaian investigative journalist who uncovered the story of “spirit
children.” The practice is that a parent experiencing financial hardships (usually, the father) consults
a soothsayer (traditional spiritualists; different from herbalists) who upon divination attributes the
father’s economic woes to one of his children. He advises the father to present the child to be killed as
remedy. When the child is brought the soothsayer administers a poisonous concoction to the child
orally, killing the child. In the report, Anas posed as a father who was facing economic hardship and
consulted a soothsayer. The soothsayer attributed the hardship to Anas’ son (except that Anas did not
have any children but had pretended to the soothsayer that he had a son.) The soothsayer then invited
him to present the son to be killed as solution to the hardship. At the appointed time, as the Soothsayer
was about to administer the poisonous concoction to the dummy child presented by Anas, the Police
moved in and arrested the Soothsayer. The full documentary is available at
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2013/01/201319121124284358.html
(last visited 23 March 2018.)
161 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 13(1): “No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except
in the exercise of the execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the laws
of Ghana of which he has been convicted.”
162 Children’s Act of Ghana, 1998, Act 560, section 6(2): “Every child has the right to life, dignity,
respect, leisure, liberty, health, education and shelter from his parents.” (emphasis is mine.)
160
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to undertake spiritual exercises aimed at bringing an end to crisis caused by Boko
Haram.163

2.8.5 Traditional / fetish priests implementing
Spiritual Law
Various communities in Africa usually have an oracle, voodoo or fetish they consider
as protecting them. The fetish priest acts as the liaison between the oracle or fetish
and the people (collectively and individually.) He is therefore the spiritual head of
people in the community and thus highly revered. Usually he gives rules of conduct
purporting to emanate from the oracle or god for the community. It is believed that
when the community or individual follows the rules laid down by the god they
prosper but when they violate those rules it angers the god and misfortune may befall
them. Sometimes the very survival of the community or individual may be threatened.
To avoid the misfortune, the community or person who consults the fetish priest
usually abides by all the laws of the god as relayed to them by the fetish priest. For
instance, there are certain specific days of the week that the gods usually set aside for
rest. On those days members of the community may not farm or fish. When a member
of the community violates this rule by farming or fishing on those days reserved for
the resting of the gods the consequence is that he or she must be banished from the
community. The fetish priest implements this rule by leading the person to the

Story of President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and the Mallams is available at:
http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/boko-haram-jonathan-invites-senegalese-mallams-forprayers/ (last visited on February 22 2017.)
163
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outskirts of that township or community and performing the necessary rituals before
physically driving the person out of the area. The fetish priest implementing these
“laws” is at variance with international norms guaranteeing the dignity of the person
and the individual’s right to independently live and be included in a community.

2.9 LESSONS FROM DOMESTIC LEGAL PLURALISM
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICAN
STATES WITH LEGAL PLURALISTIC CONTEXTS
2.9.1 Conflict of laws situation

In colonial times conflicts arose and continue to arise in the post-colonial African
states between the various systems of law in operation within those jurisdictions. In
Ghana categories of internal conflict of laws that can arise include conflicts between
customary law and statute; customary law and common law; customary law and
Islamic law; customary law and customary law; statute and common law; statute and
Islamic law; statute and statute; and common law and Islamic law. The internal
conflict of laws that occur in African states with legal pluralism is resolved through
certain rules164; but those rules for the resolution of internal conflict of laws do not

Rules for the resolution of internal conflict of Laws in Ghana are found in the following case law: Re
Canfor: Canfor v Kpodo [1968] GLR 177 [note reversed by CA on 5th August 1969]; Owusu v Agyepong
[1971] 1 GLR 56; Whittaker v Choiteram [1971] 2 GLR 267; Youhana v Abboud [1974] 2 GLR 201 CA;
164
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apply to conflicts that arise in the domestication of public international law—conflict
between national and international law; and conflict between customary law and
international law. A different approach is therefore required in order to achieve
domestication of international human rights laws in African states with legal
pluralistic contexts.

2.9.2 Acknowledge differences between homogenous
and heterogeneous societies
Again, the process of domesticating one type of international law in different systems
of law (heterogeneous societies) is more complex than domesticating one
international law in one system of national law (homogenous societies). This is the
fundamental. Generally societies are homogenous, and after receiving an
international law into the state’s municipal laws the assumption is that there is a
straightforward process by which the individuals within the state make the
international law their own. This straightforward process is absent in heterogeneous
societies and it is important to acknowledge the difference between the two societies.

2.9.3 Acknowledge different types of gatekeepers in
legal pluralistic societies
In re Larbi (deceased) Larbi v Larbi [1977] 2 GLR 52; King v Elliot [1972] 1 GLR 54 CA; Yirenkyi v Sakyi
[1991] 1 GLR 217; Dr. Owusu Afriyie Akoto v Adwoa Abrefi [2011] 1 SCGLR 533; and the following
statutes Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367); Choice of law rules in section 54 of the Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459) particularly rule 6.
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States with legal pluralism acknowledge that there is a range of people implementing
other laws within the state and creating situations of legal pluralism such as chiefs
implementing customary laws and traditional or fetish priests implementing spiritual
laws. That acknowledgement is very necessary if the state is to ensure compliance
with its own official state laws because it shows state officials the potential
gatekeepers who can allow or obstruct the successful implementation of the state
laws in that society. State officials therefore develop appropriate strategies to work
with these gatekeepers to achieve the state goals. Similarly, in implementing
international human rights treaties in African states with legal pluralism, it is
necessary for the state, human rights treaty bodies and NGOs to acknowledge that
there are gatekeepers who are already enforcing their non-state laws and they must
develop strategies for working with these gatekeepers to ensure the successful
implementation of human rights treaty. Targeting individuals in the community
directly without recourse to these gatekeepers will result in limited successes in the
treaty implementation.

2.9.4 Tap into authentic indigenous knowledge

The cases of sungusungu in Tanzania and Gacaca in Rwanda discussed above165
demonstrate that Africa’s own traditional, authentic, original, indigenous knowledge
is a wealth of resource available to the official state system which the state system

165

See Section 2.6.3. above.
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can tap into to help resolve modern day challenges. Applying this to the
implementation of international human rights, instead of UN human rights treaty
bodies insisting that African states demonstrate compliance with the relevant
international human rights treaties by following the same universal one-size fits all
method used by all other states, it can allow African states to tap into sub-group level
indigenous knowledge to enable them achieve the overarching principles of the
human rights treaties.

2.9.5 Create alternatives

Human rights treaty bodies should give African states with legal pluralism
alternatives to the overarching principles enshrined in the treaties and this would
facilitate treaty implementation in those states. For instance, in African states with
legal pluralism, state laws recognize different types of marriages which reflect the
different legal systems operating within those African states. Similarly, UN Human
rights treaty bodies could begin to give alternatives in their recommendations to
State Parties during their state reporting which show an acknowledgement of legal
pluralism within states. That kind of latitude would make it easier with African states
with legal pluralism to comply with the treaty.
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2.10 CONCLUSION

Most post-independence African states have multiple systems of law in operation
within those states. In this chapter we have examined what legal pluralism is and
what makes African legal pluralism distinct from what occurs elsewhere. We also
examined how legal pluralism operates within African states, its advantages and
disadvantages, and the factors promoting and obstructing legal pluralism in Africa.
Additionally, we attempted to draw lessons from the operation of domestic legal
pluralism in Africa for the domestication of international human rights norms in
Africa. We will now examine why African states poorly implement international
human rights treaties.
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3 CHAPTER THREE:
WHY AFRICAN STATES POORLY
IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION

An examination of African state party reports to United Nations treaty bodies shows
that generally the degree of implementation of international human rights treaties
does not meet the standard required by the treaties.166 In this chapter we will
examine: how international human rights law is incorporated into domestic legal
regimes in Africa, the reasons why African states still poorly implement international
human rights treaties even after incorporation, who is responsible for causing this
situation and how they cause it; and finally, who is responsible for improving the
situation and how they can do so.

166 OHCHR

Webpage makes available state party reports of all state parties to all the UN Human
Rights treaties: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en
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3.2 HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW IS
INCORPORATED INTO DOMESTIC COURTS IN
AFRICA (The case of Ghana)
There are many ways by which international law is incorporated into domestic courts
in Africa. This section uses the situation in Ghana to identify these methods of
incorporating international law into domestic laws in African states with legal
pluralism.167

International law is not expressly listed as a source of law in the Constitution of
Ghana, 1992.168 However Ghana incorporates international law into its domestic Law
in the following seven ways: incorporation by the dualist process; incorporation by
resolution of Parliament; incorporation by international law and domestic law
coinciding;

incorporation

by

reference;

incorporation

by

interpretation;

incorporation by using international law to fill the lacuna in domestic law and
incorporation of customary international law through the common law.169

The first process is incorporation by the dualist process. Ghana like most common
law African states, subscribes to the dualist approach of incorporating international
law domestically. Therefore, after the President of Ghana executes or causes the
It is noteworthy that Ghana is a former British colony and therefore she follows the common law
dualism tradition unlike other civil law African states such as Togo, which follow the monism tradition.
168 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 11: This Article lists the sources of law in Ghana and it does not
expressly include international law.
169 Raymond A. Atuguba, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) Executive
Master of Arts Degree in Conflict, Peace and Security (EMCPS 2) 2017 – 2018 Academic year. Lecture
1 (9th March 2018.)
167
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execution of a treaty, agreement of convention, the Parliament of Ghana must enact
an enabling legislation to domesticate the international law, which the President will
assent to. When these are done (usually in the form of an Act of Parliament with the
Treaty or Convention annexed to it as a schedule to the Act), the enabling legislation
carries the full force of law in Ghana.170 This requirement is laid down in Articles
75(2)(a) and 106 (1) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992. Article 75 (2)(a) of the
Constitution of Ghana, provides that “A treaty, agreement or convention executed by
or under the authority of the President shall be subject to ratification by [an] Act of
Parliament.”

171

Once the enabling legislation receives the Presidential assent, it

assumes the same status as any other Act of Parliament in Ghana and overrides any
other prior laws that may be inconsistent with it. This is because, Article 106(1)
provides that once the present assents to a Bill that Bill becomes Law in Ghana: “The
power of Parliament to make laws shall be exercised by bills passed by Parliament
and assented to by the President.”

The second process of domesticating international law in Ghana is incorporating by
resolution. The Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 75(2)(b) provides that “A treaty,
agreement or convention executed by or under the authority of the President shall be
subject to ratification by a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more
than one-half of all the members of Parliament.”172 However ratification by resolution
does not incorporate the international law into the domestic laws of Ghana in the

170 Constitution,

supra note 80, Article 106
Constitution, supra note 80, Article 75(2)(a).
172 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 75(2)(a)
171
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same way that ratification by the enactment of an enabling legislation does. This is
because, unlike ratification by Act of Parliament, ratification by resolution does not
give the international agreement force of law in Ghana and the international
agreement cannot override other prior Acts of Parliament (and Regulations) in
Ghana. It only signifies that Ghana is bound by the agreement internationally.

The following decisions by the Supreme Court of Ghana clearly explain the difference
between ratification by an Act of Parliament and ratification by resolution of
Parliament. First, in Republic v. High Court (Commercial Division) Accra; ex parte
Attorney General (NML Capital – Interested party) (2013), Date-Bah JSC states:
“…treaties, even when the particular treaty has been ratified by Parliament, do not alter
municipal law until they are incorporated into Ghanaian law by appropriate legislation.
This position of the Law is usually referred to as reflecting the “dualist” school of
thought, as distinct from the monist approach followed by some other States… . The
mere fact that a treaty has been ratified by Parliament through one of the two modes
indicated above does not, of itself, mean that it is incorporated into Ghanaian law. A
treaty may come into force and regulate the rights and obligations of the State on the
international plane, without changing rights and obligations under municipal law.
Where the mode of ratification adopted is through and Act of Parliament, that Act may
incorporate the treaty, by appropriate language, into the municipal law of Ghana… . The
need for the legislative incorporation of treaty provisions into municipal law before
domestic courts can apply those provisions is reflective of the dualist stance of
Commonwealth common law courts and backed by a long string of authorities…”
104

Second, in Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd v Attorney General173, the Supreme Court of Ghana
confirmed that an international agreement which does not receive the required
Parliamentary resolution would be set aside. In that case Date-Bah JSC said: “The plain
meaning of article 181(5) would appear to be that where the Government of Ghana
enters into "an international business or economic transaction" it must comply with the
requirements, mutatis mutandis, imposed by article 181 of the Constitution. Those
requirements clearly include the laying of the relevant agreement before Parliament.
The agreement is not to come into operation unless it is approved by a resolution of
Parliament. On the facts of this case, since the Respondent neither pleaded nor proved
any such Parliamentary approval, this provision would be fatal to their claim in this
action, unless an examination of this issue is foreclosed by res judicata… In my view, the
Power Purchase Agreement was clearly an international business transaction and
therefore needed to comply with the obligations imposed in relation to it by article
181(5).”

Finally in the case of Martin Amidu v Attorney-General, Isofoton & Forson174, the
Supreme Court of Ghana referred to the case of Faroe Atlantic Company Ltd v.
Attorney-General (above) where it had held “that an economic or business transaction
between the Government of Ghana and a foreign registered and resident company was
an international business transaction within the meaning of Article 181(5) of the 1992

173

Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd v Attorney General [2005-2006] SCGLR 271
Amidu v Attorney-General, Isofoton & Forson [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 167

174 Martin
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Constitution and therefore it had to be laid before Parliament and approved by it.
Failure by the Executive to secure such Parliamentary approval would result in the
nullity of the relevant agreement.”

In spite of the above decisions, Articles 40 and 73 of the Constitution of Ghana, 1993,
urge government to fulfill its international legal obligations even when those
obligations have not been domesticated.175 This was the holding by the Supreme
Court in the celebrated case of New Patriotic Party v. Inspector-General of Police:
“The Court would not decline an invitation to apply international human rights
instruments in the enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution merely on the
grounds that such instruments are not incorporated into domestic law.”176

The third process is incorporation by international law and domestic law coinciding.
Where the clear words of the Constitution and the Laws of Ghana coincide with the
international law it incorporates the international law into Ghana’s domestic laws.
For instance, Article 29 of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, contains provisions on the
rights of Persons with Disabilities. The provisions in Article 29(1)-(3) of the
Constitution of Ghana and sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Persons with Disability Act of

Constitution, supra note 80, Article 40 provides that “… In its dealings with other nations, the
Government shall (c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means; (d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may
be, the aims and ideals of – i) the Charter of the United Nations; ii) the Charter of the Organisation of
African Unity; iii) the Commonwealth; iv) the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African
States; and v) any other international organisation of which Ghana is a member.” And Article 73 of the
same Constitution provides that “The Government of Ghana shall conduct its international affairs in
consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy in a manner
consistent with the national interest of Ghana.”
176 New Patriotic party v Inspector General of Police (1993-94) 2 GLR 459
175
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Ghana, 2006 (Act 715) coincide with Article 9 of the 1975 Declaration by the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA); the provisions in Article 29(4) of the Constitution
of Ghana and Section 4 of the Persons with disability Act of Ghana, coincide with
Article 10 of the 1975 Declaration by the UNGA; and the provisions in Article 29(5)
and the provisions of section 5 of the Persons with Disability Act of Ghana coincide
with the second half of the provisions in Article 11 of the 1975 Declaration by the
UNGA. By the provisions in the domestic laws of Ghana coinciding with the provisions
in the international law, the international law is domesticated in Ghana.

The fourth process is incorporation by reference. When the Laws of Ghana make
reference to international law, by that reference, they incorporate the international
law into the domestic laws of Ghana. For instance, Article 33(5) of the Constitution,
1992, provides that “The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the
fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall
not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to
be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.” 177
This reference rights “inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom
and dignity of man” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of New
Patriotic Party v Inspector – General of Police178 to mean that the Constitution
incorporates all the body of international human rights law. In that case, Plaintiffs
sought a declaration that sections 7,8,12(c) and 13 of the Public Order Decree, 1972

177
178

Constitution, supra note 80, Article 33(5)
New Patriotic Party v Inspector General of Police, supra note 176.
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(NRCD 68) which gave the Minister for the Interior power to permit or prohibit the
holding of public meetings or processions are inconsistent with and a contravention
of the Constitution because they breach Article 21 of the Constitution, 1992 which
grants, among others, freedom of assembly and movement of all persons. HayfronBenjamin JSC held that “[I]n chapter 5 of the Constitution, 1992 appropriate procedures
for redress and enforcement of these rights are provided for in article 33 of the
Constitution, 1992. It is interesting to note that article 33(5) of the Constitution, 1992
extends the scope of human rights enjoyment when it says that the rights
mentioned in chapter 5 “… shall not be regarded as excluding others not
specifically mentioned which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and
intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.” I have no doubt in my mind that
the framers of the Constitution, 1992 intended that the citizens of this country should
enjoy the fullest measure of responsible human and civil rights. Therefore, any law
which seeks to abridge these freedoms and rights, must be struck down as
unconstitutional. The requirement of a permit or license is one such abridgement of the
constitutional right.” (emphasis is mine.)

The fifth process is incorporation by interpretation into Ghana law by way of
interpretation and exposition of particular provisions of Ghana’s laws. For instance,
in Gladys Mensah v Stephen Mensah, a case involving the devolution of marital
properties upon divorce, the Supreme Court referred to provisions in two
international human rights laws—the UDHR and CEDAW to draw out the elements of
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Article 12(1)&(2), Articles 22(3)179 and 33(5) of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992.
Jones Dotse JSC stated: “It is to be understood that discrimination and violence against
women differ from country to country and each situation has to be considered on a case
by case basis. In our Ghanaian context, we have referred to the provisions of article 33
(5) of the Constitution…Article (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides as follows:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience, and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood.”
Article 12 (1) and (2) of the Constitution 1992 give the scope and content of the
fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms which the individual is entitled to enjoy. As a
matter of fact, even though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a binding
treaty, its principles and underpinning philosophy has been incorporated into national
constitutions and referred to by several national courts. This is the context into which
our national Constitution 1992 has to be understood in relation to this principle of
Jurisprudence of Equality. Ghana is also a signatory to the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)…Furthermore,
article 5 of CEDAW adds a key concept to international equal protection analysis; the
need to eradicate customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the

Constitution, supra note 80, Article 12(1)&(2) provides that:
and Article 22(3) provides that: “With a view to achieving the full realization of the rights referred
to…(a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage; (b) assets which
are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon
dissolution of the marriage. Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and
reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by law and persons aggrieved by the
exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a court or other tribunal.
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inferiority or the superiority of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”
Consequently he held that “On the basis of the above conventions and treaties and
drawing a linkage between them and the Constitution 1992, it is our considered view
that the time has indeed come for the integration of this principle of “Jurisprudence of
Equality” into our rules of interpretation such that meaning will be given to the contents
of the Constitution 1992, especially on the devolution of property to spouses after
divorce”

The sixth process is incorporation by using international law to fill the lacuna in
Ghana law. “In Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery Authority
[2007-2008] SCGLR 1088, the Court referred to the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to fill a lacuna in the Right to Work in Ghana
law.”180

Finally, the seventh process is incorporation of customary international law into
domestic law through common law. Under Article 11(e) of the Constitution of Ghana,
1992, the Common Law is a valid source of law in Ghana.181 The argument is that
Common Law includes customary international law and therefore by making
Common Law a valid source of law in Ghana, Ghana has incorporated customary
international law into its domestic law. Date-Bah JSC gave the following explanation
in The Republic v High Court; Ex parte Attorney General, NML Capital Ltd, the

Atuguba, supra note 169
Constitution, supra note 80, Article 11 provides: The Laws of Ghana shall comprise - (e) The
Common law.
180
181
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Republic of Argentina: “Ghanaian law on this basic question is no different from the
usual position of Commonwealth common law jurisdictions. It is that customary
international law is part of Ghanaian law; incorporated by the weight of common law
case law (for instance, Triquet v Bath (1764) 3 Burr. 1478 (Court of King’s Bench)
and per Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of
Nigeria [1977] QB 529 (Court of Appeal)). In Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC
160, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, speaking through Lord Atkin, stated
this common law position as follows (at p. 168):
‘The courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations accept
among themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant
rule is, and, having found it, they will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law,
so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared by
their tribunals.’
However, treaties, even when the particular treaty has been ratified by Parliament, do
not alter municipal law until they are incorporated into Ghanaian law by appropriate
legislation.”

According to Atuguba, when Ghana ratifies an international treaty and incorporates
it into the domestic law of Ghana, she is bound by it. However even when the
international law is not incorporated domestically, Ghana is only bound by it at the
international level and not at the domestic level. Consequently Ghana cannot conduct
herself in a manner that defeats the object and purpose of the international
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instrument.182 Neither can she invoke provisions of domestic law to justify failure to
perform it.183 The major exception to this rule concerns principles of customary
international law and principles of jus cogens. This is because for common law states
such as Ghana, these principles are part of common law, which is already a part of the
domestic laws. therefore the state does not need to have ratified a treaty containing
these principles to become bound by them. the state, having incorporated common
law into its domestic law, is considered to have additionally incorporated principles
of customary international law and principles of jus cogens into its domestic laws and
therefore is bound by them.184

3.3 REASONS FOR AFRICAN STATES’ POOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
3.3.1 Domestic laws and practices violating
international law obligations
A state party cannot be said to be in compliance with its international human rights
obligations if its domestic laws and practices are in violation of the international
treaty. The principle of pacta sunt servanda requires a state party to perform its

Atuguba, supra note 169.
Atuguba, supra note 169: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 27 (with the exception
of afew constitutional principles.)
184 Atuguba, supra note 169.
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obligations under a treaty, and one way for a state to demonstrate that it is
performing its obligations is to ensure that its domestic laws are not at variance with
the treaty. Ghana’s old marital rape law offers an example of how a state party’s
existing laws can present obstacles to its successful implementation of its
international obligations. Ghana’s Criminal Code provided that once consent had been
given for marriage, that consent could not be revoked for sex.185 Invariably, although
Ghana was a party to the CEDAW, ICCPR and ICESCR without reservation, its domestic
law permitted marital rape in violation of those treaties. This was the situation until
2007 when the offending domestic law was changed.186 Interestingly, one man,
Justice Crabbe, who had been assigned the task of revising the Laws of Ghana, did the
removal. Consequently, many people still question his authority to have amended a
Law of Ghana and claim that having acted ultra vires his powers, the removal was
invalid and therefore marital rape is still permitted in Ghana. In any case, the
enforceability of the revised law is in question because it goes against Ghanaian
culture for a wife to file charges against her husband for marital rape—to date, no
such charges have been filed.

There are many domestic practices in Ghana that violate Ghana’s international human
rights obligations. For instance, the Trokosi (slavery) system violates the CRC,
CEDAW, African charter on the rights and welfare of the child and the UDHR187.
Trokosi is a system that requires a virgin girl to be sent to the shrine of a god to serve

The Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960, Act 29, section 42(g)
Elizabeth A. Archampong, Marital Rape, a women’s equality issue in Ghana, 2 (2010),
187 UDHR, supra note 18, Article 5
185
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the god in atonement for the offence of a relative and to avoid the punishment of the
entire family for that offence.188 Ghana has enacted domestic legislation criminalizing
the trokosi system189 yet the practice continues. This same trend is observed in
inheritance practices. Here, although the state has enacted the Intestate Succession
Law to regulate the distribution of property of a person who dies intestate190, in rural
communities people use customary law to distribute a deceased’s property rather
than the state law, and the customary law violates women’s equality guaranteed
under various international laws to which Ghana is party. 191

3.3.2 Incorporating international law into domestic
laws
Many African states have not expressly stated that international law is part of their
municipal laws. For instance in Ghana Article 11 of the Constitution, 1992 which
spells out the laws of Ghana does not expressly include international law.192 Yet
international law is reflected in many of the human rights provisions in Ghana’s
Constitution and international law is implied in a reading of other laws. For instance,
Article 15 of Ghana’s Constitution, which is on respect for human dignity draws
inspiration from UDHR, ICCPR, African charter, CAT/CID Treatment or punishment,
all of which outlaw torture and cruel and inhuman treatment in order to protect

Amy Small Bilyeu, Trokosi, The practice of Sexual slavery in Ghana: Religious and Cultural Freedom
vs Human Rights, IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 9:2, 457 (1999)
189 Criminal code of Ghana, Act 29, 1998, Section 314A
190 Intestate Succession Law of Ghana, 1985, PNDC Law 111
191 Okeke, supra note 71
192 Ibid
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human dignity.193 Okeke argues that there is creeping monism even in common law
countries that were usually dualist and therefore those countries do not always wait
to pass an enabling legislation to recognize the international law, but have other ways
of giving recognition to the international law domestically.194 For instance Article 144
of the Constitution of Namibia, 1990 provides that “Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law and
international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution shall form
part of the law of Namibia.”195 This trend is also found in the Constitution of Kenya:
Article 2 of the Constitution of Kenya provides that “the general rules of international
law shall form part of the law of Kenya” and “Any treaty or convention ratified by
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.”196 But the most
profound recognition of international law in the national Constitution of a dualist
African state seems to come from Article 11 of the Constitution of Cape Verde, 1992.
It provides that: “General or common international law, insofar as it is in force in the
international legal order, shall be an integral part of the Cape Verdean legal order …
Legal acts emanated from the relevant organs of the supranational organizations of
which Cape Verde is a member, shall enter directly into force in the domestic legal
order, provided that that is so established in the respective constitutive instruments.

Constitution, supra note 80, Article 15 provides: 15(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.
(2) No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or detained, be subjected to-(a)torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) any other condition that detracts or
is likely to detract from his dignity and worth as a human being. (3) A person who has not been
convicted of a criminal offence shall not be treated as a convicted person and shall be kept separately
from convicted persons. (4) A juvenile offender who is kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept
separately from an adult offender.
194 Atuguba, supra note 169
195 Ibid
196 Ibid
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The rules and principles of general or common international law and of conventional
international law, validly approved or ratified, shall prevail after their entry into force
in the international and domestic legal orders, over all legislative and domestic
normative acts of an infra-constitutional value… .”

3.3.3 Unrealistic provisions in international human
rights treaties
It is common to have situations where African states cannot relate to some of the
provisions of the international human rights treaties they ratify. The reasons for
which such African states ratify international human rights treaties are varied. 197
After ratification most of these African states realize that it is impossible to implement
the treaty provisions within their domestic contexts because they are not
guaranteeing things that the population can relate with or which are of immediate
importance to the population. For instance, the CRPD’s provisions on participation of
the PWD in cultural activities of the community and the provisions protecting the
rights of the PWD to his independence have been variously criticized by African
scholars for not reflecting the African culture.198 The scholars have argued that
whereas the Western lifestyle is built on independence the African culture is built on
interdependence. So if the CRPD’s provision on independence is fully implemented

BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, (Cambridge
University Press, 2009)
198 Eskay, M., et al., Disability within the African culture US – China Education Review 473 - 484
(2012)
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the African PWD would rather be unhappy than happy. When the treaty provision is
disconnected from the realities of the African states, it is very common for the state
to be labeled as “poorly implementing the treaty” because the realities within the
state would ensure that the treaty’s provisions would not receive full implementation.
Okeke notes that “[e]very law should take cognizance of the socio-cultural
background of the people for whom such law is made.”199 Okeke makes this statement
whilst creating doubt about how Ghana would implement a “new law” that appears
to criminalize marital rape in response to pressure from the international community
in view of its socio-cultural background: “Perhaps the law repealing the marital rape
exemption in Ghana is one of the laws that are easy to pass but difficult, if not
impossible to enforce.”200

3.3.4 Westernized International Law

One of the reasons why African states implement international human rights norms
poorly is that those norms are predominantly “Western.” According to Matua Makau
“the human rights corpus, though well meaning, is fundamentally Eurocentric, and
suffers from several basic and interdependent flaws. . . . [F]irst, the corpus falls within
the historical continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast
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Okeke, supra note 71, at 391.
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into superior and subordinate positions.”201 According to Okeke, associating the
beginning of international law with the Peace of Westphalia is flawed because in
African countries such as Egypt, international law had “existed since antiquity” but
contributions to the development of international law by African states are
deliberately ignored when recounting the history of mainstream international law
and western viewpoints are deliberately highlighted.202 International law as we have
now, also emphasizes the underlying colonial mentality of civilizing the uncivilized
states.203 Consequently, Africa is viewed as an “object” of international law and not a
“subject” of the law,204 and being mere recipients of international law, African states
fail in their attempt to domesticate those “foreign” concepts in international human
rights norms.

3.3.5 Leadership

In many African states, leaders try to serve life terms or near life terms and therefore
do not encourage the implementation of international human rights treaties that
could ultimately threaten their tenure of office. International human rights treaties
such as the ICCPR guarantee political rights and although most African states are

Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J.
201, 204 (2001).
202 Okeke, supra note 71
203 Ibid
204 HENRY J. RICHARDSON III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22, 23
(2008) “the legal history of international law and American legal history have treated most Africanheritage peoples as objects and not subjects of law when they have not ignored them altogether”
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parties to the ICCPR without reservations, their leaders would rather limit the
implementation of such instruments than limit the number of years they spend in
political office. So the interest of African leaders to hold on to political office
negatively affects how well they would implement international human rights
treaties within their states. The longer they hold on to public office, the less inclined
they are to implement international human rights treaties. African leaders are also
uneager to implement international human rights treaties within their states because
of fear of being tried under those treaties when they leave power.

3.3.6 Poverty

Most African states fall within the bracket of lest or less developed countries.205 Due
to high poverty levels, the immediate priorities of those states are often not the
implementation of international human rights treaties. The resolution of some of the
poverty-related issues such as education, nutrition and shelter may ultimately satisfy
international human rights obligations, however the satisfaction of the international
obligation is usually not the aim of the state from the on-set.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN List of Least Developed Countries,
available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-LeastDeveloped-Countries.aspx (last visited on 24 March 2018)
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3.3.7 Legal Pluralism

3.3.7.1 Legal pluralism gives African state additional hurdles
in the reception of international law
As explained in the introduction to this dissertation, generally states are supposed to
absorb international law into their domestic legal systems after ratification.
Unfortunately situations of legal pluralism, creating state and non-state systems of
laws, mean that for the international law to be absorbed into the domestic legal
system it must be absorbed into the state system and also the non-state system. This
multi-layered approach to state reception of international law, made necessary by the
condition of legal pluralism, inhibits automatic state absorption of international law.
Thus although after ratification the international law is part of the domestic law
theoretically, practically the international law does not become part of the actual
domestic law of the state because it does not order the lives of an important section
of the population – the non-state actors. Legal pluralism creates a kind of block
between state and non-state laws, and the international law must permeate this block
to reach the non-state level.

Whether the African state follows the monist or dualist tradition it must undertake
further steps after ratification to ensure that norms of the treaty reach the non-state
level within its state. Taking the additional steps to achieve this could be frustrating
for state actors because it requires the spending of extra resources, which do not have
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to be spent in other states without the feature of legal pluralism. However, without
undertaken those additional steps, the international norms will not reach the nonstate level, which is very necessary, because the violations targeted by international
human rights treaties usually occur at the non-state level. For instance, child bride
practices targeted by the CRC206, widowhood rites targeted by the CEDAW207 and the
non-education of CWDs targeted by the CRPD208 usually occur at the non-state level.
Unless non-state laws reflect the international human rights norms and the non-state
actors and institutions accept the international norms, the international treaty will
continue to be violated at the non-state level, the intended benefit of the international
treaty would not be achieved, and the state will be considered as poorly implementing
the international human rights treaty.

For non-state laws in legal pluralistic African states to reflect international human
rights treaties norms, State actors cannot limit their efforts to the enactment of
domestic legislations and other state level activities. They need to take extra
deliberate steps to extend the norms into the non-state milieu for the two streams of
law (international law and the customary or other non-state law) to meet. Without
undertaking this additional step, the state is unlikely to effectively comply with the
treaty. Yet, if the state had not had the feature of legal pluralism, this extra step would
not have been necessary because the state level actions would have been sufficient to

Early Marriage, supra note 15
UN Women, supra note 11
208 UNICEF, Promoting the Rights of Children with Disabilities, Innocenti Digest No. 13, 2007.
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ensure that the whole population is ruled by that one state – level law and no other
law.

3.3.7.2 Legal Pluralism makes state implementation of
international human rights treaties more costly
As explained above African states with legal pluralism have to go through multiple
stages in order for international law to be received into their municipal laws. Going
through these stages imposes additional costs on states. These additional costs would
be spent in ratifying the international law and then in getting non-state actors to
accept the international human rights norms. The more difficult of the two stages is
at the non-state level. There are so many different actors at the non-state level that
would need to be consulted to facilitate the reception of the international law at the
non-state level. The consultations would need to take different forms and occur under
different circumstances. For instance, approaching a chief would require the
performance of various ceremonies, which need to be paid for.

As mentioned above, many African states are poor209, and their governments are
skeptical about spending their meager resources just to domestic international
human rights laws. Consequently they would rather just complete the state level
ratification and expect the international law to trickle down to the non-state level.
Without state actors making the proper investment to bring the law to the non-state
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level, the required change (usually expected from non-state actors) will not be
achieved and the state will be accused of poorly implementing the international
human right treaty. Also non-state actors such as chiefs (who act as gate-keepers of
customary law) can make it easy for others (for instance, the subjects of the chiefs) to
receive the international law by doing away with the ceremonial hurdles that make it
expensive for state actors to reach them with the international laws.

3.4 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT CAUSAL
CONTRIBUTION TO AFRICAN STATES’ POOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
3.4.1 UN Treaty bodies

UN Treaty bodies emphasize approaches to state implementation of international
human rights treaties, which are alien to African societies, and when the African
states are unable to perform according to those approaches, the treaty bodies
consider them as poorly implementing the human rights treaty. The UN treaty bodies
are mandated to monitor state implementation of the relevant treaties they have
signed and to facilitate their work, they often require state parties to demonstrate
compliance in a similar way. Other times the treaty bodies give interpretations to the
treaty which the state parties had not contemplated at the time of becoming parties
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to the treaty and which they find unacceptable in their circumstances. For instance
the Human rights Committee has interpreted non-discrimination on the basis of sex
to include sexual orientation.210 Several African states have criminalized same-sex
unions in their domestic legislations and struggle to incorporate these new
interpretations of the international law into their domestic laws. In the meantime, as
those African states struggle to adjust their societies to the shift in the international
law, the Treaty body keeps evaluating the state as poorly performing its obligation
under the treaty. So the UN Treaty bodies’ interpretation of the treaties to reflect
concepts that are alien to Africa and were not in the contemplation of the states at the
time of becoming parties to the treaty contribute to African states’ poor
implementation of the human rights treaties.

3.4.2 Non Governmental Organizations

NGOs have almost become a permanent fixture in African states. Usually, they pursue
projects without a proper understanding of the socio-cultural context in which they
are operating resulting in the failure of those projects and they accusing the state
actors of not doing more to improve the human rights of their people. For instance, it
is common knowledge that rural African women work extra hard in their homes;
travelling long hours to fetch water for household use, travel to farm, and have limited

International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association: Kirichenko K. United Nations
Treaty Bodies: References to sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex
characteristics, 2016 (Geneva: ILGA, November 2017)
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education among others. An NGO seeking to empower these rural African women may
start a school for the women to educate them. Although well-intentioned, such
initiatives would be unsuccessful unless the NGOs approach involve bringing the
patriarchal head of the communities to an acceptance of the project. His disapproval
of the women spending time away from their marital homes could cause the collapse
of the entire project. Subsequently the NGOs in their shadow report to the UN treaty
body would accuse the state party of not doing more for women’s empowerment
causing the state to be classified as poorly implementing its treaty obligations.

3.4.3 State Leaders

In most African countries, government leaders often act in violation of the rights of
their citizens and therefore were not inclined to implement the international human
rights treaties. Some corrupt government leaders use public funds to their personal
benefit rather than provide social goods for their citizens as required under the
ICESCR. Military leaders often come into power after a coup d’etat and prefer to rule
without the control of the law. Consequently, they violate many international human
rights treaties. In Nigeria, there have been “instances of unlawful and arbitrary
detention, unfair trials without a right of appeal, torture by the military or their
agencies, mass public executions, and extrajudicial executions and public killings;
these actions were adjudged to be antithetical to the UDHR, African Charter, ICCPR,
ICESCR, CAT/CIDTorP” which Nigeria had ratified. The killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and
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eight others in Nigeria is an example of military leaders’ disregarding international
human rights principles.211 The leaders of the state discourage the enforcement of
international human rights treaties because this enables them rule the way they want.
In the long – run, the state will be deemed to be poorly implementing its international
human rights obligation because of the actions of its leaders.

3.4.4 Non-state level leaders

In most African states with legal pluralism, non-state level leaders can use their
authority to enforce sub-group norms that violate international human rights norms
and cause the entire state to be classified as poorly implementing international
human rights laws. Non-state actors such as chiefs and religious leaders wield a lot of
authority among their people some of the non-state laws they implement actually
violate international human rights norms. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, under
sharia law as punishment the punishment for engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse
is death by stoning. According to Okeke “from the perspective of international law,
this crude administration of criminal justice is incompatible with Nigeria’s
obligations under a number of international treaties (1999 Constitution of Nigeria,
ICCPR, CAT/CIDTorP, African Charter and even customary international law (jus
cogens)212

211 Okeke,
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3.4.5 Ordinary citizens

The actions of individual citizens of a state can also cause the state to be classified as
poorly implementing its international human rights obligations. For instance,
ordinary South Africans who consider that migrant workers are taking over their jobs
kill many African migrant workers in South Africa.213 Although South Africa has not
ratified the Convention on the protection of the rights of all Migrant Workers and
members of their families (CMW), this is in clear violation of South Africa’s obligations
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Such
actions by ordinary citizens contribute to a poor rating of state in the implementation
of its international human rights obligations.

3.5 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING WHICH
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ERADICATING THE
PROBLEM OF AFRICAN STATES POOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

213 The Guardian, Xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobic-violence-migrantsworkforce (last visited on 26 March 2018)
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3.5.1 UN Treaty bodies

UN treaty bodies can allow more flexibility to State Parties in determining how they
achieve their treaty obligations and interpret treaties in a manner consistent with the
understanding State Parties had at the time of entering into the international
agreement. The flexible approach will help African states develop contextappropriate approaches to maximize outcomes in their implementation of the
international human rights treaties. Secondly, Adherence to the original
understanding of the treaty will provide predictability and encourage African State
Parties to make long-term commitments in initiatives that would improve their
domestication of international human rights norms.

3.5.2 Non Governmental Organizations

NGOs working in African states can do proper socio-cultural context examination of
the communities they seek in to encourage acceptance of their interventions and
contribute to the improvement in the state’s human rights record. To avoid overconcentrating resources on one human rights area such as women’s empowerment,
NGOs could work with the state to identify other human rights areas they can help
improve. If NGOs would work with state actors and take extra steps to understand
the socio-cultural context of the African societies in which they seek to work, their
work would help states improve their implementation of their treaty obligations.
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3.5.3 State Leaders

State actors representing the state at the international level must apply their
knowledge of both their state and the requirement of the international treaty to help
the state perform its obligations under the treaty. State leaders should make and
domestic laws that reflect the international human rights norms and facilitate state
implementation of those laws. The domestic laws must be such that the population
can relate with and make their own, and that knowledge of the laws reaches the nonstate level of ordinary individuals. State leaders should equally invest adequately in
law enforcement and adjudication and through these processes, make necessary
amendment of the law to facilitate the domestication of the international norms.
Without deliberate actions towards domesticating the international human rights
norms otherwise the laws would remain abstract to the people and the people will
continue to violate the international norms and the state will continue to be
characterized as poorly implementing its obligations under the treaty.

3.5.4 Non-state Leaders

Non-state actors can use their authority over the people they govern to accept
international human rights norms and thereby help State Parties to domesticate the
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international human rights norms. For instance, in the area of disability rights, Chiefs
can ban the killing of children with disabilities and religious leaders can encourage
families with people with mental disability to seek medical help instead of chaining
them in prayer camps. The aim would be to recognize that PWDs have rights and
protect those rights. That overarching aim is consistent with the CRPD’s principles
and the outcome of their actions would bring the state into compliance with its
obligations under the CRPD.

3.5.5 Ordinary citizens

If ordinary Africans hold their governments more accountable for the enforcement of
their human rights this would help improve state implementation of its human rights
obligations. It is usually the case that ordinary Africans are used to their poor human
rights conditions and do not pressurize their governments to do more to improve
their conditions. Consequently, the governments do not make extra efforts to improve
the poor human rights conditions of their citizens. A more demanding citizenry would
help African states stop their poor implementation of their international human
rights obligations.

3.6 CONCLUSION
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It is commonplace to read that African states are poorly implementing international
human rights treaties to which they are parties. In this chapter, we have discussed
seven important reasons accounting for the poor implementation of international
human rights treaties in African states and emphasized how legal pluralism
contributes to this phenomenon. The chapter also discussed who is responsible for
what causal contribution to African states poor implementation of international
human rights treaties and who is responsible for making which contributions to
eradicating the problem.

131

4 CHAPTER FOUR:
CASE STUDIES
(WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE AND
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN GHANA)
4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an in-depth case study of the implementation of two
international human rights treaties in two African states with legal pluralistic
contexts—The CEDAW in Zimbabwe and The CRC in Ghana.

4.2 CASE STUDY OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN
ZIMBABWE
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4.2.1 What this case study is meant to establish

This case study will establish that Zimbabwe’s approach to domesticating the
international norms on the rights of women does not fit the legal pluralistic context
of Zimbabwe and is therefore not yielding desired results. It would further show what
approach would yield more positive results.

Additionally the study will show the reader what happens when the approach to
implementing an international human rights norm in an African state does not take
the state’s legal pluralistic context into account.

4.2.2 Background about the state

Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese and later Cecil Rhodes, the area now known as
Zimbabwe was a kingdom ruled according to the customary laws of the people. Cecil
Rhodes was essentially a businessman trading in gold and diamonds from the South
African region. He arrived in Kimberley in 1871 and through negotiations for mining
concessions, made his way inland until in 1891, he received British approval to
declare the area a British protectorate. On 12 September Rhodesia became a selfgoverning crown colony. Between 1957 and 1979 there was a sustained and intense
pressure from the African population for self-rule but Ian Smith gained control of the
country as Prime Minister and imprisoned the African political leaders Joshua Nkomo
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and Robert Mugabe from 1964 till 1974. He then sought to have the British declare
Zimbabwe as independent based on White minority rule. This, and his other attempts
at “indirect minority rule” were successful. Eventually the Lancaster agreement of
1979 paved the way for Britain to grant independence to Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980
with Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party winning the elections in 1980.214 Mugabe ruled
the nation for 37 years and resigned in November 2017. The new president of
Zimbabwe is Emmerson Mnangagwa.215

At Independence, a critical issue faced by the new Zimbabwean government (as was
the case for other African states) was whether to abolish the pre-existing customary
laws and the received (Roman Dutch) law of the colonial authorities in order to create
a unified legal system. Zimbabwe opted to retain both the pre-existing and the
received laws in addition to the new laws made by the new government, resulting in
a plural legal system.216

The 1979 Constitution of Zimbabwe was the country’s first Constitution. It was also
known as Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1600 of the United
Kingdom.) This Constitution received several amendments until a new Constitution
entered into force in 2013. The 1979 Constitution did not contain sufficient human
rights protections making the implementation of international human rights treaties

BRIAN RAFTOPOULOUS & ALOIS MLAMBO, BECOMING ZIMBABWE: A HISTORY FROM THE PRE-COLONIAL
PERIOD TO 2008, (Weaver Press, 2009)
215 BBC News Report, ‘Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe resigns, ending 37year rule,’ 21 November 2017,
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488 (last visited on 24 March 2018.)
216 Hellum, supra note 4
214
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problematic despite its numerous amendments. However, the 2013 Constitution
appears to have rectified this mistake by making extensive human rights provisions
in Chapter four of the Constitution.

This case study is will establish the following: first, examine Zimbabwe’s customary
law and state laws on women’s equality with men upon dissolution of a marriage to
show the gender difference within the laws; second, show the difference between the
state laws on women’s equality and the everyday lived experiences of women which
are consistent with customary law rather than the state/general law; third, show that
enacting state laws that are consistent with international norms but not reflective of
domestic customary laws on the subject will not protect women’s rights in the legal
pluralistic context of Zimbabwe; and fourth, show how African states with legal
pluralism can domesticate the international laws without rejecting prevailing
customary laws.

4.2.3 Background about the CEDAW

CEDAW was adopted on 18 December 1979 by the UN General Assembly and opened
for signature on 1 March 1980.217 It entered into force on 3 September 1981, being
the 30th day after the date on which the 20th instrument of ratification or accession

United Nations Treaty Collection
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&lang=en#1 (last visited on 24 March 2018)
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was deposited with the UN Secretary General, in accordance with Article 27(1) of the
Convention.218 The treaty has 99 signatories and 189 parties.219 Zimbabwe acceded
to the CEDAW on 13 May 1991 without any reservations, declarations or
objections.220

This study examines how Zimbabwe, as a State Party to CEDAW, complies with
CEDAW’s requirement for the equal treatment of women and men at divorce221 when
its customary law requires differential treatment of women and men while the state
laws promote their same treatment. Secondly, the study will inquire into the
approach advocated by the CEDAW Committee for the State Party to demonstrate
compliance with the treaty: enact domestic legislation, make judicial interventions
and adopt administrative practices aimed at ensuring the equal treatment of women
and men at divorce.

4.2.4 How the state actually implements the treaty
and which approach it uses
Generally, most Zimbabweans marry under customary law (requiring the payment of
bride price) before registering it or converting it into a civil law one.222 Among

CEDAW, supra note 12, Article 27(1) provides that the Convention enters into force on the 30 th
day after the date on which the 20th instrument of ratification or accession is deposited with the UN
Secretary General.
219 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 217
220 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 217
221 CEDAW, supra note 12, Article 5, 16(1) (c)
222 Hellum, supra note 4, at 130.
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Zimbabwe’s Shona speaking people, the groom’s family is required to pay the bride
price (lobolo) to the bride’s family in order for the customary law marriage to be valid.
“For the purpose of this study the term bride price or lobolo refers to the different
considerations which the groom is expected to present to different members of
the wife’s extended family during the process of marriage. “Rutsambo” is a cash
payment which the groom is expected to make to the bride’s father. “Rovoro” or
“danga” is some form of payment to the bride’s family as compensation for the
loss of their daughter’s productive and procreative capacity. It is usually paid in
cattle. “Mombe youmai” or the “motherhood beast” refers to the cow which the
groom is expected to pay to the bride’s mother and her maternal ancestors.” 223

Under Shona customary law, the payment of lobolo seals a marriage contract
requiring the wife to move to the husband’s family home and produce a reasonable
number of children to continue the husband’s patrilineage. If the wife is unable to
produce children, her extended family is required to provide another female relative
for the husband to produce the children with. The children produced through this
relative belong to the original wife. Where this arrangement does not resolve the
problem, the wife’s family is required to part with a portion of the lobolo to enable
the husband to look for another wife to produce children and fulfill the requirement
of patrilineal continuity. If it is the husband who is sterile (usually a traditional healer,
called a “n’anga” is consulted to determine who is at fault for the childlessness in the
marriage), his family arranges for a male relative to act as a “seed raiser” and produce
223 Hellum, supra note 4 131.
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children for the husband with the original wife. Those children would belong to the
original husband. Usually, the wife is permitted to give or withdraw her consent for
the “seed raiser.” She may also choose a “seed raiser” subject to her husband’s
consent. The production of children is so important among the Shona speaking people
that even for those living in nuclear family settings in urban areas such as Harare (the
capital city of Zimbabwe), and those who may have become committed Christians,
they still find alternative solutions to having children such as extra-marital
arrangements, IVF and adoption.

In the case of divorce, the husband is entitled to have his lobolo back, however certain
factors are considered in determining how much of the original lobolo the husband
will be paid back. One of those factors is the (in)ability of the wife to produce a
reasonable number of children during the course of the marriage. Sometimes because
the parents of the bride consider that they would be unable to repay the lobolo, they
insist on sending other daughters to try to make children for their childless daughter
so that their childless daughter remains married to her husband. The woman
therefore has to produce children or face all kinds of discomforts and intrusions in
her home because lobolo was paid.

At divorce, the wife (and her family) have the disadvantage of returning the lobolo to
the husband as described above. The Shona customary law provides for the payment
and repayment of lobolo or bride price which has the effect of unevenly situating
women and men during marriage and at divorce because it gives rise to different
138

rights and responsibilities to the men and women; specifically, it puts women at a
disadvantageous position during the marriage and divorce. During the marriage the
woman is compelled to produce children whether or not she wants to because lobolo
has been paid for her. She does not have the right to choose not to have children
because that will be in violation of the contract for which lobolo was paid as
consideration. Without children, she will not find marital joy because she will be
constantly under pressure from her husband, her in-laws, and her own family to fulfill
the obligation to produce children that comes with the payment of lobolo. If she is
unable to fulfill this requirement and divorces or is divorced by her husband, she will
find herself on the wrong side of the customary law once more. The law will require
her to reproduce a portion of the lobolo based on her childlessness.

Customary law is part of the existing laws of Zimbabwe since the country opted for a
legal pluralistic regime at independence. Thus this existing customary law constitutes
discrimination against women contrary to Article 2(f) of CEDAW, and does not give
women and men the same rights and responsibilities during the marriage and at
divorce, contrary to Article 16(1)(c) of CEDAW. To evenly situate women and men in
marriage and during divorce, the international human rights treaty (CEDAW)
requires State Parties to register marriages.224 Zimbabwe has therefore enacted
domestic legislation complying with CEDAW’s requirement for legislative measures
and the domestic legislation requires the registration of marriages.225 The effect is

CEDAW, supra note 12, Article 16(2)
Matrimonial Causes Act of Zimbabwe, Acts 33/1985, 11/1987, 18/1989 (s.38), 2/1990, 6/2000
(s.151.)
224
225
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that Zimbabwe formally recognize three types of marriages under its state law – The
Matrimonial Causes Act. These marriages are: civil marriages, registered customary
marriages and unregistered customary marriages.226 These are the types of
marriages that the state actors would enforce. Where the marriage is registered it is
given full recognition by the court, but where it is unregistered, the court recognizes
only certain features of the marriage, such as the children born within the marriage
and not other features such as the marriage itself. Consequently, the court does not
give any protections to a childless wife in such an unregistered customary law
marriage. This usually happens with unregistered customary law marriages where
the payment of lobolo serves as sufficient notification of a valid marriage.

The State’s requirement of registration in compliance with CEDAW is a universalism
approach to solving the problem of women’s equality. It does not take into account
the actual lived situations of a large proportion of Zimbabwean women, which is that
having been validly married under customary law those women have not additionally
converted their marriages into civil law ones or even registered their customary law
ones. Yet everyone in their community recognizes them as married, and gives full
recognition to their marriage, albeit unregistered, except the judge who implements
a law that is disconnected from reality. The state law simply says the judge will only
admit one evidence as proof of marriage for everyone, irrespective of one’s situation.
That evidence is the marriage registration.

226

Not all unregistered customary law marriages are recognized.
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Because many localities still practice customary law the resulting effect is that large
groups of women, particularly childless wives, are unprotected by the State law. At
divorce, their husbands seek to factor in the childlessness of the wife in increasing the
amount of lobolo to be refunded, and since the law does not recognize the union in
the first place, it does not offer any protection to the wife in divorce matters. The law
would however give full protection to a childless wife from a registered monogamous
marriage.227

Fortunately, where the State law, in compliance with the international law, does not
protect the rights of childless wives in unregistered customary law marriages,
customary law does, by first allowing the husband to factor in the childless of the wife
in the repayment of the lobolo (because the traditional marriage contract obligated
her to produce children for the husband and that part of the contract was not fulfilled)
and then giving the wife her share of property accrued during the marriage. Under
customary law, this intervention is made whether or not the customary law marriage
was subsequently registered. Thus once there is a form of proof that a substantive
marriage existed between the man and woman the protection is made available to
both parties; and the proof required is not limited to registration as happens under
state law. This intervention that customary law offers actually has the effect of
equalizing the situation of the divorced women and men to some extent and is
definitely better than not giving the women anything at all under state law simply
because the procedural requirement of registration was omitted. In a sense, state
227 Hellum, supra note 4, at 403.
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actors’ implementation of the requirement for registration by CEDAW through the
universalism approach actually hinders the implementation of the concept of
women’s equality in practice among childless women in unregistered customary law
marriages in Zimbabwe.

The approach of the non-state actors reflects the cultural pluralism approach to treaty
implementation. Perhaps the state law, in admitting of only one proof of marriage,
seeks to simplify matters because if differently situated women bring different pieces
of evidence to show to the court as evidence that they are validly married it would
overwhelm the court system which may struggle to establish precedence or other
such legal principles. Under the customary law, a woman from MaShonaland can
bring the remainder of a lobolo payment to say that a customary law marriage was
validly contracted whereas another woman from another community would use
another item to demonstrate that she was validly married. As explained at the
introduction of this dissertation, Africa has thousands of cultures and people could
hide behind this fact to try to deceive the court. Yet, should women be placed in a
disadvantageous situation under state laws just to simply the work of state actors?
The substance of what CEDAW intends is the protection of women’s rights. State
parties in aiming to achieve this goal should examine the overall effect of the
measures they take. If the effect of their approach is to place the wife in a
disadvantageous position against the husband, then that approach should be
changed.
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The author suggests that rather than a one-size fits all approach, or an approach that
puts what constitutes a valid marriage up for grasp, at the state level, Zimbabwe’s aim
of ensuring women’s equality would be best achieved through a “pluralistic marriage
regime:”228
To implement the equality principle in a manner that is sensitive to the situation
in hand and caters for the needs of different groups of women it is, as
demonstrated by this study, necessary to have a differentiated strategy. In my
view, the recognition that there is a plurality of forms of marriage would provide
a more flexible instrument for coming to grips with women’s mixed identities,
both as individuals and as a part of an extended family, than does a uniform
marriage regime that links legal protection to registration. Therefore a general
prohibition against sex-discrimination combined with a pluralistic marriage
regime may, under the circumstances, be preferable … by law.”229

This means that state law must first outlaw sex-discrimination and then adapt the law
to the various these forms of Zimbabwean marriages. In proscribing sexdiscrimination, the state law satisfies the overarching aim of CEDAW, and then in
having a domestic legal system that accounts for all forms of Zimbabwean marriages
rather than only the registered ones, the state law takes its legal pluralistic context
into consideration in creating a law that is fit for the context of Zimbabwe. The law
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Hellum, supra note 4, at 417.
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will therefore not leave a section of women unprotected and will not lack definition
because people will not be able to claim just any living arrangement as a marriage.

As noted by eminent African scholars such as Comaroff, customary law is not static;
it is dynamic.230 And so is state law. What constituted customary law 50years ago may
not be the same today. For instance, in many African states with legal pluralism,
customary laws on the rites of passage of girls into adulthood have changed in recent
years to reflect modern policies such as girl-child education. In the same way, state
laws also change frequently for various reasons231 and they can be changed to reflect
an approach to implementation of CEDAW that achieves the substantive aim of the
treaty – women’s equality.

4.2.5 Conclusion to CEDAW case study

Zimbabwe’s state actors’ approach to the implementation of CEDAW is consistent
with the treaty party’s requirement to follow the universalism approach. However,
the effect of implementing this approach is that women are actually placed in a
disadvantageous situation against men, which is inconsistent with the requirement
of CEDAW. On the other hand, the effect of the customary laws is that they re-set the
balance in order not to disadvantage the women. The customary laws achieve this by
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For instance, change of government can result in change of state laws.
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adopting a differentiated approach in determining what constitutes a valid marriage.
Anne Hellum suggests that the approach that would best help Zimbabwe comply with
its obligations under the CEDAW is the cultural pluralism approach.

4.3 CASE STUDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN
GHANA
4.3.1 What this case study is meant to establish

This case study is meant to establish that the cultural pluralism approach can improve
the protection of children’s rights in Ghana but with an additional step.

Ghana has moved from the previous universalism approach to domesticating the CRC
and adopted a new policy towards domesticating the CRC, which fits the particular
context of Ghana and also achieves the aim of the CRC.

The case study demonstrates that a one-size-fits-all approach to the implementation
of international human rights norms will not achieve the expected results; and that in
African states with legal pluralism a context specific approach would better achieve
the international human rights treaty’s goals.
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4.3.2 Background about the state

Ghana was originally called The Gold Coast.232 The Portuguese were the first
Europeans to arrive at the Gold Coast, doing so in 1471. The Danish and subsequently
The British, who eventually colonized Ghana in 1867, followed them. 233 Along some
coastal towns in Ghana, particularly “El mina” (meaning “the Mine” in Portuguese)
one can still hear Portuguese words worked into the local dialects. This pre-colonial
period was characterized by trade in gold and slaves with the local chiefs and
traditional leaders, “wars of conquest and related abuses, forced labour and political
oppression.”234

“Prior to the arrival of the colonial masters, the various communities that now
constitute Ghana were governed by Customary Laws. These Laws varied from
community to community but performed the same role of ordering the lives of
the people. These Laws included very fine principles of human rights, including
the sanctity of life; the right to live in community; the right to property,
individual and communal; and the right to fair trial. … On the other hand, some

John Mensah Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws (London: William Clowes & Sons Limited, 1903)
Other scholars reference the Bond of 1844 between some Fante and other local Chiefs and the
British authorities as marking the official commencement of colonization in Ghana. According to the
Constitution Review Commission of Ghana, page 628: “Immediately after the formal declaration of the
end of the slave trade, the British entered into the Bond of 1844 with a number of Fante and other local
Chiefs. The Bond legalised the imposition of the British legal system on the Gold Coast, acknowledging
the power and jurisdiction that the British had exercised de facto in the territories adjacent to the
British forts and settlements.” Sarbah, supra note 232 at v also wrote that even in 1665 (pre-colonial
era) there existed in the Gold Coast “an organized society having kings, rulers, institutions, and a
system of customary laws.”
234 Constitution Review Commission Report, supra note 233, Chapter 13 “Human Rights”.
232
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aspects of pre-colonial governance, such as slavery, executions that followed the
death of some chiefs, betrothal marriages, dictatorial chiefs and patriarchy, have
been cited by modern day human rights activists as violations of human rights
during the pre-colonial era.”235

During the colonial era, the British subjected the customary laws to the repugnancy
test as a way of refining “barbarous” laws of the locals to those that were reasonable
in the minds of the British. The remodeled versions of customary law mostly operated
at the state level, whereas as at the non-state level, people continued to practice the
original versions of their customary laws (discussed in Chapter 2).

The Gold Coast gained independence from Britain on 6th March 1957 and changed its
name to Ghana. In post-independence Ghana, one finds that the nation’s state level
culture is shaped along the British tradition. For instance, when one considers the
three arms of government, in the court system, judges and lawyers dress, sit, refer to
themselves and conduct their cases according to the English court. Government
Ministries, Department and Agencies are named and structured according in the
British way and many of them still carry the names the British established them by.
Ghana’s Parliament reflects many British concepts including the official costume of
the leadership of Parliament.

235 Constitution Review Commission Report, supra note 233 at 627
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At Independence, Ghana chose legal pluralism by keeping the British laws (which had
become the state laws), and customary laws (those practiced at non-state level) as
part of the laws of Ghana.236 Today, British laws that were in force in Ghana at the
time of independence, the customary laws that were “refined” by British judges, the
customary laws that have been subsequently “refined” by Ghanaian judges and the
non-state level “pristine” customary laws are all valid law in Ghana.237 Certain
matters of chieftaincy, inheritance, marriage and succession are reserved for
determination under customary law in Ghana.

Ghana has had five Constitutions: the 1957 (Independence Constitution),238 The 1960
Republican Constitution, The 1969 second Republican Constitution, the 1979 third
Republican Constitution and the 1992 fourth Republican Constitution. A fundamental
catalyst for the creation of each Constitution has been the quest for human rights
protection. The 1957 Constitution was born out of a fight for political rights during
the independence struggle. However it retained the British Queen as the head of state
of Ghana and to have full political rights the 1960 Constitution emerged. The result
produced by this Constitution was human rights violations, mainly because Ghana
was turned into a one-party state under this Constitution and executive power rested
in the hands of only the President.239 Any dissenting opinion was considered a threat
to the nation and one could be incarcerated indefinitely under the Preventive

Constitution Review Commission Report, supra note 233
Constitution, supra note 80, Article 11.
238 1957 Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council adopted by the British Parliament
239 The case of Re Akoto and Nine Others where the Supreme Court refused to enforce the human rights
of the applicants, the killing of political enemies.
236
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Detention Act. The 1969 Constitution therefore came into force to undo these human
rights violations by making the President became only a ceremonial head and power
shifted from the President to the Prime-Minister who was now the head of
government, but the 1979 Constitution provided that the popularly elected president
should be the head of state, Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of Ghana. Both the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions enshrined civil and political
rights of Ghanaians but the protections were mostly civil and political rights.240 It was
chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution that fully dealt with the human rights aspirations
of Ghanaians. These ground-breaking protections had the result of paving the way for
the implementation of international human rights treaties in Ghana such as women’s
rights, children’s rights and disability rights.

This case study is meant to establish the following: First, that Ghana used to
implement the CRC according to the CRC treaty body’s approach just like other states
do; Second, that Ghana found that this approach was inappropriate for its legal
pluralistic context and rather achieved negative results; and third, that Ghana
adopted a new policy fit for the context of Ghana and has found that approach as more
suitable in helping it achieve the goals of the CRC.

4.3.3 Background about the CRC

240

Constitutions of the Republic of Ghana, 1969; and Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979.
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession on 20 November 1989, and it entered into force
on 2 September 1990.241 Ghana ratified the CRC on 5th February 1990, being the first
country in the world to ratify this Convention,242 and has subsequently taken
impressive steps towards implementing it.243 Overall, the Committee on the Rights of
the Child has been happy with Ghana’s implementation of the Convention. 244

CRC, supra note 14.
Link to the Status of ratification interactive dashboard at the website of the Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited on 26 March
2018) see also http://unchildrights.blogspot.com/2011/01/chronological-order-ratificationscrc.html (last visited on 26 March 2018)
243 Since ratifying the CRC, Ghana has completely overhauled its legal and policy framework to facilitate
the implementation of the treaty. The country’s legal framework for enforcing the Convention include
the following: Domestically, the Constitution of Ghana, 1992; The Children’s Act of Ghana, supra, note
162; The Juvenile Justice Act of Ghana, 2003, Act 653; The Human Trafficking Act, 2005, Act 694; The
Domestic Violence Act, 2007, Act 732; The Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960, Act 29; Intestate
Succession Act, 1985, PNDCL 111; Education Act, 2008, (Act 778) passed in January 2009; The Mental
Health Act, 2012 (Act 846); Persons With Disabilities Act, 2006 (Act 715), (PWD Act). Internationally,
Ghana ratified the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict in 2014; the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
Persons Especially Women and Children supplementing the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime in 2012; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 2005;
The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No.182 concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour in June 2000; ILO Convention
No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, in 2011; The Convention on the
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in July 2003; Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in 2012; The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court in
1999. The following are some of the Institutional and Policy Measures undertaken to facilitate the
implementation of the Convention: Creation of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection
(MoGCSP) (2013); Creation of the Department of Children (DOC) within the MoGCSP (2013); Child and
Family Welfare Policy (CFWP) (2015); National Neo-natal Health Care Strategy (2014-2018); National
HIV/AIDS, STI Policy (2013); National Employment Policy (2012 - 2016); National Human Resource
Development Policy (2011); Education Strategic Plan (ESP) (2010-2020); National Plan of Action
(NPA) for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Ghana (2009 – 2015); National Policy
and Plan of Action on Domestic Violence (2009-2019); Under-5 Child Health Policy (2007 - 2015).
244 Link to the Reports of the Committee on the rights of the child on Ghana at the website of the Office
of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR)
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=5&Tre
atyID=10&TreatyID=11&DocTypeID=5 (26 March 2018) After Ghana’s second periodic report, the
Committee asked it to combine its 3 rd to 5th periodic reports into one report and present it in 2015 so
that it had enough time to implement the Convention. This was remarkable because the Committee
has to frequently nudge States to present their regular reports.
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Under the CRC, Ghana as a State Party has the obligation to respect the rights of
children in Ghana and protect them from abuse. The approach advocated by the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee) like all other UN Treaty bodies,
for achieving these obligations is Universalist in aspiration.245 This is shown in the
trend of the Committee’s recommendations to States Parties from 2006 to 2016 246;
urging them to undertake similar measures to demonstrate compliance with the
treaty irrespective of the peculiarities of that State Party. The Committee, instead of
making efforts to give to each state context-specific measures that would help bring
it from its specific situation into full compliance with the treaty, literally says “this is
what everyone must do, whether it will work in your situation or not … so go back
home and do same.”

4.3.4 How the state actually implements the treaty
and which approach it uses

Universalism is the usual approach of the UN treaty bodies. Andrew Byrnes justifies the use of this
approach by the CEDAW committee thus: Andrew Byrnes, The Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS CEDAW IN INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW, ANNE HELLUM AND HENRIETTE SINDING AASEN eds., Cambridge
University Press, 2013, 48: “The Committee’s role requires that it assess the extent of implementation
of the Convention in nearly all the countries of the world. It thus had had to seek to apply a universal
standard of equality and non-discrimination to societies that are enormously diverse – from tiny Island
nations to the world’s largest countries located in all regions, representing different levels of
development and legal systems; manifesting a variety of religious, traditional and cultural systems;
and with political systems ranging from advanced liberal democracies through socialist states to
countries in turmoil or seeking to find a transition from internal conflict and social disruption
(including genocidal killings and civil wars) to a stable, just and ordered society. This diversity and the
fact that the Committee is carrying out an international supervisory function that involves making
judgements (albeit non-legal ones) on the extent to which sovereign states have given effect to their
international obligations, poses significant challenges of competence, legitimacy, diplomacy and
effectiveness.”
246 Recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en
245
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The CRC obligates State Parties to ensure the education of children and education of
children is guaranteed under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana but this right is
implemented in different ways across the country. Whilst most children in urban
communities sit in classrooms and study most of the day, many children in rural use
the time to help their parents on the farm or on fishing trips and on market days, some
of these children offer their services to carry loads for market women to earn some
extra income for their families.

To enforce the right to education of the child, state actors have enacted legislation
such as the Children’s Act, making it an offense not to educate one’s child.247 The
children’s ministry has also been undertaking public education on the need to educate
children, cautioning parents that it is against the law for their children to be outside
of school during school hours and undertaking these forms of labour. Interventions
such as the school-feeding programme were introduced to encourage children to go
to school and stay in school, but their successes were short-lived. Ghana was
therefore doing what the Committee on the rights of the Child prescribed by using
state actors, state institutions and state level legislative, administrative and judicial
measures to achieve child protection and prevent child abuse. What the state actors
were doing reflected the universalism approach, yet the population of non-school
going children continued to soar.

247 Education Act of Ghana, supra note 243; and Children’s Act of Ghana, supra note 162.
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The chiefs and other non-state actors have avoided intervening in children’s
education because it was considered a government’s milieu and implementation of
their customary laws could be mistaken for abuse of the rights of the child. Under
customary law children have to learn a trade as they grew up and this was usually the
trade of their parents or something else preferred. The purpose was to develop them
into useful and responsible citizens of their communities. When a child is found
loitering about all day without being properly engaged, anyone in the community may
report this to the chiefs or traditional leaders who would summon the parents for an
explanation and possibly punish them for neglecting their duty towards the child.
Therefore, first, the child is meant to be educated under the customary laws, although
the form of education under customary law varies from that of state law. Secondly the
education of the child is of interest to the entire community, not just to the parents or
teachers. According to customary law, if the child succeeds the community owns that
success and if the child does not, the community suffers from that loss that is why
members of the community will report a child who is not engaged in some useful
training to their leadership. If a violation of the customary laws is observed, chief or
traditional leaders may punish the parents or the child or both of them.

State level legislation on the rights of the child have restricted what many traditional
leaders can do to help with the education of children. The informal (non-state)
structures therefore relied on state structures, laws and institutions to achieve the
country’s formal educational goals.
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Ghana’s Ministry for children realized this was not helping to achieve satisfactory
results in child rights protection and prevention of child abuse. A baseline study of
the Policy revealed that the most available means for protecting the rights of children
– including the right to education, are the traditional (local cultural) systems at the
non-state level but these were not adequately regulated. Consequently, to achieve the
overarching aim of the treaty – child rights’ protection and prevention of child abuse
– Ghana adopted a cultural pluralism approach (a different approach from the
universalism approach of the Committee.) This new approach was captured in a 2015
Policy titled the Child and Family Welfare Policy.248 The new Policy was considered
“Fit” for (the context of) Ghana. Meaning, it embraces the relevant international
norms but implements them based on values, beliefs and practices specific to Ghana
to domesticate the CRC. The Policy encourages the use of non-state actors, institutions
and structures such as chiefs, the extended family system and informal adoption as
against the Police, foster care and institutionalization of children to protect
children.249 The Policy encourages the use of non-state actors because they are a
ready source of information. It is not hard to get good information through these nonstate actors because after their training, they are issued community report cards and

248 The Child and Family

Welfare Policy of Ghana, February 2015, available at the official website of the
Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, Ghana http://mogcsp.gov.gh/policies/ (last visited
on 26 March 2018) aimed at consolidating efforts of various governmental departments and nongovernmental organizations working in the field of child welfare in Ghana and “establish[ing] a wellstructured and coordinated Child and Family Welfare system that promotes the wellbeing of Children,
prevents abuse and protects children from harm.”
249 Regulations for the Child and Family Welfare Policy of Ghana, 2015, 23 at 1.3: the policy makes it
mandatory for a child protection case, reported to the police, to be referred to the social welfare and
community development department. The Policy further bars the police from deciding to remove a
child from the family environment and place him or her in an institution unless for immediate safety.
This restriction on the capacity of a state institution to intervene is quite telling of the approach that
the children’s ministry is adopting.
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books by the state actors who train them, to facilitate reporting and monitoring. Social
welfare officers regularly visit them (the non-state actors) and collect any reports that
are due from them for purposes of reporting back to the state. This interface between
the formal and informal sector for information collection – the reporting process –
provides a source of good information. The Policy further encourages the use of the
informal (non-state level) system because it is readily available and inexpensive.
First, child abuse costs Ghana millions of dollars each year. However the amount of
resources needed to rope in the informal sector to prevent child abuse is very little,
therefore constituting savings to government. Second, by using the informal sector,
the formal sector (the state) passes on the cost of child rights’ protection to the
community. Certain costs, such as cost of food and security, are passed on from the
state to the community and absorbed by the community through the community
setting, and extended family setting. This practice is founded on the traditional
understanding that the child belongs to the community (not just his or her parents)
and if the child belongs to the community in the long run the community gets a better
citizen. This also provides new roles for traditional communal groups such as the
Asafo groups – the traditional community security forces – which have been dormant
in recent times due to the absence of conflicts and communal wars. 250 Such groups
can now assume new roles of child protection within the community.

Atuguba, supra note 80, footnote 25: The Asafo companies of the Asante were groups of young men
who were the focal points for political mobilization, community economic and social activities, and
security provisioning in the pre-colonial era.
250
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Two examples confirm the cultural pluralism approach of Ghana’s Child and Family
Welfare Policy. First, the Policy specifically ropes in Traditional leaders, Chiefs and
queen mothers to help implement the international treaty. It makes them “…
responsible for facilitating dialogue and engagement through organized community
forums and debates on child and family welfare issues to help increase the common
understanding of issues and discuss different solutions and resources available.” This
is significant because first, the traditional leaders, chiefs, queen mothers, community
leaders and elders, religious leaders (as mentioned in the Policy) are non-state actors
being asked by state actors to help implement an international human right norm.

Second, by “increase the common understanding of issues,” the non-state actors traditional leaders, chiefs and queen mothers - are being asked to help translate
international human rights norms to their people based on their intersubjective
understandings of such issues, and this is key if the general population is to
domesticate the international law. As shown in the previous chapters, Ghana has a
legal pluralistic context and traditional leaders, chiefs and queen mothers, and
religious leaders are some of the groups of people who implement laws other than
the state laws, and people under their authority conform their behavior to those nonstate laws. Therefore getting the help of such non-state actors to correct wrong
perceptions, change wrong understandings of child-related issues and adopt and
enforce state laws on these matters among their people will help facilitate the
domestication of the CRC.
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However, three issues are likely to arise: First, how do these non-state actors who are
neither engaged at the international level nor involved in the drafting of the state laws
and policy become acquainted with the law in the first place in order to translate it;
second, what if the norms of the people and the state norms diverge; and third, are
the people not likely to consider the non-state actor’s new perspectives on those
issues a rejection of their customs and practices and therefore oppose them?

In response to the first issue, the Ministry responsible for Children has developed a
Community Training Manual, an Activity book and Tools with which it has been
training various types of community leaders including chiefs and religious leaders.251
This informs the community leaders of acceptable and non-acceptable practices
under the treaty. Of particular importance is the approach used in such trainings: the
non-state actors are guided by the trainers (usually state actors such as the District
welfare Officer) to agree on what child abuse and violations are, how they manifest in
that particular community, and how they can be dealt with in that particular
community based on the peculiar resources available there.252 Thus the training
impacts knowledge of the international law and using traditional leaders, chiefs and
queen mothers to “discuss different solutions and resources available” to their
community at these trainings means that the solutions and resources generated are
context specific and not one-size fits all, because the solutions and resources available

So far about 800 communities have received training.
for the Policy – this is a working document developed by UNICEF Ghana and the Ministry of
Gender, Children and Social Protection. It is continuously being updated based on feedback received
from the various trainings so the version on file with me may soon be outdated.
251

252 Manual

157

to an Asante chief (in the Ashanti region) for instance may not be available to a Bole
chief (in the northern region) but, the different cultural resources would be
harnessed towards a common goal of child protection. In response to the second issue
of possible divergence of norms, reality is that the chiefs are forced or compelled to
accept these international norms because of modernization - Child Protection has
been accepted as a national issue and every chief or queen mother would like to be
part of protecting children; because the aim is to get to Accra – to do what the people
in the capital city, Accra, do (which is similar to the CRC way); because those chiefs
want to get to the National House of Chiefs (and it looks good on their profile if they
have been attending these trainings – so that they can get to the regional house of
chiefs and further to the National House of Chiefs); and because they want to get
donor funding for their projects. So the trainings and “agreement with the CRC
norms” makes the chiefs look good. On the third issue of non-state actors who enforce
laws other than state laws being accused of betraying their custom when they start
enforcing state laws, the practice by Ghanaian chiefs for instance has been two fold:
first they announce the new rules consistent with the International laws to their
people and subsequently invite a state actor such as the District Social Welfare Officer
and a member of an Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) working in the area to
confirm the importance of the new rule. Secondly, during annual festivals Chiefs
usually set aside a day to deliberate with their people on welfare matters. These days
the discussions include how children are performing in school (sometimes they invite
the headteacher of the local school to inform parents of their children’s performance),
what could be accounting for poor performance of children from the community in
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national examinations and how to improve their performance. From such
discussions, the people tend to generate options that imply changes to their customs.
For instance, the raping of a girl is culturally considered a crime against the
community, something that offends the gods. In some communities, the traditional
leaders may banish the offender from the community, or require the performance of
some rituals to cleanse the offender and the community. Usually, the girl (victim) ends
up with a bad name in the community, is teased in school – giving rise to various
psychological issues for her without any support and she eventually drops out of
school and is soon an unmarried teenage mother. The Policy aims to have the
traditional leaders use their authority and laws to do things differently in such
situations. The traditional leaders encourage the community at its annual durbar to
deal with such offenders under state law, and undertake rituals and community
announcements to protect the victim’s image and reassure her position in the
community. If she is pregnant she should be encouraged to go to school and complete
her education without been teased. But the question is how do state actors get the
non-state actors to do all this? First, Chiefs have the traditional responsibility to
protect children. Second, when the training is organized through state institutions
such as National House of Chiefs the Chiefs are obligated to attend. Third, the chiefs
need the trainings and positive implementation for their own Curriculum Vitae (CV)
or profile – to be chosen to be in the Regional House of Chiefs and National House of
Chiefs. Finally, the chiefs accept the training to improve chances of donor funding for
their community. For these reasons, sometimes the chiefs pretend to be
implementing the international norms they have learnt but do not actually do it. So
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that when you go back into their communities you could still find child abuse
incidents such as young children engaged in hazardous labour on cocoa farms rather
than being in school.

The second confirmation of the cultural pluralism approach is that under the Policy
the chief and other traditional leaders use their resources to achieve the overarching
value of child protection in their community. One of the characteristics of the cultural
pluralism approach is that the different sub-groups must use their different resources
to achieve the other arching goal of the state and that is what happens in the cultural
pluralism approach to the CRC implementation in Ghana because the Chiefs, the Asafo
people, and the Police among others, are all tapping into their different resources (the
chiefs for example tap into their indigenous knowledge system) to achieve the
overarching goal of children’s rights protection in Ghana.

The third confirmation of the cultural pluralism approach is that the Policy states that
the Ministry had realized that focusing only on the individual child’s interest in
isolation from the family’s interest as a whole (as canvassed by the CRC Committee)
has not been helpful in the past and so in this new policy, the Ministry will consider
the interest of the child within the context of the family and community. The family
and communal interest is an African value enshrined in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights253 and it supersedes the individual’s right.254 The Ghanaian Policy

253
254

ACHPR, supra note 97
ACHPR, supra note 97
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embraces this communitarian value and uses it in implementing the international
law.

After nearly two years of implementation, the Ministry for Children’s Policy, Planning,
Monitoring and Evaluation team has found the new Policy to be more effective in child
protection from harm and prevention of child abuse than the previous purely
universalism approach.255 Therefore harnessing the help of the non-state actors has
proven to be the missing link to the effective domestication of the international
human right (CRC) in Ghana.256

4.3.5 What accounted for the Successful
Implementation of the CRC In Ghana
From the case study of the implementation of the CRC in Ghana, we identify three
steps through which Ghana was able to successfully domesticate the CRC. First, adopt
the overarching international principle protecting children from abuse and tap into
sub-group resources (indigenous knowledge and methods) to achieve the
overarching international principle. Second, develop a legal and policy framework for
achieving this international principle that is fit for the legal pluralistic context of

National Team Monitoring – Greater Accra Region, October 2016 (Interim report) 5 “… behaviour
change issues have been observed in terms of positive parenting, deepened understanding of child
protection by parents and community members, community members discussing community laws on
child protection and putting in structures within the communities to address child protection issues.
256 Interim report, supra note 255 also identifies gaps in the training process which, when addressed,
would further improve the domestication of the international norms. For instance, training with
activities and tools that specific communities can relate with more easily.
255
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Ghana. And third, create an interface where responses from non-state actors about
the implementation of the treaty are transmitted to state actors and vice versa. When
these criteria (or conditions) are true, then international human rights norms will be
successfully domesticated.

4.3.6 Conclusion to CRC case study

In the above case study I have presented the situation of children’s rights in Ghana. I
have sought to demonstrate how Ghanaian state actors failed to achieve their goals
on child rights protection when they used the universalism approach to implement
the CRC as advocated by the Committee on the rights of the child and how the cultural
relativism approach is unlikely to generate an improvement in children’s rights
protection in Ghana. I then showed how Ghana achieved success in the protection of
the rights of the child when it switched from the universalism approach to the cultural
pluralism approach with some modification to that approach.

4.4 STATEMENT OF THEORY

These case studies illustrate the following thesis: For an African state with a legal
pluralistic context to successful domesticate international human rights norms she
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must take the following steps: First, adopt the overarching international human rights
norm and tap into sub-group level indigenous knowledge and other resources to
achieve the overarching international human rights norm. Second, enact domestic
legislation that reflects all the varied domestic manifestation of the issue; and third,
create an interface between non-state actors and state actors that allows for frequent
updating of both state and non-state laws and policy to reflect the international
human right norm.

This three-step approach has ensured success in the implementation of the CRC in
Ghana, albeit some drawbacks such as the slow rate of the spread of the norms and
lip service paid by some non-state actors to the norms instead of demonstrating
sustained commitment to their implementation.

4.4.1 Explanation of Theory

When a state party enters into an international human rights treaty, it is assumed that
she aims to implement the international law. Consequently the necessary first step in
this theory is for the African State Party to adopt an international human rights
principle in the treaty and aim to achieve that principle. This principle could be
‘children’s rights protection.’ The second half of this first step is for state actors in the
African State Party to tap into sub-group level indigenous knowledge and methods to
find out which ones are most appropriate to help achieve the overarching guiding
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principle. As explained earlier, the overarching human rights principle would serve
as the guiding principle for the state as it makes efforts towards implementing the
treaty. It would help the state to avoid doing things that would be inconsistent with
the treaty, because working towards achieving the principle invariably means
working towards the treaty. Since the African State Party has a legal pluralistic
context, her state actors should tap into the authentic, original, and indigenous
resources at the sub-group level to achieve the overarching principle. The people
would be able to identify more easily with methods they already know at that level
and this would facilitate their compliance with the treaty’s principle. For instance, as
previously shown, an original resource for child protection in Ghana would be the use
of Asafo companies. The people already know these groups so they would be effective
in enforcing rules that ultimately enforce the international human rights principle.

The second step is creating the legal and policy framework that would help achieve
this principle. In Ghana, the Constitution and children’s Act of Ghana proscribe the
abuse of children and reflect both rights of children and duties of children. The
concept of duties of children is an essential non-state level principle in Ghana, so nonstate actors are more accommodating of a law that provides for both the rights and
duties of children. Ghana has also adopted ‘the child and family welfare policy.’ This
policy was made to “fit” the legal pluralistic context of Ghana while at the same time
achieving the overarching international human rights goal.
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The third step in this theory is the creation of an interface where responses from the
non-state actors about the implementation of the treaty are transmitted to state
actors and vice versa. This interface creates the opportunity for the modification of
local customary laws to make them more responsive to the state’s obligations under
the international treaty on the one hand, and also creates the opportunity for the
modification of state laws and policy to make them more suitable to the local cultural
contexts on the other hand. When this interface was applied in the CRC
implementation in Ghana it shifted Ghana from making non-state actors passive
objects of the international norms to making them active subjects in the
domestication of the international human right treaty. The state gave recognition to
non-state actors’ interest in the welfare of their local children and rather than impose
rules on those non-state actors laws, used the non-state actors as a resource to
protect the rights of local children and to find out what would work best in the
particular circumstance to better protect the children.

The third step is my critical addition to the cultural pluralism approach. In this third
step creates a unique interface for non-state actors to interact with state actors. By
interaction I meant that they would meet with each other at forums such as
workshops, visits by the state actors’ to the Chiefs’ palace in the communities, or visit
by the Chiefs’ to state actors’ offices in the urban areas. Non-state actors that could
attend such meetings would include Chiefs, council of elders and community leaders.
State actors who could attend such meetings would include Directors of Policy
Implementation at the Ministries, social workers and community educators. It would
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also be helpful if the state actors initiate such meetings and do so on regular basis
because they have a broader sense of what the international body requires of the state
and know how much time is available to meet the goals. At the meetings, attendees
should be encouraged to speak freely without intimidation. To this end, it would be
helpful not to invite the Police or other stakeholders whose presence at such meetings
would intimidate one group or the other. The atmosphere should encourage free flow
of information and ideas from state actors to non-state actors and vice-versa. Nonstate actors are usually cautious when they discover that state actors are not
forthright with them but could only be pretending to be interested in their views. On
the other hand some non-state actors considering themselves gatekeepers of their
communities without whom the aim of the state will not be achieved may use the
opportunity to sabotage the process. It is very necessary for both sides to be
genuinely interested in achieving the overarching goals. During such meetings
information exchange is key. Information about what works and what does not work
in the implementation of the treaty must be passed on and received in a language that
both sides fully understand. Suggestions for modifying both customary law and state
law to facilitate the translation and reception of the international norms to ensure
that both legal systems work towards attaining the overarching goal of the state
complying with the international human right norm should be exchanged at such
meetings. The stakeholders - State actors and the non-state actors – should carve out
responsibilities for the non-state actors that harness their unique capacities among
their people and positions them as interested stakeholders in the implementation of
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the international human rights norms rather than passive recipients of the
international human right norm.

When non-state actors consider themselves as “owners” of the process they go the
extra mile to ensure the successful implementation of the treaty in their communities.
Secondly, the advantage of having different types of non-state actors as stakeholders
is that they could work together, holding each other responsible for violations and
reminding each other of decisions taken at previous meetings. Such steps ensure the
overall progress in the treaty implementation.

At the same time, some non-state actors may feign interest in the whole process
because of the stipends they may receive at the various meetings they attend. To curb
this practice it would be helpful for the state actors to take frequent field trips outside
of the formal offices of the Chiefs and traditional leaders to ascertain for themselves
the true happenings on the ground in terms of the implementation of the treaty. The
trips and stipend payment carry cost implications and the state must demonstrate
commitment to pay them in order to incentivize the stakeholders.

4.4.2 Why this is a theory

Legal pluralism is a phenomenon that this grossly under-theorized, yet its effect on
how well African states implement international human rights treaties is significant.
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An approach to implementing international human rights in Africa, which does not
factor in legal pluralism, is at best dead on arrival. It is a major reason for which
African states poorly implement international human rights treaties. Anne Hellum
has therefore shown that the cultural pluralism approach is more likely to help
improve the implementation of international human rights in Africa because this
approach makes use of legal pluralism. However although the cultural pluralism
approach recognizes the role of legal pluralism, it leaves other incidents of legal
pluralism unaccounted for. This thesis builds on the work of Anne Hellum by
accounting for other aspects of legal pluralism to sustain the cultural pluralism
approach. Instead of limiting the influence of sub-group level actors to the provision
of indigenous knowledge and methods to achieve the overarching human rights
principle, this theory brings the sub-group actors into contact with the state actors
such that sub-group customary laws could potentially influence international law.
Thus instead of a one-way flow of information from the state level to the non-state
level, because the state actors would only reach into the non-state level to draw out a
method for achieving the international norm, this theory creates another way for the
non-state level actors to also reach into the state laws and influence them.

4.4.3 Why this is a new theory
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Bringing international human rights norms to the ground—the non-state level—has
proven to be so challenging that scholars usually limit their work to the state level.257
They usually recommend that state actors take steps to change certain things at the
state level and ultimately the intended aim of the international human rights treaty
would be achieved at the non-state level. My theory is new because I provide specific
principles for not only how the international human rights norms could reach the
non-state level, but also how to keep the two streams of law—international and
indigenous law—in continuous touch.

Although the critical third step of the theory may be accused of adding nothing new,
it is actually adding something new to the body of law because it is bringing
indigenous authentic African resources in the form of traditional leaders (who are the
gatekeepers to their sub-groups) to connect with international norms. This is unique.
Again my theory is new because it opens up international law to the influence of subgroup level actors, which is unprecedented. This is because the feedback from the
traditional leaders could influence the state to make reservations to certain
provisions in the next treaty she enters into, because she would have received first
hand knowledge that such provisions would be unimplementable in her domestic
settings.

Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human
Rights Law, 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 642 (2004), Goodman and Jinks advocate acculturation; Harold
H. Koh, Transnational legal process, 75 Nebraska Law Review 181 (1996): Koh advocates the
Transnational legal process.
257
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4.4.4 Robustness of the theory

The main argument, which can be presented against my theory, is that it is intuitive.
My response to such argument is that the theory is deeper and more complicated than
initially meets the eye. For a long time the fact of legal pluralism in African states has
been glossed over or not properly accounted for, and African states were presented
with approaches to implementing international human rights law that assumes that
their societies are homogenous. The cultural pluralism approach has stepped in to
account for legal pluralism in treaty implementation. However, the approach as it
stands currently is one-sided, which makes it unsustainable. My theory is more robust
in that I suggest an interactive interface for the exchange of information and
continuous updating of both state and non-state law. In the long run this theory would
make the cultural pluralism more sustainable.

Another likely criticism of this theory would be that it is an adjunct to the pluralism
approach. My response is that there is a critical difference between the cultural
pluralism approach and my theory. My theory builds on the pluralism approach by
not limiting the responsibilities to the state actors, but assigning responsibilities also
to non-state actors. Again cultural pluralism approach as it is does not make room for
customary law to “touch” or “change” state law, but my theory allows for the
interaction between these two systems of law and, very importantly, it allows for the
two systems of law to continually update themselves.
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4.4.5 Advantages and disadvantages of the
theory
The first major advantage of this theory is that it offers a simplified means for
achieving improved implementation of international human rights in African states
with legal pluralism.

The second major advantage of this approach is that it uses traditional leaders as
active participants in the implementation of the international human rights law. Using
non-state actors opens the door to many more positive ripple effects. For instance, it
makes the process cost effective because since the traditional leaders play active roles
in planning how to domestic the treaty, using their help to implement the treaty
should not give rise to additional costs to the state. Again, as active participants, the
non-state actors own the process of the domestication of the international human
rights norms. They are therefore protective of it at the ground level. This “ownership”
of the process is very essential for the successful domestication of the international
human rights norms. When the leaders of the communities—the gatekeepers— feel
that the process of change is theirs and not the superimposition of an outside
authority, the process of domestication is more likely to be well grounded.

The third major advantage of this theory is that it is sustainable. First, by providing
for the frequent updating of state law and customary law to reflect feedback from
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either side and to achieve the overarching aim of the international human rights
treaty, the theory makes room for growth and will make the process of domestication
sustainable. The theory does not give a one-time solution because you cannot change
social conduct abruptly. This is the reason why many theories of domestication fail.
This new theory rather acknowledges that both customary law and state law evolve,
and rather uses the evolving character of both laws to its advantage to ensure a more
sustainable process of domestication.

Second, this process is more sustainable because of the actors who actually
implement it at the ground level. The traditional leaders command a level of trust
from the people at the ground level that is different from how the people feel towards
politicians and state actors. The people have entrusted themselves to the care of their
traditional leaders and who actually live with them in their communities. They have
the understanding that those leaders would not implement things that will destroy
the very community of which those leaders are a part. On the other hand, they do not
have the same level of trust for a politician or a state actor who lives outside their
community but comes to their community to introduce a new norm to them and then
leaves at the end of the day, and would not be affected if the effect of his advise is the
destruction of the community. Using the community’s traditional leaders will
therefore be the catalyst that leads to a sustained acceptance and implementation of
the international human rights principle at the ground level.
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A fourth major advantage of this theory is that it frees state actors to concentrate on
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the treaty wholistically to ensure
that overall, the state meets its goal of domesticating the international human rights
principle. As earlier shown in this dissertation, Africa is a heterogeneous continent
with multiple domestic legal systems. The effect is that, even within one African state
with legal pluralism, the different mechanisms will be needed in order to achieve
compliance with the human rights treaty at the community level. So in order to ensure
that all the different mechanisms lead to one result of implementing the overarching
principle, it would be best that the actual implementation is left to the community
leaders whilst the state actors constantly monitor and evaluate those mechanisms to
ensure that they achieve the intended result of implementing the international
human rights principle

Finally, the fifth major advantage of this theory is that it measures the level of a state’s
progress in implementing its international human rights obligations according to the
specifics of the state and not through a one-size fits all approach. When the state
makes its legal and policy framework that is “fit” for its context, for domesticating the
human rights principle, this ensures that at the international level, the related treaty
bodies and other bodies, use that framework as the yardstick for determining
whether the state is making any progress or is at a standstill; instead of evaluating the
state by a generalized standard, which has the disadvantage of not showing the actual
progress the state may or could have made but did not. This makes room for a contextspecific assessment of state implementation of the international human rights treaty.
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The main disadvantage of the theory is that, where the systems of law at the subgroup level are many, it may be complicated for the state to monitor and evaluate the
various different methods that each sub-group chooses to use to achieve the
overarching human rights principle. This disadvantage is however over-shadowed by
the fact that the theory makes room for frequent interactions between state actors
and non-state actors, which if well implemented, can forestall such happenings.

4.5 CONCLUSION

Zimbabwe’s implementation of CEDAW and Ghana’s implementation of the CRC
provide very important lessons for the implementation of international human rights
treaties in African states with legal pluralistic contexts. After undertaking these two
case studies we arrive at the conclusion that the universalism and cultural relativism
approaches do not help improve implementation of international human rights
treaties in African states with legal pluralistic contexts. The cultural pluralism
approach however can help improve the implementation of those treaties, with some
modification. In the next chapter I will examine the implementation of the CRPD in
Ghana to determine if Ghana is fully complying with its obligations under that
international human rights treaty, if not, I will assess the applicability of the cultural
pluralism theory developed above to the case of the implementation of the CRPD in
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Ghana to determine if it would help improve Ghana’s implementation of the CRPD, in
the following chapter, chapter six.

175

5 CHAPTER FIVE:
APPLICATION OF THEORY TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRPD IN
GHANA
5.1 INTRODUCTION:

Ghana has a huge population of PWDs258 and the state has been making various
legislative and administrative interventions to improve the respect of the rights of
this population. In this chapter we will examine the actual situation of PWDs in Ghana,
the effect of the state level interventions in the lives of PWDs and the effect of
customary laws on disability on the lives of PWDs in Ghana. Next we will apply the
cultural pluralism theory developed in Chapter four to the situation of disability
rights in Ghana to determine if it would help improve the situation of PWDs in Ghana
and further test the theory to determine if it has traction in other sectors of human
rights.

Population and Housing census of Ghana, summary report of final results, 12 (Ghana Statistical
Service, 2012)
258
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5.2 CASE STUDY OF DISABILITY RIGHTS IN GHANA

5.2.1 What this case study is meant to establish

This case study is meant to assess the current situation of PWDs in Ghana in terms of
national and international law. The case study is also going to answer certain crucial
questions of responsibility: who is responsible for what causal contributions to the
problems of PWDs in Ghana; who is responsible for making (which) contributions to
alleviating or better eradicating these problems; and who is responsible for making
the various systems of law co-existing in Ghana’s legal system work together to
improve the rights of PWDs in Ghana?

Through this case study, the reader will be presented with a spectrum of actors who
are capable of making different contributions to improving the rights of PWDs in an
African state with legal pluralistic context. The intended outcome is to question the
treaty body’s reliance on the universalism approach to the implementation of the
CRPD in State Parties.
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5.2.2 Background about the state

Ghana’s political and constitutional history has been copiously discussed in the
previous chapter. In this case study I will first undertake an examination of the
relevant contextual facts and trends. This will involve an examination of the situation
of disability rights in Ghana and the attitudes/"ideologies" of the general population,
relevant politicians and civil servants towards disability. Second, I will examine the
available funds and facilities for disability rights protection in Ghana, and the work of
chiefs, individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations in disability rights
protection in Ghana. Third, I will offer an explanation of why things are as they are:
what are the existing laws (customary laws, judicial pronouncements, statutes, and
constitutional provisions), practices, culture, attitudes, influence of multiple domestic
systems of law on disability protections, foreign influences, and how they together
cause the situation as described to persist. Finally, we will assess the current situation
in terms of national and international law as well as from the standpoints of social
justice and morality.

5.2.3 Background about the CRPD

The CRPD and its Optional Protocol were adopted on 13 December 2006 at the United
Nations Headquarters in New York “during the 61st session of the United Nations
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General Assembly by resolution A/RES/61/106.”259 The treaty was opened for
signature by states and regional integration organizations on 30 March 2007. 260 On
that same day “there were 82 signatories to the Convention, 44 signatories to the
Optional Protocol, and 1 ratification of the Convention. This is the highest number of
signatories in history to a UN Convention on its opening day.”261 The Convention
entered into force on 3 May 2008 being 30 days after receiving its 20th ratification as
required by Article 45(1) of the CRPD.262 As at December 15 2017, almost 10years
after the CRPD entered into force, the Convention had received 175 ratifications.263
Forty-two African states have ratified the CRPD whilst 3 African states have signed
but not ratified the CRPD.264 Many of these African states have enacted domestic
legislation protecting the rights of PWDs.265 Ghana signed the CRPD on March 30
2007 and ratified the treaty on 31 July 2012. The Parliament of Ghana passed the
Persons with Disability Act, 2006, Act 715 in June 2006 and it received the

United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 217
CRPD, supra note 16, Article 42
261
United
Nations
Division
for
Social
Policy
and
Development
Disability
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-withdisabilities.html (last visited on 23 March 2018)
262 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 217
263 United Nations Division for Social Policy and Development Disability, supra note 261
264 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 217: The African states that have signed but not
ratified the CRPD are Cameroon, Chad and Libya. Egypt is the only African country that made a
declaration or reservation upon signing or ratifying the treaty. Egypt declared that the meaning of
Article 12(2) of the CRPD on the recognition of PWDs on an equal basis with others before the law did
not include capacity to perform under Egyptian law.
265 Algeria http://www.handicap-international.us/algeria (last visited on 28 March 2018): The
webpage contains steps Algeria has taken towards disability rights protection in that country.
259
260
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Presidential Assent in August 2006266 while the CRPD was adopted in December
2006.267

The CRPD guarantees the rights of Women268 and children269 with disabilities. The
right to life,270 liberty and security of person271 freedom from torture or cruel
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,272 freedom from exploitation
violence and abuse273 right to live independently and be included in the
community,274 right to freedom of expression and opinion, and access to
information,275 right to privacy,276 right to marry and found a family,277 right to
education,278 right to health,279 right to work,280 right to adequate standard of living

Ghana Federation of Disability Organizations, News Commentary on the tenth Anniversary of the
Disability Act 715, Its Impact on the Lives of Persons With Disabilities by Yaw Ofori Debrah, National
President of the Ghana Federation of Disability Organisations (26 March 2018)
https://www.facebook.com/gfdghana/posts/333987956943420 (last visited on 26 March 2018)
267 For an in-depth analysis about whether the provisions of the PWD Act of Ghana is consistent with
those of the CRPD see Lewis Abedi Asante and Alexander Sasu, The Persons with Disability Act, 2006
(Act 715) of The Republic of Ghana: The Law, Omissions and Recommendations Law, Journal of Law,
Policy and Globalization Vol. 36, 2015; and Law and Development Associates, Aligning the Mental
Health Bill of Ghana to the Convention on the rights of Persons With Disability Act, Project Report, May
2012. These publications show that the provisions of the PWD Act of Ghana, are not entirely consistent
with those of the CRPD. Important specific provisions are omitted such as the rights of women with
disabilities. These do not however detract from the basic fact that the domestic legislation is intended
to formally protect the rights of PWDs are required by the CRPD.
268 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 6
269 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 7
270 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 10
271 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 14
272 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 15
273 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 16
274 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 19
275 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 21
276 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 22
277 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 23
278 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 24
279 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 25
280 CRPD, supra note 16Article 27
266
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and social protection,281right to participate in political and public life,282right to
participate in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sports.283 Ghana’s Constitution and
Disability Act enshrine most of the rights guaranteed under the CRPD284 however
many local customary laws and practices violate disability rights. The approach
advocated by the relevant treaty body to State Parties for achieving the obligation is
universalism.

5.2.4 How the state actually implements the treaty
and which approach it uses
First, Article 7 of the CRPD requires Ghana to ‘take all necessary measures to ensure
the full enjoyment by Children with Disabilities (CWDs) of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children,’ and Article 10 of the
CRPD guarantees the right to life of all PWDs. Article 37(2)(b) of Ghana’s Constitution
provides that “[T]he State shall enact appropriate laws to assure the protection and
promotion of all other basic human rights and freedoms, including the rights of the
disabled… .” However the right to life of Ghanaian CWDs is frequently violated based
on different cultural beliefs about disability.

281 CRPD, supra note 16Article 28
282 CRPD, supra note 16Article 29
283 CRPD, supra note 16Article 30
284 Constitution, supra note 80, Articles 29, 37(2)(b) and 38 (3)(b); Disability Act of Ghana,

supra

note 243.
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Among the Asantes of central Ghana, the cultural belief is that babies born with
disabilities are evil signs for the community from the gods, threatening the very
survival of the community. Parents must have offended the gods to receive a CWD.
Babies with intellectual disabilities are believed to come from rivers and are labelled
‘Nsuoba’ literally; ‘child of the river.' Such babies were returned to the river to go back
to where they came from or ‘to their own kind.’285 Babies with physical disabilities
such as six fingers, were killed at birth (Munyi (2012) or labelled ‘nea wadidem’
literally; ‘the one who has a physical “deformity”.’ This label signifies ‘an imperfect or
incomplete person.’286

Among the northerners of northern Ghana, babies born with disabilities were killed
because they were considered a threat to their parents’ prosperity. The
intersubjective understanding of the problem of disability in children among the
people living in northern communities is that such babies are actually evil spirits sent
to impoverish their parents, as parents would have to spend all their wealth nursing
their CWDs to health. Babies born with disabilities (or complex medical conditions)
are labeled ‘spirit children’, ‘Kinkirigo’ (language in Kassena Nankana district) and
their birth signifies the emergence of an evil force in the family necessitating their
death or abandonment.287

285

Chomba Wa Munyi ‘Past and Present Perceptions towards disability: a historical Perspective’
(2012) http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3197/3068 (accessed 26 March 2018)
286 PWD Act, supra note 243, section 37 criminalizes the calling of persons with disabilities with
derogatory names.
287 Jacqueline Slikker, Attitudes towards Persons with disability in Ghana, (2009) 15.
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In January 2013, an investigative journalist uncovered the active pursuit of the killing
of “spirit children” through soothsayers in communities in northern Ghana.288 These
practices of soothsayers and other non-state actors have persisted because they are
founded on negative non-state norms about disabilities. These negative non-state
rules about CWDs violate the right to life of the CWD, which is protected under the
state law (the Constitution) and under international law (CRPD).

Second, Article 19 of the CRPD guarantees PWDs the right to be included in the
community, whilst Article 30 of the CRPD guarantees PWDs the right to participate in
cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport.289 Article 29(1) of Ghana’s Constitution
provides that “Disabled Persons have the right to live with their families or with foster
parents and to participate in social, creative or recreational activities.”290 This right is
re-echoed in Section 1 of Ghana’s Persons with Disability Act, with an extension to
include the right to participate in political and economic activities.291

Operating at the non-state level, stigmatization is the single most difficult barrier to
PWDs participating in communal, cultural, recreational, economic, social and political
life. For PWDs, stigmatization usually starts from childhood and continues into
adulthood. The cultural perception that the birth of a child with disability is the

Anas, documentary on spirit children, supra note 160
CRPD, supra note 16, Articles 19 and 30. Some African scholars have argued that the Western
concept of communal life as protected under the CRPD is different from the African concept.
290 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 29(1)
291 PWD Act of Ghana, supra note 243.
288
289
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parent’s punishment for offending a god292 leads some parents of ‘normal’ children to
stop their children from playing with CWDs, lest the ‘punishment of the god’ is
transferred to their ‘normal’ children. On the other hand, parents of CWDs hide them
from the community instead of seeking help for them. Baffoe (2013) narrates the
response of a parent of a child with Intellectual disability who was a participant in his
survey:
“when my child was born with this illness (Down’s syndrome), everybody told me
that my family may have done something wrong for the gods to send me this child. I
never brought him outside the house. The only time I bring him out of the room to
the open compound is when everyone in the neighborhood has gone to the farm…”293
Not allowing CWDs to play freely with other children without disabilities in the
communities, and hiding children with disabilities from other people within the
community for fear of stigmatization violate the rights of the CWDs to participate in
the community life.

Adults with disabilities are denied the opportunity to become chiefs or appear before
them due to the stigma attached to their disabilities.294 This violates their right to

Mawutor Avoke Models of disability in the labelling and attitudinal discourse in Ghana (2002) 17
Disability and society 769, 773; Joseph S. Agbenyega The power of labelling discourse in the construction
of disability in Ghana, A paper presented at the Australian Association for Research in Education
Conference, New Castle, Assocation of Active Educational Researchers (AARE), Volume 16, (2003/12),
available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dbf7/cbaed55503793265f51e6a5c642ca383ec7b.pdf
(last visited on 28 March 2018)
293 Michael Baffoe ‘Stigma, discrimination & marginalization: Gateways to oppression persons with
disabilities in Ghana, West Africa (2013) 3(1) Journal of Education and Social Research 187 195.
294 Recently several important national positions are being occupied by PWDs in Ghana. In 2013 a
visually-impaired lawyer Henry Seidu Daanaa was appointed minister of Chieftaincy and Traditional
Affairs in Ghana, it was a taboo for visually-impaired persons to be admitted into the presence of chiefs
let alone address them, and a chief could be de-stooled for admitting a person with visual impairment
into his court. Consequently the appointment of the minister was greeted with great uproar and
292
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participate in the Political life of their communities. There is a Ghanaian customary
law rule that before someone marries, a background check is conducted of the
prospective partner to determine if there are any issues of mental illnesses or other
disabilities in that partner’s family. Where there are, the marriage is discouraged;
least the disability (bad bloodline) is introduced into the ‘healthy’ family. A PWD’s
chance of marriage is therefore severely hampered by customary law rules violating
his right to family and social life.295 The CRPD guarantees PWDs the right to be
included in their communities296 and to participate in public life.297 However many
non-state norms in Ghana ‘dehumanize PWDs, affect their self esteem and limit their
opportunities for social interaction.’298 For instance, a regular pastime of adult
Ghanaian men, particularly those in rural areas (where PWDs are concentrated) is
drinking together and calling out of drinking names to other men in their
communities.

Among the Ewe-Anlo of South-Eastern Ghana, the calling out of drinking names of an
Ewe-Anlo man awakens his personhood in ways that defy categorization using the

protests from some chiefs but government maintained that appointment. In 2015, Gabriel Pwamang,
a lawyer with a physical disability, was sworn in as a Supreme Court Judge. In early 2016, Ivor
Greenstreet a wheel chair-bound person was elected presidential candidate of a major political party
in Ghana (Convention People’s Party) ahead of Ghana’s November 2016 national elections.
295 Population and Housing Census, supra note 258, ‘40% PWDs were married compared to 43% in the
total population, while 42.5% of non-PWDs had never married the proportion for [non-] PWDs was
27.3 percent’
296 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 19
297 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 29
298 Osman Mensah et al Strengthening the disability movement in Ghana through organizational capacity
and advocacy: Contextual analysis of the disability situation in Ghana, JMK Research Consulting, (2008)
v http://www.gfdgh.org/Context%20analysis.pdf (last visited on 28 March 2018).
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five senses.299 The denial of a drinking name to a PWD on the basis of his disability300
is a blow on his personhood, making him feel ‘less than.’ Being denied the pleasure of
that recognition from his community when colleagues are accorded it, affects one’s
self esteem and is an example of not being allowed to participate fully in the activities
of the community because of one’s disability in violation of the right to be included in
one’s community guaranteed under Article 19 of CRPD.

Even when an adult with disability is healed of a disability, he or she is always
associated with the former disability. Members of the community continually make
reference to the former disability to justify his or her exclusion from various
communal activities. For instance, Ghana enacted the Mental Health Act in 2012,
aimed at “promot[ing] a culturally appropriate … mental health care that will involve
both the public and the private sectors.”301 Two years after the enactment of this
legislation the Chief Psychiatrist of the Accra Psychiatric Hospital, Dr. Akwasi Osei,
complained that when mentally ill patients are treated and sent home, their families
and communities do not want to accept them back and allow them to reintegrate into
their societies because of the customary norm that ‘once a person has been mentally

299 Kathryn L. Geurts

& Elvis Gershon Adikah, Enduring and Endearing Feelings and the Transformation
of Material Culture in West Africa in E EDWARDS et al eds., SENSIBLE OBJECTS: COLONIALISM MUSEUMS AND
MATERIAL CULTURE (Berg, 2006): For instance, among Ewe-Anlos of South-eastern Ghana, certain
feelings do not fall into the broad categories of the five senses such as what they call “seselelame”
literally; “feel-feel-at-flesh-inside.
300 Avoke, supra note 292, Among Ewes the cultural belief is that a person with mental disability is a
fool. Such persons are therefore labelled ‘Asovi’ meaning ‘a fool or an idiot,.
301 Mental Health Act, supra note 243, section 2(d)
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ill before, he or she still retained some mental illness no matter how well-recovered
he or she may be.’302

Third, Article 9 of the CRPD requires state parties to ensure to PWDs access to, inter
alia, buildings, roads, transportation and other indoor and outdoor facilities on equal
basis with others, to enable them live independently and participate fully in all
aspects of life.303 Ghana’s Constitution provides for equal access to public places for
PWDs304 and Ghana’s Disability Act directly obligates the owner or occupier of a
public place to provide appropriate facilities for PWDs to have access to them.305
However public places in Ghana are frequently constructed without disability access.
In 2007, the Millennium Development Authority (Ghana) began constructing the
George Walker Bush Highway in Ghana. The Ghana Federation of the Disabled (GFD)
was not consulted during the design of the Highway although it is the umbrella body
of PWDs in Ghana and the highway is a major one, linking some of the major vehicular
and pedestrian traffic routes in the capital city of Ghana: Accra. Later, and in response
to requests of the GFD, assurances were given that adequate provision had been made
in the design of the Highway to facilitate its use by PWDs. The designer of the highway
informed the GFD that overpasses and pelican crosses were available for use by
pedestrians. During the actual construction of the Highway, the GFD observed that

Interview
of
Dr.
Akwasi
Osei,
10
October
2014
http://www.myjoyonline.com/lifestyle/2014/October-10th/resource-constraints-may-forceshutdown-of-mental-facilities.php (last visited on 24 March 2018): The popular saying is ‘obi abodam
ko a, na enye kakra a, ode be hunahuna mmofra’ meaning: ‘no matter how well someone’s mental
illness is treated, there still remains some for him to use frightening children.’
303 CRPD, supra note 16 Article 9(1)(a).
304 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 29(6).
305 PWD Act of Ghana, supra note 243
302
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adequate provisions were not being made to accommodate their disabilities and this
matter was brought to the attention of the appropriate officials albeit fruitlessly. The
GFD applied for an interim injunction to restrain the government from
commissioning the road without first addressing their concerns but the motion was
unsuccessful. After commissioning, patronage confirmed the fears of the GFD. It
showed that whereas able-bodied persons could traverse the highway safely by using
either the overpasses or the pelican crossings, PWDs who are the more vulnerable of
the two groups were limited to the Pelican crossings as the only medium for
traversing the major highway. The overpasses were constructed in such a way that
they were inaccessible to PWDs. At the foot of the overpasses, the initial step was so
high that a person with mobility impairment could not easily climb it and the railings
that could have supported their climb were absent at the ground level. Subsequent
steps were also unevenly spaced and too steep for such PWDs to use. Where railings
are located on the overpasses, these were not strong enough to support the weight of
an adult and were so widely spaced that young children with mobility impairments
were in danger of falling through. At the Pelican Crossings, the curbs did not facilitate
crossing by PWDs in wheel chairs. (These observations were confirmed in a Safety
Audit Report conducted by the Ghana Highway Authority on the Highway, which also
classified some of the defects as requiring immediate action.) Secondly, the pelican
crossings are so far apart from each other that the PWDs have the additional burden
of walking long distances just to be able to cross the highway from one side to the
other. This bad situation was worsened by the fact that most of the stops for
commercial vehicles (the usual means of transportation of PWDs) on the highway are
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far away from the pelican crossings. Thus, when a PWD alights from a commercial
vehicle but needs to traverse the road to reach her destination, she must walk a
further distance to reach a pelican crossing, cross the road before continuing her
journey. For these reasons the GFD issued a writ of summons at the High Court, Accra
(Human Rights Division) seeking, inter alia, an order compelling the defendants to
provide facilities to make the overpasses accessible to PWDs traversing the Highway
in compliance with Article 17 of the 1992 Constitution (non-discrimination clause)
and Act 715. 306

What is particularly interesting about the case is the absence of disability access to
the Human Rights courtroom. Thus the representative of the GFD who is mobilityimpaired frequently struggled up the stairs to the third floor where the Court is
located.307 In a sense, the absence of disability access to public buildings additionally
affects access to justice of PWDs in violation of Article 13 of the CRPD308, Article 29(5)
and (6) of Ghana’s Constitution309 and Section 5 of Ghana’s Disability Act310. Absence
The GFD issued a writ from the Human Rights Court; Ghana Federation of the Disabled v. AttorneyGeneral of Ghana, Ghana Highway Authority and Millennium Development Authority; Suit No. HRC 12/12
(Case on going.)
307 At some point in the proceedings the Judge directed that the representative of the GFD maybe
excused from appearing before the Court due to the absence of disability access to the courtroom.
308 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 13(1): “States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons
with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and ageappropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect
participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other
preliminary stages.” CRPD Article 13(2): “In order to help to ensure effective access to justice for
persons with disabilities, States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those working in the
field of administration of justice, including police and prison staff.
309 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 29(5): “In any judicial proceedings in which a disabled person
is a party, the legal procedure applied shall take his physical and mental condition into account.” Article
29(6): “As far as practicable, every place to which the public have access shall have appropriate
facilitates for disabled persons.”
310 PWD Act, supra note 243, Section 5: “Where a person with disability is a party in judicial
proceedings, the adjudicating body shall take into account the condition of the person with disability
306
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of disability access also creates a barrier for PWDs in the enjoyment of their right to
education, which is guaranteed under Article 24 of the CRPD311, Article 30 of Ghana’s
Constitution312 and Sections 16 and 17 of Ghana’s Disability Act.313 Baffoe (2013)
narrates the observations of a visually impaired student of the University of Ghana
(Ghana’s premier public university.)
“All the roads on this campus have open gutters beside them. There are no
pavements by the roadside so it is very difficult for those of us that are blind to walk
safely around the campus. Another difficulty I have is the stairs to climb to some of
the lecture halls that are on the second and third floors. There is no lift (elevator) in
the building so sometimes I get friends to carry me upstairs but this is difficult. When
I don’t get any people to carry me upstairs to the lecture hall, I don’t go to class. It is
as if the university is only for able-bodied persons.”314

Teachers in elementary public inclusive education remain prejudiced against CWDs
due to negative non-state customary laws about disability. The CRPD provides that
PWDs should be guaranteed the right to inclusive education at all levels, regardless
of age, without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity.315 Until recently,

and provide appropriate facilitate that enable the person with disability to participate effectively in
the proceedings.”
311 CRPD, supra note 16 Article 24 is on Education. It guarantees the rights of PWDs to education and
development, and mandates State parties to include PWDs in the policy of Free Compulsory Basic
Education and continuous education up to the tertiary level inclusively.
312 Constitution, supra note 80, Article 30: “A person who by reason of sickness or any other cause is
unable to give his consent shall not be deprived by any other person of medical treatment, education
or any other social or economic benefit by reason only of religious or other beliefs.
313 PWD Act, supra note 243, Sections 16 & 17 obligates a person who has custody of a CWD to enroll
that child in school or requires the Minister of Education to enact the appropriate legislation to ensure
the provision of appropriate facilities and equipment necessary for the successful education of CWDs.
314 Baffoe, supra note 294, at 194.
315 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 24.
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CWDs in Ghana were not inclusively educated. The change begun in 1962 when
Ghana’s education laws mandated inclusive education of children with moderate
disabilities in regular schools.316 Currently, the Constitution, the PWD Act and the
Policy of Inclusive Education collectively guarantee the right to inclusive education of
CWDs 317 based on certain guiding principles.318 Yet an overwhelming number of the
regular teachers are unwilling to teach CWDs inclusively; considering themselves
‘mentally unprepared’ to teach CWDs. 319 In the face of clear provisions in the CRPD
and Ghana’s legislation that CWDs have right to education,320 attitudes of teachers
influenced by cultural beliefs about disability suggest the contrary. Consequently,
CWDs complete the education cycle ill-equipped to participate in society, which
already does not expect their participation. Students who undergo specialized
education graduate with “non-functional” diplomas because society is unwilling to
employ them due to their disabilities.321

These three examples demonstrate the actual lived experience of PWDs in Ghana.
They show that although the CRPD, the Constitution of Ghana and the Disability Act
of Ghana guarantee their rights, those rights are undermined in Ghana, and PWDs are

Education Act of Ghana, supra note 243.
Constitution, supra note 80, Articles 25 & 29; PWD Act, supra note 243, sections 16, 17, 18, 20 & 21;
and Government of Ghana, Education Strategic Plan, 2010 – 2012, Vol. 1, Policies, Strategies, Delivery,
Finance; Ministry of Education, February 2012; items 2.2.5 and 2.3.4.
318 Education Plan, supra note 317, at 17
319 C Obeng ‘Teacher’s view on the teaching of children with disabilities in Ghanaian classrooms’ (2007)
No. 1 International Journal of Special Education 96 101: In a 2006 survey conducted by the author, 80%
of the respondent teachers said they would be unwilling to teach CWDs even if they were given the
requisite training and the children were placed in a separate classroom, away from the regular
students.
320 CRPD, supra note 16, Article 24; and PWD Act, supra note 243, section 16.
321 Baffoe, supra note 293, at 194.
316
317
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not given equal rights as other people within the state who do not have disabilities.
PWDs are denied their right to education, to participate in cultural activities or to
marry and found a family because a person with disability is considered to have a bad
bloodline.

From the actual lived experiences of PWDs in Ghana, the disability rights guaranteed
by the CRPD, the Constitution of Ghana and the Disability Act of Ghana, are
undermined by non-state norms in Ghana. These non-state norms are founded on
deep-rooted stigma based on which people do not give PWDs equal rights as other
people without disabilities.

State actors have employed methods such as legislation criminalizing violations of
disability rights and formal statements to discourage violations of the rights of PWDs
and encourage the inclusion of PWDs in social life. Inclusive education is being
encouraged in mainstream public schools and state actors frequently educate the
general public that PWDs are capable of being useful to their communities. In
particular, the methods are aimed at bringing non-state norms in conformity with the
international norms on disability. These methods employed by the state actors reflect
the universalism approach that the CRPD committee encourages State Parties to use
in meeting their obligations under the treaty, yet they have not changed violations of
the rights of PWDs in Ghana.
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Non-state actors use customary laws to justify violations of the rights of PWDs.
Customary law prohibits certain contacts with PWDs by individuals and by the
community and there are dire consequences attached to the non-observance of these
laws as demonstrated above. For instance, the customary law is that when a child is
born with disabilities he or she must be killed. When the community fails to observe
this law, the effect is that the community itself may be annihilated.

Again, as discussed earlier, customary law is valid law in Ghana. But Ghana’s
Constitution provides that such laws that do not reflect the letter and spirit of the
Constitution are invalid. Thus, in a sense, customary law that violates the right to life
of PWDs, which is guaranteed under the Constitution of Ghana is invalid law and
would be struck down if challenged in Court. Interestingly, non-state actors who
implement such customary laws are blissfully oblivious to court decisions and deepseated stigma against disability operating at the non-state level does not change
through community education,322 enactment of state legislation criminalizing
violations of the rights of PWDs323 or even the expression of one’s intention.324 For
instance, Ghanaians have been receiving education for a long time now about the need
not to stigmatize PWDs. Ghana has enacted many laws criminalizing violations of the
rights of PWDs and even politicians and other national leaders have spoken about the

Law and Development Associates, Aligning the Mental Health Bill of Ghana to the Convention on the
rights of Persons With Disability Act, Project Report, (May 2012) 12.
323 Christine Buamah, ‘State Conformity to International Human Rights Norms: The Acculturation
Approach,’ LLM paper, 2014. In this paper I explain how criminalizing of certain conducts of non-state
actors are unable to deter them from their acts because those methods do not reflect their
intersubjective knowledge of the issues.
324 Law and Development Associates, Ghana, supra note 322, at 9 “expression of intention is not enough
to go round this deep-seated social problem.”
322
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need to respect the rights of PWDs. Yet the disconnect between the state laws and
efforts and the customary laws against disability remains because the methods been
used have not been targeted to respond to Ghana’s legal pluralistic context.

As a result a Ghanaian intellectual will still refuse to allow marriage between his
daughter and a man who was previously mentally-ill but has now recovered and is
economically independent. That intellectual maybe living and working in the urban
area but will likely cite possible objections from his extended family in the rural area
against the suitor’s history of mental illness as the excuse for violating the PWDs right
to marry. The intellectual will likely present himself as powerless to change the
customary rules of his extended family in the rural area about disability and since
marriage in the Ghanaian sense is the coming together of families, would yield to the
overarching rules of the wider family.

Unless targeted actions are taken to connect these systems of law, the state may
continue to make laws protecting the rights of PWDs as required by the CRPD, judges
may make decisions invalidating customary laws that violate the rights of and state
agencies may undertake all the education they want (all these in compliance with the
universalism approach advocated by the CRPD committee), but non-state actors will
continue violating the rights of PWDs because those state laws will not change nonstate actions.
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5.3 APPROACHES USED IN THE CRPD
IMPLEMENTATION IN GHANA
The CRPD requires Ghana to protect the rights of PWDs in Ghana by taking
administrative, legislative and judicial measures. To comply with this, Ghana has
enacted domestic legislation protecting the rights of PWDs and there is an
administrative policy requiring that 2% of the District Assembly Common Fund be
set aside for PWDs to use start or establish small-scale businesses.325 These steps
meet the requirement for all State Parties to the CRPD, yet they do not achieve the
expected result of improved respect for the rights of PWDs.

A cultural relative approach would not work either to improve disability rights in
Ghana. Presently, chiefs and other non-state actors claim that they are justified in
violating the rights of PWDs because their actions are consistent with their cultural
beliefs and their customary laws; and customary law is guaranteed under the
Constitution of Ghana. However, the Constitution of Ghana invalidates customary law
which is inconsistent with the Constitution. Therefore since the Constitution protects
the rights of PWDs, customary law that violates the rights of PWDs is not guaranteed
by the Constitution.

Republic of Ghana, District Assembly Common Fund: The Common Fund Newsletter, Issue 2,
(December 2014). Available at http://www.commonfund.gov.gh/Final%20DACF.pdf (last visited on
24 March 2018.)
325
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5.4 THEORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IMPLEMENTATION IN AFRICAN STATES WITH
LEGAL PLURALISM
My theory for the successful implementation of international human rights norms in
African states with legal pluralistic contexts is that the African state must first adopt
the international human rights norm, then enact domestic legislation that reflects all
the varied domestic manifestation of the issue and finally create an interface between
non-state actors and state actors that allows for the frequent update of state and nonstate laws or policy to reflect the international human right norm.

5.5 APPLICATION OF THE THEORY TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRPD IN GHANA
I will now apply my theory to the CRPD in Ghana’s legal pluralistic context to see if it
would improve Ghana’s domestication of international disability norms.

First, Ghana will need to adopt the overarching principle of protecting the rights of
PWDs. This first step has already been accomplished because Article 29 of the 1992
Constitution of Ghana guarantees the rights of PWDs and is consistent with the
principles embodied in the CRPD. The Mental Health Law of Ghana, 2012, Act 846
contains provisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities and these
provisions are also consistent with the overarching principles embodied in the CRPD.

196

The second step requires the development of a context specific policy or legal
instrument to guide the implementation of the overarching principle. This
instrument, like Ghana’s child and family welfare policy, must be fit for the specific
context of Ghana. To meet this second step, Ghana will need to develop a disability
policy that relates with the cultural beliefs of the people and at the same time protects
the rights of PWDs. The policy must make use of cultural structures that people can
identify with such as chiefs. For instance, it is culturally unacceptable for chiefs to
permit blind persons into their court. If a chief accepts a blind person or a person with
mental disabilities into his or her court, it would send a specific message straight to
the targeted constituency (non-state actors) the blind persons or persons with mental
disability are no longer outcasts.

The third step requires the creation of an interface where responses from non-state
actors about the implementation of the law or policy are transmitted to the states
actors and vice-versa; thereby creating opportunity for the modification of local
customary laws and practices to make them more responsive to the state’s
obligations under the CRPD and the modification of State laws and policy to make
them more suitable to the local cultural contexts.

To meet this goal, existing bodies working in the field of disability rights such as the
Ghana Federation of the Disabled (GFD) should expand their membership to include
non-state actors whose actions have the potential of violating the rights of PWDs such
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as soothsayers; and state actors who need to be more directly informed about what
works best for the disability community such as a representative of the department
of roads and highways and a Member of Parliament (MP). Thus for instance in the
construction of roads, the state would receive direct feedback from the GFD on
whether there is sufficient provision made for the use of the road by PWDs and
soothsayers would receive direct evidence PWDs can achieve just as much with their
lives as persons without disabilities. The soothsayers on such bodies would in turn
be able to tell other soothsayers where they have been wrong in judging PWDs and
their messages would be more targeted and maximize outcomes in terms of
behavioral change among their colleagues. At the same time the soothsayers would
be able give helpful feedback to the GFD on advocacy techniques that would be most
efficient and inform the MP of what law would work and those that would not.

5.6 WILL THE THEORY HELP TO IMPROVE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRPD IN GHANA
The theory would help improve the domestication of the CPRD in Ghana because it
assembles the necessary actors whose actions can improve the rights of PWDs in
Ghana and assigns interactive roles for them. Whereas universalism has the effect of
sidelining non-state actors, and cultural relativism has the effect of sidelining stateactors, cultural pluralism misses the interactive aspect of the roles that state and nonstate actors are supposed to play. I believe that once these actors interact, it would
break down barriers of stigma and superstition as well as unrealistic laws, and the
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acceptance and enforcement of the rights of PWDs would only be a matter of course
because it would bring “home” the concept of the rights of PWDs down to the basic
level of the ordinary Ghanaian who can.

5.7 DOES THIS CULTURAL PLURALISM THEORY
HAVE ENOUGH TRACTION IN OTHER AREAS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION SUCH AS WOMEN’S RIGHTS?
To answer this question I will apply my theory to the implementation of CEDAW in
Zimbabwe to find out whether what I know would improve the implementation of the
CRPD and CRC in Ghana would also improve the implementation of the CEDAW in
Zimbabwe.

When Zimbabwe attained independence from Britain in 1980 it immediately signed
and ratified many international human rights laws in fulfillment of her “responsibility
to protect” citizens under international law.326 Immediately after independence, the
Zimbabwean government established a Ministry of Community development and
Women’s Affairs as the national machinery for the advancement of women in all
spheres of life.327 Zimbabwe acceded to the CEDAW in May 1991.328 “As from 1994, a

Torque Mude, The History of International Human Rights Law in Zimbabwe, Journal of Social
Welfare and Human Rights, Vol. 2 No. 1, 53-86, 57 (March 2014.)
327 The exact ministry in charge of women’s issues in Zimbabwe has changed over time.
328 Initial state report of Zimbabwe to CEDAW Committee, Core Document, the Convention and
Zimbabwe, page 8.
326
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focal point was established in other Ministries…for ensuring that policies of their
respective Ministries are gender sensitive.”329 In the case of Ghana, the country
attained independence in March 1957 and eagerly joined the international
community signing and ratifying many international laws. Ghana was the first
country to ratify the CRC in February 1990. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana devoted
an entire chapter to Fundamental human rights and freedoms including children’s
rights.330 Subsequently the Children’s Act of Ghana, 1998, Act 560 came into force.
These accounts show that both State Parties make commitments to the international
human rights laws and follow up with domestic commitments to protect those rights;
showing that in both African states there is a willingness of state actors to implement
international human rights. The cultural pluralism theory the worked in Ghana’s CRC
and CRPD requires the adoption of the international human rights norm, followed by
domestic legal or policy framework towards the enforcement of that international
norm. Zimbabwe has performed these first two requirements. The additional third
requirement of the new cultural pluralism theory is the creation of an interface where
responses from non-state actors about the implementation of the state law or policy
are transmitted to the state actors and vice-versa; thereby creating opportunity for
the modification of local customary laws and practices to make them more responsive
to the state’s obligations under the international law and the modification of State
laws and policy to make them more suitable to the local cultural contexts. This is
something that Zimbabwe can easily achieve. Zimbabwe, like Ghana, is a legal

329
330

Initial state report, supra note 328, at 9.
Constitution, supra note 80
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pluralistic state where non-state actors make and enforce non-state laws including
customary laws. Both Zimbabwe and Ghana are patriarchal societies331 and the men
enforce these customary laws over women and children in similar fashion,
particularly in their rural communities. State actors can create the interface with such
non-state actors so that international norms of the rights of women can be introduced
into the customary laws of Zimbabwe through these non-actors and at the same time
customary law knowledge on how best to protect the rights of women within their
context is also passed to state actors to be used in formulating more fitting state laws
and policy. This additional step will help improve the protection of women’s rights in
Zimbabwe because at the sub-group level, the leaders will know the international
norms on women’s rights and due to the constant interaction with the state actors,
they will be encouraged to implement those norms. At the state level, state laws and
policy will receive inputs that will ensure that they are so distant from the actual lived
experiences of people. So that, for instance, state laws that require registration before
recognizing a valid customary law marriage as a marriage, would change. I therefore
find that that the retrofitted version of the cultural pluralism theory has traction in
women’s rights protection in Zimbabwe as it does in disability rights and children’s
rights protection in Ghana.

Initial state report, supra 328; Felicia Safoa Odame, Ghanaian traditional women leaders and
sustainable development: The case of Nadowli district of Ghana, European Scientific Journal, May 2014
edition, Vol. 10, No. 14, ISSN:1857-7881.
331
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Secondly, according to Zimbabwe’s initial state report to the CEDAW Committee, a
large percentage of Zimbabwean women live in the rural communities.332 In Ghana
about 70% of the population dwells in the rural areas.333 Since about 36.5% of the
population of Ghana consists of children aged 15years and below334, we can say that
at least half of the children in Ghana live in rural areas. In rural areas in both
Zimbabwe and Ghana, customary law is the main law that governs the lives of people
although both countries have state laws. Therefore the distance between the situation
of children in Ghana and women in Zimbabwe is not too far—in both cases their lives
are ordered according to customary law. It is therefore critical that a successful
theory for improving children’s rights in Ghana and women’s rights in Zimbabwe
shows how the international human rights norms can be introduced into customary
law. Since my theory of cultural pluralism succeeded in showing how international
norms on children’s rights were introduced into customary law in Ghana and resulted
in improvement in children’s rights in Ghana; it is likely to also succeed in introducing
international norms on women’s rights into the customary law in Zimbabwe to help
improve women’s rights in Zimbabwe.

Thirdly, as was discovered in the case study of the CEDAW in Zimbabwe, the
customary law on the rights of women upon the dissolution of their marriages gave

Initial state report, supra 328, 8: “The 1992 census figures indicate that a very large percentage of
women are based in the rural areas and are in one way or the other connected with or involved in
agriculture.”
333 Ghana-UNICEF Inequality Briefing, Inequality in Ghana: A Fundamental National Challenge, Briefing
Paper, (April 2014) 3.
334 Ghana Population, available at http://countrymeters.info/en/Ghana#age_structure (last visited on
28 March 2018).
332

202

actual protection of the rights of such women, which is consistent with the
overarching aim of CEDAW. This is because customary laws recognized women
whose marriages were unregistered as married and therefore entitled to all the
incidents of marriage whereas the state laws did not recognize such women as
married and therefore not entitled to a share of the marital property upon the
dissolution of the marriage. Similarly customary laws on the rights of children in
Ghana had the effect of giving more protection to the rights of children in Ghana as
required by the CRC unlike the effect of state laws. This is because customary laws
have the effect of requiring the entire resources of the community to be used to
protect the children whereas the state laws limit the resources to be used for the
children’s rights protection to that of the family. For instance in most rural
communities, any other member of the community can feed a hungry child. Such
customary laws ensure that a more robust system for child welfare protection.
Consequently since the actual customary laws on Women’s rights in Zimbabwe and
Children’s rights in Ghana are not too far away from the international human rights
laws—CEDAW and CRC—the cultural pluralism theory that worked for the CRC in
Ghana can also help improve the CEDAW in Zimbabwe.

Based on the above, my theory of cultural pluralism has enough traction in other
sectors of international human rights such as women’s rights in Zimbabwe.
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5.8 CONCLUSION

The situation of PWDs in Ghana is far-removed from what is expected from a stateparty to the CRPD. The above analysis shows that to improve the rights of PWDs in
Ghana, specific solutions targeted at non-state actors will be needed and my theory
offers such a solution.

My theory for the successful implementation of international human rights in African
states with legal pluralism involves the creation of an interface for state and non-state
actors to interact. In practical terms, it makes use of indigenous resources at the nonstate level to help domesticate the international human rights norms. This is the
additional step to the cultural pluralism approach that would bring the international
norms on disability rights to the level of the ordinary Ghanaian and make it easy for
him to accept that PWDs have rights in the society and so he must conduct himself in
such ways as not to violate those rights. The interface is also the step that would help
state actors formulate more robust legal and policy framework for disability rights
protection in Ghana.

In this chapter I have additionally demonstrated that my theory is not limited to
disability rights but has traction in other sectors of international human rights such
as women’s rights in African states with legal pluralism.
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Therefore in conclusion, this chapter has established that my theory will help
improve the implementation of international human rights in African states with legal
pluralism.
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6 CHAPTER SIX:
CONCLUSION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In this concluding chapter to my dissertation, I am going to summarize the
dissertation and show the original contribution that my work makes to legal
knowledge.

6.2 SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION

6.2.1 Summary of Thesis
African State Parties to international human rights treaties are frequently accused of
poorly implementing the treaties. My thesis is that the reason for this state of affairs
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is that prevailing approaches to implementing international human rights treaties
(universalism and cultural relativism) do not factor in legal pluralism into those
approaches. The cultural pluralism approach however factors in legal pluralism but
in order to achieve a more sustainable implementation of human rights treaty, I add
a third step to the cultural pluralism approach—the creation of an interface, which
will ensure that the customary law and state law, are updated frequently as the state
works towards implementing the international human rights norms.

6.2.2 Summary of Research Method
This dissertation was borne of mainly library research. It answered the following
research question: First, what are the prevailing approaches to implementation of
international human rights in Africa? Second, what is legal pluralism, and why is it
important to factor it into any approach to implementing international human rights
law in Africa? Third, how has this factoring-in been done and what were the
outcomes? And fourth, can the outcomes of the third research question be applied to
the CRPD in Ghana?

The dissertation employed case studies in the examination of the human rights treaty
implementation. In all three case studies were undertaken: case study of the
implementation of the CEDAW in Zimbabwe; case study of the implementation of the
CRC in Ghana and case study of the implementation of the CRPD in Ghana. After the
CEDAW and CRC case studies, I developed my theory for implementation of human
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rights treaties in African states with legal pluralism and assessed its applicability to
the CRPD in Ghana.

6.2.3 Outcome of Research

The outcome of my research is that my theory will help improve the implementation
of international human rights in African states with legal pluralism. My theory of what
would help improve the implementation of human rights in African states with legal
pluralism is that the African state must first adopt the international human rights
norm and use indigenous methods available at the sub-group level to achieve the
international norm; then the state must enact domestic legislation that reflects all the
varied domestic manifestation of the issue; and finally the state must create an
interface between non-state actors and state actors that allows for the frequent
update of state and non-state laws or policy to reflect the international human right
norm.

6.3 CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL KNOWLEDGE

My work demonstrates the complex effect of legal pluralism on the implementation
of international human rights in African states and presents a theory for achieving
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improvement in the implementation of international human rights in African states
when legal pluralism is present.

6.4 CONCLUSION

International human rights are intended to be implemented. So far, three main
approaches have been suggested to State Parties to be used in implementing
international human rights treaties. These approaches are the universalism
approach, the cultural relativism approach and the cultural pluralism approach. In
this dissertation I have shown that the situation of legal pluralism in African states
changes the dynamics of state implementation of international human rights norms
and therefore an approach that does not account for legal pluralism will not succeed
in improving the implementation of international human rights.

Consequently, through a case study of women’s rights in Zimbabwe, I found that
although the cultural pluralism approach accounts for legal pluralism it is missing an
additional step which would bring the international human rights norm to the level
of the ordinary person and help improve the implementation of the human rights
treaty. I further found that Ghana’s application of the cultural pluralism approach to
the implementation of children’s rights accounts for the additional step that helps
introduce the international norms on the rights of the child to the non-state level.
Based on this knowledge I developed a theory of what would help improve
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implementation of human rights in African states with legal pluralism and tested my
theory with the case of disability rights in Ghana to determine whether it would help
improve disability rights in Ghana and it did.

6.5 BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. BOOKS
1. ALLOT, A., THE LIMITS OF THE LAW (Butterworths, 1980) 197.
2. CRANSTON, M. W., WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (Bodley Head, 1973).
3. HART, H. L. A., THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (Oxford University Press, 1961.)
4. HELLUM, A., WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFRICA: MIXED NORMS

AND IDENTITIES IN INFERTILITY MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE 30 (Tano Aschehoug,
1999).
5. KELSEN, H., GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Trans. A. Wedberg, 1949)
6. LOUIS, H., et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 397 (2nd ed. Foundation Press, 2009.)
7. MENSKI, W., COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ASIA AND

AFRICA, (2nd ed., Cambridge)
8. RAFTOPOULOUS, B., & MLAMBO, A., BECOMING ZIMBABWE: A HISTORY FROM THE PRE-

COLONIAL PERIOD TO 2008, (Weaver Press, 2009)
9. RICHARDSON H. J., III, THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN INTERESTS IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 22, 23 (2008)

210

10. ROUVEROY VAN NIEUWAAl, E. A. B. VAN, AND Z. W., eds., SOVEREIGNTY, LEGITIMACY, AND

POWER IN WEST AFRICAN SOCIETIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY, (Lit
Verlag, 1998):
11. SARBAH, J. M., FANTI CUSTOMARY LAWS (London: William Clowes & Sons Limited,

1903)
12. SIMMONS, B., MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC

POLITICS, (Cambridge University Press, 2009)
13. TAMANAHA, B. Z., A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (Oxford University

Press, 2001)

B. ARTICLES, PAPERS AND REPORTS
14. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Indigenous Peoples in Africa:

The Forgotten Peoples? The African Commission’s work on indigenous peoples in
Africa (2006)
15. Agbenyega, J. S., The power of labelling discourse in the construction of disability in

Ghana, A paper presented at the Australian Association for Research in Education
Conference, New Castle, Assocation of Active Educational Researchers (AARE),
Volume 16, (2003/12).
16. Anas Aremeyaw Anas, Report on the killing of spirit children in Ghana,

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2013/01/20131912
1124284358.html

211

17. Ajayi A. J. F., The Continuity of African Institutions under Colonialism in T.O. Ranger,

ed., EMERGING THEMES OF AFRICAN HISTORY 189, 195 (East Africa Pub House,
1968).
18. Archampong, E. A., Marital Rape, a women’s equality issue in Ghana, 2 (2010)
19. Asante, L. A., and Sasu, A., The Persons with Disability Act, 2006 (Act 715) of The

Republic of Ghana: The Law, Omissions and Recommendations Law, Journal of Law,
Policy and Globalization Vol. 36, 2015.
20. Atuguba, R. A., Ghana @ 50 Colonised and Happy, in GHANA LAW SINCE

INDEPENDENCE, HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS CONSTITUTION,
(Henrietta J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu et al., ed., Black Mask for Faculty of Law University
of Ghana, Legon, 2007).
21. Atuguba, R. A., Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)

Executive Master of Arts Degree in Conflict, Peace and Security (EMCPS 2) 2017 –
2018 Academic year. Lecture 1
22. Atuguba, R. A., “Seven Phases in the Evolution of Customary Law in Africa:

Signposts from Ghana,” Lancaster University of Ghana, 2nd Colloquium on Law for
Development: “Almost 100% of marriages in Ghana are (first) celebrated or
wholly or partially performed according to the rules of customary law.
23. Avoke, M., Models of disability in the labelling and attitudinal discourse in Ghana

(2002) 17 Disability and society 769, 773.
24. Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1781)

212

25. Baffoe, M., Stigma, discrimination & marginalization: Gateways to oppression

persons with disabilities in Ghana, West Africa 3(1) Journal of Education and Social
Research, (2013).
26. Betham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (18th Ed.,

London, W. Pickering 1823)
27. Bilyeu, A. S., Trokosi, The practice of Sexual slavery in Ghana: Religious and Cultural

Freedom vs Human Rights, IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 9:2, 457 (1999)
28. Buamah, Christine ‘State Conformity to International Human Rights Norms: The

Acculturation Approach, LLM paper.
29. Cerna, C. M., Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation

of Human Rights in Different socio-cultural contexts, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 740, 741
(1994.)
30. The Constitution Review Commission of Ghana, Report of the Constitution Review

Commission of Ghana, From a political to a developmental Constitution, December
2011.
31. Dañino,

R.,

World

Bank.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/2145761139604306966/20817148/CustomaryLawGhana120505.pdf
32. Donnelly, J., Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, Human Rights

Quarterly, Vol. 6 No. 4, 400-419 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Nov., 1984.)
33. Eskay, M., et al., Disability within the African culture, US – China Education

Review 473 - 484 (2012)

213

34. Ezeanya-Esiobu,

C.,

TED

Talk

2007

https://www.ted.com/talks/chika_ezeanya_esiobu_how_africa_can_use_its_tradi
tional_knowledge_to_make_progress
35. Fallers, L., The Predicament of Modern African Chief: An instance from Uganda,

American Anthropologist, Vol. 57, 290; 295 (1955)
36. Gedzi, V., “Principles and Practices of Dispute Resolution in Ghana: Ewe and Akan

Procedures on Females Inheritance and Property Rights” PhD thesis,
International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The
Hague,

Netherlands,

(2009)

109-111,

available

online:

repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32640/90-423-0372-7 DOK%5B1%5D.pdf
37. Ghana-UNICEF Inequality Briefing, Inequality in Ghana: A Fundamental National

Challenge, Briefing Paper – April 2014, p3
38. Ghana Federation of Disability Organizations, News Commentary on the tenth

Anniversary of the Disability Act 715, Its Impact on the Lives of Persons With
Disabilities by Yaw Ofori Debrah, National President of the Ghana Federation of
Disability

Organisations

https://www.facebook.com/gfdghana/posts/333987956943420
39. Goodman R. and Jinks, D., How to Influence States: Socialization and International

Human Rights Law, 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 642 (2004)
40. Griffiths, A., Pursuing Legal Pluralism: The Power of Paradigms in a Global World,

The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 43: 64, 173 – 202 (2013).
41. Griffiths, J., What is legal pluralism? Journal of Legal Pluralism 24, 1 (1986).

214

42. Guerts K. L., and Adikah E. G., Enduring and Endearing Feelings and the

Transformation of Material Culture in West Africa in E Edwards et al; (eds)
SENSIBLE OBJECTS: COLONIALISM MUSEUMS AND MATERIAL CULTURE (2006)
43. Hammond, A. F., “Towards an Inclusive Vision of Law Reform and Legal Pluralism

in Ghana, PhD thesis, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, (2016),
available online: http://docplayer.net/48486835-Towards-an-inclusive-visionof-law-reform-and-legal-pluralism-in-ghana-ama-fowa-hammond-a-thesissubmitted-in-partial-fulfilment-of-the-requirements.html
44. Ibhawoh, B., Restraining Universalism: Africanist Perspectives on Cultural

Relativism in the Human Rights Discourse in HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, (Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and Philip J. McConnaughay eds.,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 22.
45. Initial state report of Zimbabwe to CEDAW Committee, Core Document, the

Convention and Zimbabwe.
46. International Labour Organization and the African Commission on Human and

People’s Rights, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Kenya, Country Report of the
Research Project (2009).
47. International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association: Kirichenko

K. United Nations Treaty Bodies: References to sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender expression and sex characteristics, 2016 (Geneva: ILGA, November 2017)
48. Koh, H. H. Transnational legal process, 75 Nebraska Law Review 181 (1996)

215

49. Kutsoati, E., and Morck, R., Family Ties, Inheritance Rights, and Successful Poverty

Alleviation: Evidence from Ghana, NBER Working Paper No. 18080, 23-24 (2012).
Available at www.nber.org/papers/w18080
50. Kyei, T. E., Marriage and Divorce Among the Asante: A study undertaken in the

course of the Ashanti Social Survey, Cambridge African Monographs 14 (1945),
“Death of a spouse,” 76.
51. Larbi, W. O., Ghana’s Land Admin Project: Accomplishments, Impact and the way

ahead, Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, 2011, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Resources/4754951302790806106/GOV5Pres2Larbi.pdf
52. Law and Development Associates, Aligning the Mental Health Bill of Ghana to the

Convention on the rights of Persons With Disability Act, Project Report, May 2012.
53. Logan. C., Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief co-

exist? Afrobarometer working Paper No. 93, February 2008.
54. Matua, W. M., The Ideology of Human Rights, Virginia Journal of International Law

36 (1996.)
55. Matua W. M., Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42

HARV. INT’L L. J. 201, 204 (2001).
56. Mensah, O., et al Strengthening the disability movement in Ghana through

organizational capacity and advocacy: Contextual analysis of the disability
situation in Ghana (2008) v http://www.gfdgh.org/Context%20analysis.pdf
57. Merry, S. E., Legal Pluralism, Law and Society Review, Vol. 22 No. 5 869-896,

870(1988)
216

58. Mude, T., The History of International Human Rights Law in Zimbabwe, Journal of

Social Welfare and Human Rights, March 2014, Vol. 2 No. 1, 53-86, 57.
59. Munyi, C. W., ‘Past and Present Perceptions towards disability: a historical

Perspective’ (2012) http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3197/3068
60. Ndulo, M., African customary law, customs, and women’s rights (2011) Indiana

Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 18:Iss. 1, Art. 5.
61. Obeng, C. Teacher’s view on the teaching of children with disabilities in Ghanaian

classrooms No. 1 International Journal of Special Education 96, 101 (2007).
62. Odame, F. S., Ghanaian traditional women leaders and sustainable development:

The case of Nadowli district of Ghana, European Scientific Journal,
63. Okeke, C. N., The Use of International Law in the domestic Courts of Ghana and

Nigeria, 32 Ariz. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 371, 381 (2015).
64. Okupa, E., International bibliography of African customary law ius non scriptum,

Hamburg (Lit verlag).
65. Pantoja, A. et al., Towards the Development of Theory: Cultural Pluralism Redefined,

The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 4 Issue 1, Article 11, 130-131
(1976).
66. Population and Housing census of Ghana, summary report of final results, 12

(Ghana Statistical Service, 2012)
67. Ray, D. I., Divided Sovereignty: Traditional Authority and the State in Ghana, Journal

of legal pluralism 1996, 12.
68. Ray, D. I. and Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E. A. B. van., The New Relevance of

Traditional Authorities in Africa: The Conference; Major Themes; Reflections on
217

Chieftaincy in Africa; Future Directions, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial
Law, The Ghana Conference, Vol. 37-38 (1996)
69. Republic of Ghana, District Assembly Common Fund: The Common Fund

Newsletter,

Issue

2,

(December

2014).

Available

at

http://www.commonfund.gov.gh/Final%20DACF.pdf (last visited on 24 March
2018.)
70. Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E. A. B. van., States and Chiefs: Are Chiefs Mere Puppets?

Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, Issue No. 37-38 (1996)
71. Sorrell, K., Cultural Pluralism and International Rights, 10 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l

369, 371 (2002)
72. Skalnik, P., Authority Versus Power: Democracy in Africa Must Include original

African Institutions, Journal of Legal Pluralism, (1996)
73. Slikker J. ‘Attitudes towards Persons with disability in Ghana’ (2009) 15.
74. Tamanaha, B., Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,

Sydney Law Review Vol. 30, 375, 377 (2007)
75. Tamanaha, B. Z., The Folly of the “Social Scientific” concept of Legal Pluralism,

Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 20 No. 2 (1993).
76. Teson, F. R., ‘International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism’ 25 Va. J. Int’l L.

869 (1985)
77. The Law, Omissions and Recommendations Law, Journal of Law, Policy and

Globalization Vol. 36, 2015;

218

78. Tomlins, C. and Comaroff, John “Law as…” Theory and Practice in Legal History,

available

at

http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/Vol1No3Articles/TomlinsandComaroff.pdf
79. UNICEF, Early Marriage: A Harmful Traditional Practice (A statistical exploration),

(UNICEF,

2005),

available

at

http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Early_Marriage_12.lo.pdf
80. UNICEF, Promoting the Rights of Children with Disabilities, Innocenti Digest No.

13, 2007.
81. Vanderlinden, J., Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty years later, The Journal of Legal

Pluralism, Vol. 21, Iss. 28, (1989).
82. Vanderlinden, J., Le pluralism juridique: essai de synthese in JOHN GILISSEN (ed.), LE

PLURALISME JURIDIQUE, (Universite de Bruxelles).

C. STATUTE AND CASE LAW
83. 1957 Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council adopted by the British Parliament
84. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1969
85. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979
86. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992
87. Children’s Act of Ghana, 1998, Act 560
88. Courts Act of Ghana, 1993, Act 459
89. Courts Ordinance, Cap 4 (1951 Rev)
90. Criminal Code of Ghana, 1960, Act 29
91. Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law, PNDC Law 112.

219

92. Education Act of Ghana, 2008, Act 778
93. Government of Ghana, Education Strategic Plan, 2010 – 2012, Vol. 1, Policies,

Strategies, Delivery, Finance. Ministry of Education, February 2012.
94. Intestate Succession Law of Ghana, 1985, PNDC Law 111
95. Land Title Registration Act, P.N.D.C.L. 152
96. Marriages Act of Ghana, 1884-1985, CAP 125;
97. Matrimonial Causes Act of Ghana, 1971 (Act 367)
98. Matrimonial Causes Act of Zimbabwe, Acts 33/1985, 11/1987, 18/1989 (s.38),

2/1990, 6/2000 (s.151.)
99. Mental Health Act of Ghana, Act 846, 2012 (Mental Act)
100.

The Chiefs’ Act of Kenya, Chapter 128 of the Laws of Kenya.

101.

The Chiefs Act of Zambia, Chapter 287 of the Laws of Zambia

102.

The Child and Family Welfare Policy of Ghana, February 2015, available at the

official website of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection, Ghana
http://mogcsp.gov.gh/policies/
103.

Manual for the Child and Family Welfare Policy

104.

Regulations for the Child and Family Welfare Policy of Ghana, 2015, 23 at 1.3

105.

Re Canfor: Canfor v Kpodo [1968] GLR 177

106.

Owusu v Agyepong [1971] 1 GLR 56

107.

Whittaker v Choiteram [1971] 2 GLR 267

108.

Youhana v Abboud [1974] 2 GLR 201 CA

109.

In re Larbi (deceased) Larbi v Larbi [1977] 2 GLR 5

110.

King v Elliot [1972] 1 GLR 54 CA
220

111.

Yirenkyi v Sakyi [1991] 1 GLR 217

112.

Dr. Owusu Afriyie Akoto v Adwoa Abrefi [2011] 1 SCGLR 533

113.

Oyewumi v. Ogunesan, Judgment delivered on Friday the 4th of May 1990 in

the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
114.

Lewis v. Bankole [1908] 1 NLR 81, 100-01 (Nigeria.)

115.

Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd v Attorney General [2005-2006] SCGLR 271

116.

Martin Amidu v Attorney-General, Isofoton & Forson [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR

167
117.

New Patriotic party v Inspector General of Police (1993-94) 2 GLR 459

118.

The case of Re Akoto and Nine Others

D. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION
119.

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AFCHR)

120.

OHCHR Website: State Party reports of all state parties to all the UN Human

Rights

treaties:

http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=
en
121.

OHCHR Website: Status of ratification interactive dashboard at the website of

the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR)
http://indicators.ohchr.org/

221

122.

OHCHR Website: Link to the Reports of the Committee on the rights of the child

on Ghana at the website of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=
en&TreatyID=5&TreatyID=10&TreatyID=11&DocTypeID=5
123.

OHCHR Website: Link to the Core international human rights instruments,

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
124.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN List of Least

Developed

Countries,

available

at

http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-listof-Least-Developed-Countries.aspx
125.

United Nations Treaty Collection

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV8&chapter=4&lang=en#1
126.

UN Women, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment

of Women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm
127.

United Nations Division for Social Policy and Development Disability

https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rightsof-persons-with-disabilities.html
128.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

(CEDAW),

Text

available

at

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
129.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Text available at

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
222

130.

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Article 4(1)(b.)

Text

of

the

CRPD

is

available

at

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
131.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Adopted by UN General

Assembly 217A (III) of 10 December 1948 in Paris during the 183rd plenary
meeting.

Available

at

OHCHR

website

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx
132.

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World

Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. Available at OHCHR
website

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx

(Last visited on 21 January 2018)
133.

Definition

of

Cultural

Identity,

available

at

https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=what+is+cultural+identity&*
134.

Definition of Soothsayer:

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/soothsayer
135.

Definition,

Reception

of

international

law

http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195389777.001.0
001/acref- ((la9780195389777-e-1896
136.

BBC News Report, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe resigns, ending 37year rule,’ 21

November

2017,

available

at

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-

42071488

223

137.

Myjoyonline,

Child

marriage

in

Ghana,

http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/March-7th/traditional-rulersinstitute-fines-to-stem-child-marriage.php
138.

Myjoyonline, Mental health in Ghana, Interview of Dr. Akwasi Osei, 10 October

2014

http://www.myjoyonline.com/lifestyle/2014/October-10th/resource-

constraints-may-force-shutdown-of-mental-facilities.php (last visited on 24
March 2018)
139.

The National Mirror, President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and the Mallams

http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/boko-haram-jonathan-invites-senegalesemallams-for-prayers/
140.

The Guardian Newspaper,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/ebola-cremation-rulingsecret-burials-liberia
141.

The

Guardian

Newspaper

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/south-africa-xenophobicviolence-migrants-workforce
142.

Time, http://time.com/3478238/ebola-liberia-burials-cremation-burned/

143.

Malawi, http://mwnation.com/22-malawi-chiefs-demoted/

144.

Ghana, http://countrymeters.info/en/Ghana#age_structure

145.

Algeria http://www.handicap-international.us/algeria

146.

Quran 4:3 & Quran 4:11

224

147.

Catholics in Africa

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/12/catholic-churchafrica/1963171/
148.

Baylor University, http://www.baylor.edu/mlc/index.php?id=11594

149.

Baylor University, Modern Languages & Culture, Division of Asian and African

Languages, http://www.baylor.edu/mlc/index.php?id=11594

225

